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INTRODUCTION
Class actions, to borrow a phrase from the perhaps accidental legal
commentators Mick Jagger and Keith Richards, have had more than their
“fair share of abuse.”1 All manner of social ills have been attributed to
class actions—litigation blackmail, sweetheart settlements, excessive
compensation, economic burden, obfuscation of serious legal and social
issues—the veritable “works” of criticisms that can be leveled at a type of
legal proceeding.2 Much like bankruptcy, medical malpractice, jury trial,

1. For the benefit of those outside the boomer generation, the phrase is from THE ROLLING
STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (ABKCO Records 1969). The full
line from the song is “And I went down to the demonstration to get my fair share of abuse,” id., an
ironic parallel in that class action litigation has been something of the progressive outsider of civil
litigation, consistently met with opposition, perhaps even repression, at the hands of the legal
“establishment.” Like any classic of any genre, lyrics from once-popular songs appear to have some
staying power, at least among law professors of the baby boom generation. See, e.g., DAVID G.
EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN
CONTEXT 830 (2002) (using chorus of the same song as introductory quote for section on specific
performance).
2. See, e.g., Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other People’s Money, 35
U. MEM. L. REV. 53, 54 (2004) (“[U]proar over class actions has been building for years. . . . As the
years passed . . . hostility toward the class action developed.); James P. Feeney & Richard E. Gottlieb,
Taming Class Actions: Keeping Best Practices in Mind, RISK MGMT. MAG., Feb. 2005, at 10 (“[T]he
class action device is so overly used and abused that all business entities need to be prepared for a
potentially crippling class action lawsuit.”); Eleanor Laise, Picked Clean, SMARTMONEY, May 2005,
at 80 (describing class action suits as thriving but stating that the supposed plaintiff-beneficiaries often
receive pennies on the dollar or small nonmonetary compensation, while lawyers have turned such
lawsuits into an industry for collecting large fees). This gloomsday scenario is pretty typical of the
perspective found in business, insurance, risk-management, and defense-counsel literature. It is
undoubtedly shared by more than a few judges as well. See, e.g., In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard
Siding Prod. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D. 417, 419 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Class certification exists today in an
environment of diminished respect.”). For scholarly discussions of these concerns surrounding class
actions, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS,
JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377
(2000); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law,
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 (2001); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). As one commentator put it, a “staple of class action
literature is the recognition that class counsel might embrace a settlement inadequate for all, many, or
some class members.” Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 163 (2003). The same can be said for issues of blackmail, conflict,
self-dealing, or attorney opportunism. Professors Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard’s contribution to this
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defendants’ rights, broad civil discovery, and the tort system, class actions
have become, to mix metaphors, a whipping boy and a political football
upon which divergent elements of the legal and political community take
out their aggressions. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),3
although it may accomplish some good, arguably provides another
example of the trend. Not surprisingly, this type of atmosphere tends not
to serve the public interest, as debate over the issues becomes long on
rhetoric and short on analysis (and shorter still regarding empirical fact).
The class action “football,” however, has been kicked both upfield and
downfield over the years. Class actions have arguably been both
overutilized in questionable circumstances (e.g., the 30-minute case from
filing to settlement)4 and underutilized in cases where aggregation of
claims or issues would provide an efficient means to address legitimate
questions that might otherwise go unanswered.
Although a number of factors account for this seeming inconsistency,
several seem particularly to blame. First is the traditional, almost nostalgic
American preference for perfect individuated justice, a cultural norm so
entrenched that it continues to rule us from an arguable “grave” in which it
has been interred for decades (in view of the reality that nearly all civil
disputes are resolved by settlement5 and most American law is not

Symposium captures a good deal of this criticism of class actions generally in its discussion of the
factors leading to enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”). See
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead
Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 871–75
(2005). See infra text accompanying notes 341–51 for further discussion of the merits of the
“blackmail” or “coercion” claim.
3. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See
GEORGENE M. VAIRO, THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2005) (additional pamphlet/
supplement/update to JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2005)).
4. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt, Protecting Competition by Narrowing Noerr: A Reply,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 77, 78 (stating that most antitrust class actions “will be on the fast track to
settlement shortly after class certification, long before a summary judgment motion or merits
adjudication of any kind”).
5. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 609–25 (2005)
(stating that modern civil litigation is geared to effecting settlement, a trend furthered by movement
toward what Professor Resnik terms a “Contract Model of Procedure” due to use of arbitration clauses,
other ADR agreements, and limitations on the default judicial range of remedies, jurisdiction, venue,
choice of law, and discovery). See also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (and other
articles in this symposium issue on relative absence of full adjudication); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339
(1994); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III,
113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000) (suggesting that in civil disputes, settlement is the norm and
adjudication is often seen as a failure or aberration); Robert G. Bone, From Judgment to Settlement:
The Changing Character of American Courts, Lecture at Boston University (Oct. 16, 2000) (transcript
available in the Boston University Law Library).
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adjudicative6). As a consequence, courts resist class treatment by insisting
too greatly on both the “day in court” ideal and that class adjudication (if
permitted) resolve the whole of a matter, overlooking the degree to which
class resolution of selected issues or claims can provide significant social
good and dispute-resolution efficiency.7
Second, critics of the class action tend to overlook or minimize the
deterrent purposes of class actions in favor of focus on the compensatory
aspects.8 When examining class action adjudication as compared to stand-

6. At least most American dispute resolution is not adjudicative in the formal sense of
producing a judgment after full civil litigation, including trial. Many legally binding orders are
administrative. See RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMANN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 1998) (stating “[w]e live in an administrative state” and
quoting Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s comment that “[t]he rise of administrative bodies
probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century” and that “[t]hey have become a
veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories”
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting))).
Considering government regulation and enforcement such as fines and license revocation as well as
benefits claims such as social security or workers compensation, in addition to the sheer number of
administrative law judges and hearing officers, strong cases can be made that the clear majority of
American law is administrative law rather than adjudicative law. Of course, administrative law is
shaped by adjudication (as well as legislation) and is sometimes trumped by judicial review, so there
has not necessarily been a coup of legal legitimacy. See also OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK,
ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE (2003) (viewing
procedure in broader sense than most scholars to combine consideration of criminal, civil, and
administrative procedure).
Most obviously, at least since the rise of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement in the
1970s, it has become clear that many disputes are resolved through processes other than adjudication
or in supplementation of adjudication. Nonetheless, the traditional view of the legal profession has
been to exalt the traditional model of adjudication over its alternatives. See Jean R. Sternlight,
Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 681 (2005) (focusing on law school curriculum but making convincing case that legal
profession in general gives ADR secondary status relative to traditional civil litigation). My extension
of Prof. Sternlight’s analysis posits that as between different modes of civil adjudication, the legal
profession traditionally and currently privileges individualized adjudication too greatly in relation to
aggregate adjudication.
7. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (1992) (noting that American jurisprudence is so dominated by the notion
of each litigant being fully heard on its claims as to create a quite restrictive notion of the preclusive
effects of prior litigation). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
244–47 (2004) (describing the “Accuracy Model” of procedural justice, one version of which is “The
Utopian Ideal of Perfect Procedural Justice”). Professor Solum, while making litigant participation,
autonomy, and dignity major components of his preferred form of procedural justice, the “Participation
Model,” id. at 259–73, nonetheless eschews an unrealistically utopian vision and in the case of class
actions and aggregated disputes argues for a modified application of these concepts where necessary to
avoid unduly limiting substantive rights. Id. at 313–20. See also infra text accompanying notes 302–21
(noting that the individual-based concerns of Professor Solum can be accommodated by the class
treatment advocated in this article).
8. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should
Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533 (2005) (arguing for rejection of a
theory of loss causation under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) then
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alone, full-dress individualized litigation, the class device is seen as
wanting because it cannot provide the type of tailored justice or precision
at least purportedly achieved through individualized adjudication. The
class device is also seen as inferior because of its purportedly greater
opportunities for self-dealing by lawyers less tethered to traditional client
controls and economic incentives. What these critics overlook is that class
actions were designed in large part to give voice to claims that would
otherwise not be brought at all and thereby provide deterrence of wrongful
defendant behavior. Measured against this goal, class actions can fall short
of the individualized adjudicative ideal and nonetheless provide
considerable social value.
Third, both critics and defenders of the class action have, in my view,
tended to overlook the degree to which different types of actions present
different problems—and different opportunities—for use of the class
action device. For example, critics of the class action have effectively
conflated the perceived problems of mass torts, consumer claims, and
investor actions into a hybrid sense that class actions are not only broken
but also highly problematic in general.9 In reality, different types of
lawsuits present different dangers but also present varying prospects for
useful application of Rule 23.10

pending before the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), that
presumed prior inaccurate announcements of good news increased share prices before a price decline
that was not directly linked to misleading statements and later corrective disclosures). Professor Coffee
also presented this paper at the Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference on Mutual Funds,
Hedge Funds and Institutional Investors on April 8, 2005, and the Supreme Court opinion did in fact
reject this theory of causation two weeks after Professor Coffee spoke at the ILEP Symposium.
His paper, although well-reasoned, gives comparatively little weight to the deterrence question
presented by the case and also argues that affirming the Ninth Circuit’s approach to loss causation
would create excessive deterrence and inefficiency by making suit too easy whenever a stock declined
in price. See Coffee, supra, at 535, 537–38, 542–43. In my view, Professor Coffee gives too little
attention to the issue of deterrence of securities fraud and the likely impact on deterrence that may
result from given resolutions of the loss causation problem. See infra text accompanying note 265. The
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision, which embraced Professor Coffee’s conclusion and much of his
analysis, soft-pedals the deterrent function of securities law while focusing on the compensatory
function, leavened with a strong dose of worry that businesses will be unfairly punished for merely
being wrong or that undeserving plaintiffs may reap windfalls. See Broudo, 125 S. Ct. at 1633. As
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 205–300, I regard Dura Pharmaceuticals as problematic
and arguably erroneous, even though defenders of the decision can argue that Congress, through the
PSLRA, directed this result.
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New
Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (1995) (criticizing contemporary class action
practices of settlement class actions, resolution of future claims, and burdening of opt-out choice of
class members); Epstein, supra note 2; Feeney & Gottlieb, supra note 2; Judith Resnik, Aggregation,
Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918 (1995) (noting movement of class actions toward
settlement and away from adjudication of individual rights).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 99–160.
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Fourth, the tendency of American courts to overlook or undervalue the
utility of court-connected judicial adjunct proceedings further contributes
to the problem of failure to further address large or complex matters in the
most efficient manner.11 Much of this stems from an overly restrictive
reading of Rule 23, a very traditional concept of “fact finding,” an implicit
belief that Article III judges must be engaged at all stages of a dispute
resolution process, and a view that the Seventh Amendment permits little
experimentation.12
The Class Action Fairness Act, if it functions as intended, will deposit
a greater proportion of the problem in federal courts. This expansion of
authority, combined with a recognition that class actions have been beaten
down a bit by the body politic, gives federal courts an opportunity to
improve the situation by taking a less formal and more functional13
approach to class actions and rebalancing the pro- and anti-class-action
forces into a new equilibrium, one that would enhance the utility of the
class action while simultaneously reining in the perceived excesses that
have fueled the attack on class actions.14
Part I of this Article describes the evolution of the perception of the
modern class action from populist darling to greedy lawyer pariah,
including recent passage of CAFA.15 Part II examines the degree to which
different types of cases present different potential benefits and detriments
of class action treatment and explains why investor class actions, including
those brought by institutional investors, are particularly likely to benefit

11. For discussion of judicial resistance to use of Special Masters and other judicial adjuncts, see
infra text accompanying note 425. See also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (holding provisions of 1978 Bankruptcy Act unconstitutional for permitting Article
I bankruptcy judges to hear and decide matters based on state law that are not part of “core”
bankruptcy proceedings).
12. For discussion of caselaw taking a strong view of the jury trial guarantee set forth in Seventh
Amendment, see infra text accompanying note 359.
13. This Article will use the term “formal” to describe judicial decisions based largely on a strict
or even narrow reading of text, doctrine, and case precedent that does not give significant examination
to the history, background, goals, and purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the substantive law (e.g.,
securities law, tort law) that is the subject of class claims. The term “functional” will be used to
describe decisions taking a broader approach to text, doctrine, and precedent coupled with substantial
emphasis on the “contextual” factors of the history, background, public policy, and purpose of Rule 23
and substantive legal claims at issue in class action cases. See infra text accompanying notes 441–52,
discussing the formalist-functionalist divide at greater length. See also Ellen E. Sward, Justification
and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2004) (distinguishing formalism and
functionalism).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 61–82 (discussing concept of the judiciary seeking
equilibrium in the law, and the greater role to be played by federal courts in class actions because of
the tendency of CAFA to direct more class action litigation to the federal courts and to permit fewer
state court class actions).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 21–106.
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from class treatment, are resistant to many of the perceived problems of
class actions in other contexts, and should receive a warmer welcome from
courts, both in absolute terms and relative to other types of class actions.16
Part III discusses the continuing underutilization of the class action and the
degree to which potential benefits of class treatment are lost due to an
excessively formal application of Rule 23.17 Two significant problem areas
are examined, including refusal to use partial class treatment in mass tort
matters and reluctance to accord class treatment to Rule 10b-518 damages
claims. In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo19 is discussed, as it represents an example
of an overly grudging judicial approach to investor class actions (even
though it is technically a case interpreting the loss causation and
particularized pleading requirements of the PSLRA and not a class action
opinion per se).20 Part IV outlines and defends a flexible approach to class
treatment that can be applied in a case-specific fashion to enable more
effective use of class actions for vindicating civil wrongs as well as
protecting non-culpable defendants.
I. THE MODERN CLASS ACTION AT FORTY:
UNREALIZED PROMISE AND EXCESSIVE BACKLASH
Group litigation has existed for centuries.21 Class actions were
sufficiently established to be part of the pre-1938 Equity Rules and to be

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra text accompanying notes 107–60.
See infra text accompanying notes 164–301.
See infra text accompanying notes 332–40.
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
See infra text accompanying notes 205–16.
See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 10.20, at 641 (5th ed. 2001) (“The antecedents of the class action date back through the
equity procedure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the middle ages. The modern class suit
evolved in the civil rights cases of the 1950s and 1960s and in the consumer movement of the 1960s
and 1970s.”). The definitive historical account is generally seen as STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987), which builds on several
significant historical articles about group litigation. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and
Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977); Stephen C.
Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I: the Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27
UCLA L. REV. 514 (1980); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litgation to Class Action Part II:
Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1980). See also Robert G. Bone,
Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation,
70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION
TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) and commenting at length); Raymond B. Marcin, Searching
for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 515 (1974); William Weiner & Delphine
Szyndrowski, The Class Action, from the English Bill of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:
Is There a Common Thread?, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 935 (1987).
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formally codified in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 But it
was not until the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules that the
modern class action emerged.23 The 1966 Amendments effected a
considerable expansion and liberalization of Rule 23, ushering in a new
era of expanded class action use. The primary rationale for expansion of
the class action was concern about the existence of injuries unremedied by
the regulatory action of government. As the Supreme Court has said,
“[w]here it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless
they employ the class action device.”24 As further elaborated by a leading
treatise:
Class action suits serve several basic purposes. One primary
purpose is to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding
multiple adjudications of the same issues. From the plaintiffs’
perspective, class actions afford aggrieved persons a remedy when
it is not economically feasible to obtain relief through the traditional
framework of multiple individual damage actions as, for example,
when each claim involves only a small dollar amount. Thus, the
class action device enhances access to the courts by spreading
litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims. From
the defendants’ perspective, a class action provides a single
proceeding in which to determine the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims
and, therefore, may protect defendants from repeated and
potentially inconsistent adjudications.25

22. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23App.100. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note, reprinted in 2 Moore et al., supra, § 23App.01[2] (“This is a substantial restatement
of Equity Rule 38 . . . .”).
23. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23App.01[3] (“Rule 23 stood as promulgated in 1937
until it was completely revised in 1966.”); JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 21, § 10.20 at
641 (“The key legal development in [expansion and] evolution [of the class action] was the 1966
revision to Federal Rule 23, which eliminated several technical constraints on the class action.”).
24. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). Accord Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action . . . . A class action solves this problem . . . .”).
25. 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23.02 at 23–37 to 23–38 (citations omitted). Accord JAMES,
HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 21, § 10.20 at 641–44 (also emphasizing deterrent role of class
actions in “enforcing the law” as well as providing means of avoiding constraints of requirement that
“necessary parties” be joined to proceed with action and facilitating suits by organizations). Further, as
Professors Hay and Rosenberg point out, the attractiveness of the class action is not simply that it
makes aggregation of uneconomically small claims feasible but also “that it prevents the defendant
from using the plaintiffs’ numerosity against them” by allowing plaintiffs to
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But, the treatise continues, “[c]oncerns of judicial efficiency may not
overrule all other concerns, however. Fairness and due process concerns
make litigation by and against named parties the normal rule and litigation
by or against a class the exception to the normal rule.”26
This tension between a strong public policy purpose in giving voice to
claims that might not be brought but for the benefits of Rule 23’s
aggregation and concern that the class device not overly supplant the norm
of individualized adjudication has been apparent throughout the forty
years of the modern class action. Amended Rule 23 was initially met with
a good deal of optimism. Many judicial opinions praised its rationale and
stated that Rule 23 should be liberally construed to effect its purposes.27
Within a few years, however, the class action was subject to critical
commentary and judicial decisions restricting its use.28

exploit the same scale economies [in a class action case] as the defendant when investing in
the case. Because the plaintiffs’ lawyers can spread their investment over all the claims—just
as the defendant does—it becomes possible to make investments in the litigation that the
plaintiffs could not make if the claims were prosecuted separately.
Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1380–81.
26. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23.03 at 23–38.
27. See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). As discussed infra in text accompanying note 37, the Supreme Court’s reversal of the Second
Circuit’s Eisen decision, although officially classified as reversal based on a differing view of Rule
23(b)(3)’s notice requirement, can also be regarded as reversal based on a substantially less liberal
construction of Rule 23 and substantially less regard for the deterrence and claim-viability-throughaggregation rationales underlying Rule 23. Instead, the Supreme Court placed considerably more
emphasis on the individualized justice, procedural safeguards, and the aspects of Rule 23 that protect
against weak claims that nonetheless pose serious financial risk when aggregated. See Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action
Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979) (suggesting that the Court’s excessive fear of large class
actions led it to take an unreasonably stringent view of notification requirements).
28. In addition, this tension was apparent in other decisions that, in arguable counterpoint to
cases urging liberal construction of Rule 23, stated that Rule 23 should be strictly construed. See, e.g.,
La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that Rule 23’s
broad, flexible language must be narrowed through judicial construction, particularly where proposed
class would present manageability problems). This is a candid and overt embrace of what might be
deemed judicial activism in the service of narrowing the reach of legislation. Under the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (2000) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are at least tacitly approved
by Congress after promulgation by the Supreme Court since Congress has the power to act within six
months to alter, amend, or eliminate a proposed Rule or Amendment. See also In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 694, 729–38 (4th Cir. 1989) (criticizing La Mar Court’s analysis as excessively resistant to
text, purpose, history, and rationale of Rule 23). However, the La Mar sentiment—a broadly
interpreted Rule 23 is not wise—crops up frequently in case decisions, usually under the individualism
principle, the manageability principle, or the fear of coercive litigation rather than in a frontal assault
on Rule 23 itself or overt disagreement with the principle of liberal construction to serve the purposes
of the Rule. See, e.g., Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996) (construing
manageability problems to preclude class treatment of claims); Roby v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 775
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For example, in Snyder v. Harris,29 and Zahn v. International Paper
Co.,30 the Supreme Court held that the claims of class members could not
be aggregated for purposes of satisfying the jurisdictional amount for
federal jurisdiction. Snyder held that a class action may not be maintained
when no member of the class has a claim in the requisite amount.31 In
Zahn, the Court rejected class treatment in a matter even though the named
plaintiffs had claims of more than $10,000 because many of the class
members had claims of less than that amount32 (the jurisdictional amount
at the time, which was subsequently raised to $75,000 in the current
version of 28 U.S.C. § 1332). In other words, each member of the class
needed to have a significant enough personal claim to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount, a requirement that made it considerably more
difficult to obtain diversity jurisdiction to support prosecution of a federal
court class action (and was made more difficult over the years as the
jurisdictional amount for diversity cases climbed from $10,000 to
$75,000). The Court’s Snyder and Zahn decisions, like other forms of
judicial resistance to aggregation of claims to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, have been correctly criticized.33 Nonetheless, the Court made no

F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that Rule 23 must be strictly construed).
To some extent, this inconsistency is one seemingly inherent in the complexity of law, the
differences among judges and situations, and the inconsistency of the human intellect. For example,
two old saws of statutory construction are (1) remedial statutes should be liberally construed and (2)
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. See J.G. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION §§ 573–75, 582–85 (2d ed. 1904). These two rules of statutory
construction are, of course, almost completely inconsistent in that by definition nearly every piece of
remedial legislation will be in “derogation” of the common law. Were the common law otherwise,
there would be no need for the remedial legislation. Karl Llwellyn made this point convincingly more
than fifty years ago. Karl N. Llwellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (juxtaposing these
and other accepted maxims of statutory construction and demonstrating inherent inconsistency in the
legal system recognizing both as legitimate, mainstream rules of law). But despite the inconsistency,
both rules continued to be cited as the law of statutory interpretation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 331–32
(2000). Judicial and scholarly attitudes toward the class action display a similar inconsistency, but one
that commentators appear to recognize more than courts. See infra text accompanying note 308
(discussing conflicted attitudes of legal scholars toward class treatment of claims).
29. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 36 at 198 (4th ed. 1983).
30. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
31. Snyder, 394 U.S. at 338. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 36 at
212 (5th ed. 1994).
32. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301. See WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 36 at 214–15.
33. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 31, § 36 at 212, 214–15 (criticizing Snyder both for failing to
articulate clear standard for assessing when claims of individual plaintiffs may be aggregated for
purposes of satisfying jurisdictional amount for diversity jurisdiction and for implicitly taking overly
restrictive view; criticizing Zahn as “a puzzling case, particularly because of its failure even to
consider the argument of three dissenters that recent principles of ancillary jurisdiction, which have
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movement to soften these barriers to class treatment of claims. Ironically,
Zahn was ultimately legislatively overruled by the enactment of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367,34 the supplemental jurisdiction provisions of the 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act, although the Court did not reach this conclusion until fifteen
years after passage of the Act.35
In addition, the Supreme Court took the view that denials of class
certification were not appealable final orders even under circumstances
where denial of certification amounted to the “death knell” of the
litigation.36 Further, the Court took the view that in Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions seeking money damages, members of the class were ordinarily
entitled to mailed notice of the class and their rights to opt out, even if this
imposed a substantial cost-fronting burden on the named plaintiffs and
class counsel.37 Although these 1970s decisions were setbacks of sorts,

been held to overcome the jurisdictional-amount requirement in other contexts, should do so also in
connection with joinder of parties.”) (footnote omitted). See also id. at 211
The rule that if there are several parties their claims cannot be aggregated had its origin more than
160 years ago, at a time when joinder of parties was far less understood than it is today, and it was a
construction of a statute regulating the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather than the
original jurisdiction of the district courts.
34. Section 1367(a), passed as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, provides that where
a district court has original jurisdiction, it “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). The most natural reading of this statutory text suggests that a court facing a
proper class in which at least one of the class members meets the jurisdictional amount may hear the
entire class action and that each class member must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. More debatable
is the question of whether a class of claimants where not even one class member has a claim of more
than $75,000 can be heard by aggregating the small claims. As discussed in note 35, infra, the
Supreme Court accepted the former proposition but not the latter.
35. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005) (holding that where
other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount in
controversy requirement, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over claims of other plaintiffs in
the same case or controversy). Prior to the Court’s decision in Allapattah, courts had divided over the
issue. Compare Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding § 1367 to
legislatively overrule Zahn) with Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that Zahn continues as binding precedent notwithstanding that the text of § 1367 can be read to permit
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claimants whose claims individually fall short of the
requisite jurisdictional amount). The Court’s Allapattah decision seems indubitably correct as a matter
of both statutory text and jurisprudential consistency, in that § 1367 was enacted to overrule cases
restricting “pendent parties” federal jurisdiction and generally expands jurisdiction in the interests of
seeking more efficient, omnibus resolution of cases. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.28 (5th ed. 2001). But it is not at all clear that
Congress specifically intended this result or wished to strengthen class actions as a byproduct of
enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act. Where Congress has expanded federal jurisdiction over class
actions, as in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, see infra text accompanying notes 59–79, this has
largely been done as a way of reining in class actions rather than expanding their use.
36. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
37. Eisen v. Carlin & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra
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inhibiting use of the class action, they proved not to be insurmountable
stumbling blocks as class actions continued to flourish and be brought in
large numbers.38 In addition, class actions expanded beyond their historic
base of securities litigation to other realms, most notably mass torts.39
During the 1980s, however, class actions became subject to sustained
criticism on the basis of their purported tendency to become lawyercontrolled litigation that lacked requisite client control and policing of
attorney behavior. A common criticism was that class actions were feedriven and designed more to generate counsel fees than obtain
compensation for the claimants and purported class members.40 Both the
traditional bailiwick of class actions—securities fraud—and the emerging
use of class actions for mass torts came under criticism.41
This trend continued into the 1990s. For example, Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,42 decided in 1994, is, strictly
speaking, an opinion about substantive securities law, but had a
considerable dampening effect on securities-fraud class actions. The
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, abolished civil liability for
“aiding and abetting” securities fraud, even though a majority of the

note 21, § 10.23 at 661–62 (criticizing Eisen in that the “practical effect of this ruling is to place a
severe cost barrier before mass class actions for damages. It also encourages plaintiffs to delay any
decision on class certification and notice until they can negotiate a settlement, which can then be used
to fund the notice.”).
38. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (according class
treatment in large mass tort matter). A search of the LexisNexis caselaw database suggests more than
3,000 class actions resulting in some sort of opinion during the 1975–1985 period.
39. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
certification apt due to important common defenses raised by defendants in product liability toxic tort
where defenses were applicable to entire class); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 429 (holding
that common issues regarding knowledge of the health hazard posed by asbestos, failure to warn, and
industry practices warranted class treatment). See also 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23.23[4][h] at
23–86 (stating “courts have become less reluctant to certify [mass tort] classes based on common . . .
issues” and citing Agent Orange as a key early case in the trend). See generally PETER SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
40. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 680–81 (1986). See also
Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92
(noting that even in individual cases, lay parties have relatively little control of the litigation in relation
to attorneys).
41. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 1985, at 5, 17–18, 20–23; Roger H. Transgrud, Mass
Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 87–88. See also David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 914–16 n.2 (1998)
(providing extensive listing of articles discussing class action practice).
42. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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federal circuit courts had recognized this liability for some time.43
Thereafter, lawyers, accountants, bankers, or others that indirectly helped
perpetrators engage in direct violation of the securities laws could not be
sued under the 1934 Act (although they might still have liability under
relevant state statutes or common law, such as an action for professional
negligence, and they might still be liable as principals). This change in
substantive law had a corresponding contracting effect on the scope of
securities class actions, as it eliminated a significant possible use of the
class action for investors concerning a type of misbehavior that often
would have common questions of fact and law.44
Class actions or the types of suits spawning class claims then became a
target in the legislative arena as well. Securities class actions were the first
to feel the pinch of what can in retrospect be seen as ten years of
developments restricting class treatment of litigation. First came the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,45 which had emerged as
a top political priority for congressional Republicans under their “Contract
with America” program. When swept into control of the House of
Representatives on the heels of the 1994 mid-term elections, Speaker
Newt Gingrich and his allies placed sufficient emphasis on securities
litigation reform to achieve it within a matter of months.46 Not even a
presidential veto could stop the legislation.47 Among other things, the
PSLRA:
•

adopted a heightened pleading requirement for antifraud claims
under the 1934 Act;

•

adopted a safe harbor for forward-looking company statements;

43. Id. at 169, 184–85
44. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 92 (2005) (Central Bank “reversed twenty-five years of practice
and precedent in eleven federal circuits”); David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver:
Private Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1817,
1839 (1995) (Central Bank “fundamentally alters” private securities litigation by elimination of aiding
and abetting liability and consequent restriction of meritorious actions as well as nonmeritorious
actions).
45. Pub.L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.).
46. Support for the PSLRA was hardly limited to Republicans. Prominent Democrats such as
Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), and Carol Mosley-Braun (D-Ill.)
were listed as co-authors on the initial bill. S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995). See S. REP. NO. 104-98
(1995).
47. See Choi et al., supra note 2, at 873 (reviewing background of PSLRA). See also Stephen J.
Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468–78 (2004) (providing
background on PSLRA and assessing empirical results of securities class actions);
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•

imposed a mandatory stay of discovery during the time a motion
to dismiss a securities fraud suit is pending;

•

established proportional liability rather than joint-and-several
liability;

•

limited damages available in fraud-on-the-market cases;

•

restricted counsel fee awards to a reasonable percentage of
damages actually paid to the plaintiff class; and

•

added a provision requiring plaintiffs to prove a sufficient causal
nexus between defendant misstatements and the loss claimed by
plaintiff.48

The PSLRA is not restricted to class actions per se but speaks to
securities fraud claims generally. However, because class actions are a
common vehicle for bringing investor claims and because so much of the
expressed concern animating passage of the Act related to class actions, it
is more than fair to see the PSLRA as a backlash-like reaction to perceived
problems of the class action.49 “When it was reported that lawyers were
evading [the PSLRA] by filing actions in more permissive state courts,
Congress preempted many state court securities fraud class actions with
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998”50 (SLUSA).51
The congressional orientation toward securities claims continued to be
more hostile than welcoming. During the late 1990s, a number of
prominent court decisions also curtailed aspects of class action litigation.
For example, class treatment was refused in mass tort cases52 and in a

48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(6), (b)(2), (b)(3)(B), (b)(4), (e), (f), 78u-5 (2000).
49. For example, in addition to generally constricting securities claims, Congress refused to
overturn the Central Bank decision and restore aiding and abetting liability under the securities law.
See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standard for Aiders and Abettors Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 BUS. LAW. 1 (1996) (but noting that SEC may
bring actions against aiders and abettors of securities fraud even if individuals have no right of action
under Central Bank of Denver); Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look: Central Bank After the
Public Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 568–69 (1996) (same).
50. JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 21, § 10.22 at 654.
51. 15 U.S.C. 77p, 78bb(f) (2000). See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:
Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2–7 (1998).
52. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). See also In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005)
(vacating trial court’s certification of class on question of punitive damages claims against tobacco
companies and rejecting limited-fund class-action status; also suggesting that constitutional limitations
on punitive damages set forth in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
work against class treatment of punitive damages claims). See infra text accompanying notes 164–77
for further discussion of Rhone-Poulenc.
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securities matter in which the plaintiffs clearly appeared to have
established culpability of the defendants.53 Most important, the U.S.
Supreme Court twice supported limitations on the use of class actions in
mass tort claims.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court overturned
settlement of a mass tort class action where the Court found insufficient
predominance of common issues of fact and also found representation of
the class members to be inadequate due to conflicts of interest among the
class members, some of whom were currently displaying symptoms of
asbestos-related injury and some of whom were asymptomatic and might
never develop injuries.54
Two years later, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Supreme Court
overturned a $1.535 billion global settlement of 45,000 pending and all
future claims on the ground that this was not a proper use of a limited
funds class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B), the
limited funds being the remaining assets of an asbestos manufacturer and
its insurance coverage.55 In addition, despite its limited funds rationale, the
Fibreboard settlement would have permitted the company to retain
“virtually its entire net worth,” the class definition was viewed as
incomplete, and class representatives were seen as recovering
disproportionately more than similarly afflicted class members.56
Although the correctness of the Amchem and Ortiz rulings and the
precise degree to which they limit future settlement of class actions can be
debated, there is no debate that their net effect was to make class actions
less attractive as a mass tort settlement tool. In the aftermath of these
decisions, asbestos defendants and plaintiffs have shown considerably
more interest in using bankruptcy proceedings, particularly the prepackaged bankruptcies authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)57 as a means of

53. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). See infra text accompanying
notes 178–204 for further discussion of Newton.
54. 521 U.S. 591, 622–28 (1997).
55. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
56. Id. at 854–58.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000); see Susan Powers Johnston & Katherine Porter, Extension of
Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code to Nondebtor Parents, Affiliates, and Transaction Parties, 59
BUS. LAW. 503, 510–11 (2004) (“In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide a
restructuring model for asbestos-related bankruptcies. Section 524(g) represents a congressional
response to the need for an effective mechanism to facilitate reorganization of companies facing
massive numbers of asbestos claims. A variety of efforts to achieve such relief outside Chapter 11
have not proven successful. Section 524(g) codifies the approach that Johns-Manville Corporation, a
major asbestos producer, used in its bankruptcy in the mid-1980s to deal with the asbestos claims
against it.”) (footnotes omitted).

p1127 Stempel book pages.doc4/20/2006

1142

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1127

achieving global peace.58 Although Amchem and Ortiz have only a
tangential impact on investor class actions and settlement, they are part of
the restrictive trend of the past decade.
Most recently, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005,59 in which class action critics continued in the vein of the PSLRA in
attempting to rein in purported misuse of the class device. Certainly, the
arguments in favor of CAFA have been made on the political circuit for
years, at least since passage of the PSLRA and SLUSA. Intervening use of
state-court class actions in mass tort and consumer matters (perhaps
spurred by efforts to avoid the effect of the Amchem and Ortiz holdings)
fueled the drive to reform. Many saw such class actions, particularly in
mass tort matters, as a means of forum shopping in favor of highly
plaintiff-friendly venues60 (what the American Tort Reform Association
has labeled “judicial hellholes”61). With the 2004 re-election of President
Bush and stronger Republican majorities in the House and Senate, CAFA

58. See Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 93, 106–07 (2004) (reporting more than seventy asbestos-related bankruptcies); see also
Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000); Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won’t Stay in the
Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1319 (2002). Of course, Amchem and Ortiz only restricted
particular usage of the class action as a dispute resolution device. They did not eliminate the asbestos
mass tort problem, which rages on. See Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons,
88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002).
59. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of § 28 U.S.C.).
60. See VAIRO, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that the purpose of the Act is “‘to prevent judge
shopping to States and even counties where courts and judges have a prejudicial predisposition on
cases’”) (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter (RPa))).
61. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 (2004), http://
www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf. See VAIRO, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that under the preCAFA status quo, “corporate defendants complained of being sued in ‘judicial hellholes’”). Although
the rather attention-getting term has its origin with avowedly partisan lobbyist groups such as the
American Tort Reform Association, the term has also been employed by groups generally regarded as
non-partisan. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, MASS TORT LITIGATION MANUAL
263–65 (forthcoming 2005) (describing certain jurisdictions as “judicial hellholes” sought by counsel
for plaintiffs because of favorable judges and jurors in given area). However, I would argue that these
groups can be partisan on certain issues. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal
Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 530, 629 (2001) (noting that American
College of Trial Lawyers played active role in advocating narrowing of federal civil discovery through
2000 Amendment to Rule 26 and that College committee active on the issue was overwhelmingly
composed of defense counsel, particularly product liability defense counsel).
According to Professor Vairo, the “political nature” of CAFA “cannot be disputed.” See VAIRO,
supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting that House bill was co-sponsored by sixty Republicans and thirteen
Democrats, a nearly five-to-one ratio, suggesting greater GOP support but with significant numbers of
Democratic legislators supporting CAFA, and stating, “[e]ven though CAFA was politically
motivated, many Democrats and some plaintiffs’ attorneys shared the notion that problems existed
with class action litgation.”).
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moved to the top of the legislative agenda.62 CAFA made several
significant changes in class action law. Among other things, CAFA:
•

Expanded federal jurisdiction so as to encompass most class
actions, requiring only minimal diversity among plaintiffs and
defendants to permit exercise of federal jurisdiction.63 In
addition, CAFA creates federal jurisdiction for a new category of
“mass actions,” which are defined to include cases seeking
monetary relief that have been joined for trial, involve 100 or
more plaintiffs, and satisfy the other federal jurisdictional
requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)-(11).64
Interestingly, Congress chose to reject aggregation of plaintiffs’
claims for purposes of determining whether the jurisdictional
amount is met in mass actions.65 The Zahn rule continues to
govern in this area.66

•

Provided for more expanded removal of class actions from state
courts and restricted remand, authorizing expedited appellate
review of remand decisions.67 The federal court is required to

62. See Correy E. Stephenson, New Law Limits Class Actions, LAW. WKLY. USA, Mar. 14,
2005, at 1 (“The new class action bill signed into law by President Bush on Feb. 18 has given the
administration its first tort reform victory.”). The legislation passed with strong majorities of 279 to
149 in the House and 72 to 26 in the Senate. Id. at 1. To some extent, CAFA appears part of a broader
trend toward restricting litigation and claims thought to be unreasonably favorable to plaintiffs. See
Steven J. Mintz, ELECTIONS FAVOR TORT REFORM: STATE INITIATIVES LIMIT CONSUMER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SUITS, LITIG. NEWS, Mar. 2005, at 1.
63. CAFA creates a new provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), which provides for federal jurisdiction
over any class action in which at least one plaintiff is a citizen of a state different than that of at least
one defendant and where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $5 million. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(d)(2) (2005). This section of CAFA specifically rejects the Zahn bar to aggregating plaintiffs’
claims to reach the jurisdictional amount, see supra text accompanying notes 30–32, providing that
“[i]n any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine
whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(6) (2005).
64. “Mass action” is defined in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(11).
65. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (2005).
66. See VAIRO, supra note 3, at 33–34; Gregory P. Joseph, The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005: A Preliminary Analysis, NAT’L L.J. (2005), http://www.law.com/pdf/nlj/cafa_joseph.pdf.
67. In particular, a federal court is required to exercise jurisdiction over a removed state court
class action unless at least one-third of all class members are citizens of the forum state. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(d)(3)-(4) (2005). If the number of class members who are forum state residents is between onethird and two-thirds of all class members, the federal court is permitted to decline jurisdiction,
provided that the “primary defendants” are also citizens of the forum state. Id. In guiding the exercise
of its discretion, the court is to consider the following six factors:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the action was
originally filed or by the laws of other States;
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decline jurisdiction only where two-thirds or more of the class
members are residents of the forum state and either the primary
defendants are also forum state citizens68 or the underlying facts
of the dispute are closely linked to the forum state and other
criteria are met.69 In addition, the one-year time limit on removal
generally applicable to civil actions does not apply to removal of
state court class actions.70 Removal is without regard to
defendant’s citizenship (not restricted to nonresident defendants
as is the case with general removal) and does not require the
consent of all defendants, as is normally the case.71 Expedited
appellate review of remand orders is provided.72
•

Changed the settlement procedure for federal court class actions.
Federal and state officials (in states where class members reside)
must be notified of any pending class action settlement within
ten days after filing of a proposed settlement with the trial court,
which is barred from approving the settlement until at least
ninety days after the last government official is served.73 The
notice must include a good deal of information designed to

(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal
jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members,
the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens
from any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is
dispersed among a substantial number of States; and
(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other
class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have
been filed.
Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F).
68. Id. § 1332(d)(4).
69. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A). This standard requires that: (i) more than two-thirds of the class
members be forum state residents, (ii) at least one defendant from whom “significant relief is sought”
and whose conduct is a “significant basis” of the claim is a citizen of the forum state, (iii) the
“principal injuries” of the plaintiff class were suffered in the state, and (iv) no other class action
asserting the same or similar claims against any of the defendants has been filed during the prior three
years. Id. In other words, the large core of the dispute must be forum-state centered to avoid removal
under CAFA.
70. Id. § 1453(b). Section 1446(b) of Title 28 establishes the general one-year limit on removal
and was added to the removal provisions of the Judicial Code in 1988 in an effort to prevent stale
removal that might cause delay or disruption of litigation. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,
67–69 (1996).
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b).
72. Id. § 1453(c).
73. Id. § 1715.
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permit the government official to make an informed decision as
to whether to further investigate and perhaps challenge the
settlement.74
•

Regulated coupon settlements.75

•

Took a more stringent view of settlements in which class
members must make an expenditure in order to enjoy the benefit
of a settlement.76

•

Limited geographic variance in class member treatment.77

In microcosm, CAFA exemplifies the up-and-down history of the class
action in the legislative and political arena. The Act has its genesis in
perceptions that class actions are being “abused” in significant fashion and
that action must be taken to correct the problem. Certainly, groups that are
not friendly to class actions regard the legislation as a victory, while class
action proponents regard it as a defeat.78 The Act does in fact restrict
certain class action practices. However, CAFA also should bring an
increase in federal class actions (by shifting cases from state court to
federal court),79 which is arguably a qualitative expansion of the genre in
view of the relatively greater federal court expertise on this topic.

74. Id. § 1715(b). Among the items to be included with the notice are the complaint and
appendices (although these may be sent electronically), notice of any scheduled judicial hearing, any
proposed or final notice of settlement to be sent to the class, any settlement or contemporaneous
agreement between class counsel and defense counsel, any final judgment or notice of dismissal, any
judicial opinion relating to the settlement, and information as to the identities of class members
residing in the official’s state. Id. § 1715(b)(1)-(8).
75. Id. § 1712. In particular, CAFA provides that the value of coupon settlements is to be
calculated on the basis of coupons actually redeemed rather than upon the hypothetical total value of
all coupons issues that could be redeemed. Id. § 1712(a). The purpose of the statute is to avoid cases in
which large counsel fees are awarded on the basis of a seemingly valuable (at least in the aggregate)
issuance of coupons by the defendant when in fact the plaintiff class members are uninterested in
redeeming the coupons.
76. Id. § 1713 (requiring that the nonmonetary benefits of any settlement to class members
“substantially outweigh” the monetary costs of partaking in the settlement).
77. Id. § 1714 (prohibiting judicial approval of settlements where compensation to class
members is based “solely” on geographic proximity to situs of case).
78. See Stephenson, supra note 62, at 1, 24 (noting that American Tort Reform Association
General Counsel Victor Schwartz praised passage of CAFA while Sally Greenberg of the Consumers
Union criticized the Act); Matt Brady & Arthur D. Postal, Insurers, Agents Bask in Class-Action
Victory, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Feb. 28, 2005, at 6.
79. See VAIRO, supra note 3; Alison Frankel, Magnet Courts Losing Their Pull, LEGAL TIMES,
April 11, 2005, at 3 (stating that plaintiffs’ counsel appears prepared to “simply switch to federal
court” for prosecuting class claims); Gerald R. Maatman, Jr., Class Action Reform May Hike
Settlements, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (PROP. & CASUALTY ED.), Mar. 7, 2005 at 30, 31 (stating CAFA is
an “expansion of federal jurisdiction” over class actions and “makes it significantly easier for plaintiffs
to file class actions in federal court” and predicting routine defendant removals to federal court).
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Certainly, the Act is not a total disaster for class action proponents. One
can make a strong argument that pruning back the arguably abusive
practices that animated the Act will in general strengthen the class action.
But, on a political level, CAFA represents backlash against the class
action and a tendency to blame class actions for other ills of the system.
For example, one might ask why Congress has during the past twenty
years been unable or unwilling to address the asbestos mass tort problem
directly, since this is the primary impetus driving much of the criticized
resort to state court class actions. Similarly, if the problem is the existence
of kangaroo courts in certain localities, one might wonder why Congress
does not attempt to legislate pursuant to the Due Process Clause to bring
problematic venues (a/k/a the “judicial hellholes”) under federal
supervision in the manner of federal policing of voting rights in affected
jurisdictions. Of course, these paths are more logistically, legally, and
politically challenging. By comparison, class actions are a “soft target”
that can be more effectively attacked by policymakers.80
In determining which direction to go with future class action practice, it
remains useful to remember that although the class action device may
exacerbate other problems in the system, the class action is probably not
the root cause of many of the problems for which it is blamed. The trite
but true adage about being careful not to discard the baby with the
bathwater81 should serve as a reminder that class actions, despite being
battered in recent years, retain a good deal of untapped utility. In the wake
of CAFA’s most recent round of reform, the stage may be well set for
courts to attempt to realize some of that utility by permitting more flexible
and expanded use of class treatment in appropriate cases.
After the past decade’s efforts at recalibrating class actions, it is pretty
clear that the American legal-political establishment has something of a
love-hate relationship with the class action. Although class actions may
become lightning rods for criticism and change, there appears not to be

80. Of course, “soft” does not mean squishy-soft. CAFA was opposed by organized plaintiffs’
counsel and consumer groups. Nonetheless, it was more prudent for business and defense-bar interests
to attack class actions rather than to directly attack aspects of substantive law favorable to consumers.
A congressional effort to abolish products liability actions would probably raise previously slumbering
citizens and organizations in protest. In addition, examples of extreme forum shopping in mass tort
cases with minimal contact with the target jurisdiction present useful anecdotes for use in the political
arena.
81. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993) (urging caution for critics quick to reject all proposed changes and
suggesting that such an attitude would lead to Rules becoming outmoded and problematic). Professor
Marcus was the co-Reporter of the Federal Civil Rule Advisory Committee.
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any significant support for eliminating class actions.82 In spite of
criticisms, class action treatment is routinely sought by litigants.83 And in
spite of what I at least view as too resistant an attitude toward class
treatment by many courts, class certification is frequently granted.84
Certainly, the class device remains effective in bringing claims that might
otherwise not be brought and that appear to be more efficiently resolved
through class treatment.85 Even in cases where individual litigants would
appear well situated to bring an individual claim, the class action device
presents attractive opportunities for economies of scale.86

82. See, e.g., Leslie A. Brueckner, Class Action Ethics Issues: Combating the Threat of Class
Action Abuse, 2000 PROF. LAW. 133 (arguing that the problem is not the class-action device itself but
abuse of class action through the pre-CAFA no-opt-out provision and coupon settlements); Richard M.
Phillips, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and
Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1065 (1996)
(arguing that PSLRA “achieves a reasonable balance” of interests in protecting investors and avoiding
abusive litigation by allowing pursuit of meritorious claims and “deterring speculative securities
litigation”).
83. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING A
CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS (Apr. 2004 with May 2004 Update), available at http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmOn02.pdf/$file/AmOrt02.pdf; see also LAURA E. SIMMONS &
ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS:
SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003 (2004), available at http://securities.stanford.
edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2003/2003_Settlements.pdf (noting continuing significant class
action activity notwithstanding the PSLRA); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table
C-2A: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods
Ending Septmber 30, 1999 Through 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/
appendices/c2a.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc, 382 F.3d 1241, 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2004) (certifying class of
physicians in suit against health care company over claims pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-1-00-458 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18977 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 2004) (certifying class action against auto maker in claim alleging
failure to honor warranties to purchasers of new cars); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D
326, 352 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (certifying class in antitrust action); Young v. Meyer & Njus, P.A., 183
F.R.D. 231, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (certifying class in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case); Enfield
v. Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am., 98 P.3d 1048 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (certifying class in action
alleging failure to disclose fact resulting in higher future premiums for purchasers of insurance). For
example, one study found that securities class action filings increased from 1996 to 1998 and remained
at an average of 190 filings or more per year through 2004. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, CAF INDEX—
NUMBER OF CLASS ACTION FILINGS 1996–2004, available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/
Research/litigation.htm. See also Lindsay Fortado, Class Actions: Record Securities Settlements,
NAT’L L.J., Mar. 14, 2005, at 9 (noting total securities class action settlements valued at $5.5 billion in
2004, $2 billion higher than in 2003). See generally 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT R. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:8 (4th ed. 2002).
85. See cases cited supra note 84. Although the amounts of damages claimed in these actions
were by no means trivial, many of the class members were claiming damage amounts small enough to
call into question the economic utility of litigation as a remedy.
86. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1379–81 (demonstrating that even in cases where
individual injury is large, defendant has advantage over multiple plaintiffs unless claims are

p1127 Stempel book pages.doc4/20/2006

1148

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1127

aggregated due to economies of scale for investing resources in litigation in pursuit of improved odds
of success). For instance, in In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), a
class action was filed on behalf of investors in WorldCom, with many class members large individual
or institutional investors. See infra text accompanying notes 150–51 for further discussion of
WorldCom as indicative of utility of the class action even for institutional investors with large separate
stakes in dispute.
In In re Tri-state Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660 (N.D. Ga. 2003), relatives of decedents who
were to be cremated but were instead left rotting on land adjacent to the crematory pursued a class
action against funeral homes, the crematory, and the family that owned the property on which the
crematory was located on the theory that there was damage to the families of the decedents because of
their residual property-like interest in the physical remains of their loved ones and because the
revelation of the horrid treatment of the bodies caused significant injury to the family members. The
plaintiff class reached several substantial settlements with various funeral homes that had used the
facility as well as a large (but confidential) settlement with the owners of the crematory. See In re TriState Crematory Litig. MDL No. 1467 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2004) (in camera proceedings placing
settlement on sealed record). Individuals acting alone in the wake of the ghoulish revelations about the
treatment of deceased family members would not likely have fared as well, if they had prosecuted their
respective causes of action at all.
One could therefore argue that the individual plaintiffs would have had sufficient economic
incentive to pursue the tort claims individually. Perhaps. But given the realities of litigation costs, risk,
inconvenience, and delay, one can seriously question whether even a $50,000 injury is worth suing
over, particularly for middle- and upper-class persons who could, at least on an economic basis,
merely “lump it.” See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525 (1981). More importantly, this is a case in which it
appears that class treatment brought an efficient and relatively swift resolution to tort claims that
would otherwise have presented a major problem of judicial administration. Although defendants may
argue that this is another case of aggregation creating undue pressures to settle, one must ask: Would
the defendants (and their liability insurers obligated to defend the claims) really have preferred to face
1,600 individual suits? Or even 400 suits, if I am right about the economics of claim-making?
In what is perhaps the most heavily studied tort litigation, the asbestos mass tort of the past thirty
years, analysts have found that more than half and as much as two-thirds of all amounts expended have
been for disputing costs, primarily counsel fees (roughly evenly distributed as between plaintiff
counsel and defense counsel). See STEPHEN J. CARROLL, et al., Asbestos Litigation Costs and
Compensation: An Interim Report v-vii, 40, 47 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
documented_briefings/DB397/DB397.pdf; James S. Kakalik et al., Variation in Asbestos Litigation
Compensation and Expenses (1984).
In the 1970s and 1980s, when asbestos claims were more fiercely and individually litigated, total
disputing costs were roughly two-thirds of the amount spent on the claims. In other words, only one
dollar in three actually went toward victim compensation. In the 1990s, the disputing costs were closer
to one-quarter of the amounts expended, reflecting the degree to which asbestos claims were more
frequently settled rather than litigated, particularly with the use of group settlements as asbestos
defendants attempted to achieve global peace. Because it costs money to litigate, rational plaintiffs and
defendants would rather settle so long as they can arrive at a rough evaluation of the case less the
expected disputing expenditures. See Rick Vassar, To Settle or Not to Settle, RISK MGMT. MAG., Nov.
2005 at 64 (corporate risk manager advocates settlement and less aggressive litigation, stating that “an
organization needs to understand that claims management is economic . . . and outside vendors [e.g.,
attorneys, insurers] have primary interests that may be secondary to the company.”); see also JAMES
HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 21, §§ 6.3, 6.4.
Certainly, the judicial system would not be well-served by this alternative. More importantly, if
the claims lacked merit, class treatment provided the defendants with a single forum and suit for
defense. The uncontested facts of the matter and the size of the settlement certainly suggest that the
case was meritorious. The amounts awarded, although large in the aggregate, hardly seem excessive in
light of the injuries claimed and the conduct in question.
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In many ways, attitudes toward the class action seem reminiscent of
attitudes toward government. In the abstract, many people are critical of
“big government.” But when asked to eliminate a concrete government
program, many of these critics are usually unwilling to ax a program from
which they benefit.87 In similar fashion, the legal-business-political
community may criticize class actions, but it continues to permit them and
pursue them.
As discussed in the Introduction, the undue resistance to class actions
seems to stem from a number of factors that are more broadly cultural than
analytically focused on class actions themselves. Perhaps foremost is the
traditional preference for individuated justice, which is somewhat
romantically perceived to be better than it really is. Professor Bob Bone
has referred to this as the “day in court ideal,” a sentiment that captures
both the concept and its idealized notion.88 As Professor Bone has
observed, notwithstanding problematic aspects, American “commitment to
litigant autonomy runs deep: a person must have her “day in court” before
the state may bring its judicial power to bear upon her.”89 In actual fact,
most litigants do not ultimately obtain a day in court but instead
participate in a dispute resolution system designed to effect negotiated
resolution in accordance with overall legal-social norms.90 Nonetheless,
the romantic appeal of the day-in-court mythology is sufficiently strong
that there is a subconscious tendency to view class actions or other
omnibus modes of dispute resolution as a type of second-class justice.

For purposes of disclosure, litigation remains pending regarding insurance coverage in connection
with policies issued to the owners of the property on which the crematory operated, who settled with
the class in return for assignment of their rights to coverage under the policies and a covenant that the
plaintiff class would not seek to satisfy the settlement from the personal assets of these defendants. I
have been retained by the plaintiff class in connection with the insurance coverage litigation.
87. See Geoffrey Nunberg, Thinking About the Government, AMERICAN PROSPECT, May 1, 2005
at A8 (“people’s enthusiasm for smaller government is apt to wane on the first heavy snow day”).
88. Bone, supra note 7. Accord Solum, supra note 7, at 259–73 (describing importance
traditionally placed in legal doctrine on litigant’s participation in process); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003). See also
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (One “central concern” of the legal process is “the
promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.”), cited
by Solum, supra note 7, at 259–60.
89. See Bone, supra note 21, at 215 n.4 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), which
found absent parties not bound by prior consent judgment settling job discrimination claims).
90. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War With the
Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 952–53 (1993) (suggesting that civil litigation is a
system of forced negotiation due to coercive default option of adjudication if negotiations fail); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the
Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 84 (1997) (“[M]ore than ninety percent of cases settle short of trial.”);
supra note 5 (noting that most cases are resolved without full trial and entry of judgment).
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Related to this is traditional reluctance to depart from the typical mode
of adjudication as an “event,” in which the proceedings occur
simultaneously with one trial determining all issues of liability and
damages. Although bifurcation of liability and damages has been a fixture
of litigation for some time, the focus of American litigation remains the
arena-like event of trial, with the corresponding subconscious resistance to
piecemeal adjudication.91 In actuality, incremental adjudication is much
more dominant than is commonly acknowledged. Much adjudication, of
course, takes place through pretrial proceedings that decide many of the
issues initially presented by the case (through Rule 1292 and Rule 5693
motions) as well as conducting the disclosure and discovery that serves as
a basis for settlement.94 In addition, various modes of ADR may be
required of some issues in dispute.95 Finally and most obviously,

91. This stands in contrast to the continental mode of trial, which frequently takes place in
episodic, piecemeal fashion, a trait facilitated by the absence of the jury. See Mirjan Damaska,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(1)-(7) provides several grounds for dismissing claims or even entire
actions on the basis of lack of subject matter, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue,
defective service, failure to join a required party and , perhaps most important, for failure to state a
claim (Rule 12(b)(6)). See ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §§ 4.1, 4.2 (5th ed. 2001).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted where there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At
least in theory, if a party has inadequate factual support for an allegation or is basing its claim on an
impermissible legal argument, the court can end the case without trial. Although summary judgment
can be sought at the outset of litigation, it is more commonly not available until the close of discovery.
See HAYDOCK, HERR & STEMPEL, supra note 92, § 12.3.
94. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRETRIAL LITIGATION V, 4 (4th ed. 2000) (Vast majority of civil dispute resolution activity is pretrial
litigation rather than trial itself; trial itself occurs in only “a small percentage of disputes.”). The legal
academy was arguably slow to recognize this now seemingly obvious fact. Prior to 1985, when the
First Edition of Fundamentals of Pretrial Litigation was published, there were many trial practice and
appellate advocacy texts for law students, but few books regarding pretrial. The past twenty years have
seen a comparative explosion of books on pretrial litigation, including multiple editions, as law
schools belatedly recognized this civil disputing reality (and market for books). See, e.g., R.
LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2001) (first
published in 1991). Although judges are undoubtedly aware of this same reality, it is not at all clear
that the bench (at least certainly not the entire bench) appreciates the implications for determining
when class treatment is or is not “superior” to other adjudicative methods; THOMAS A. MAUET,
PRETRIAL (5th ed. 2002) (first published in 1988); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, PRETRIAL PROCESS
(2003).
95. As with the dominance of largely clientless pretrial proceedings over “day in court”
adjudication and the predominance of settlement over trial, the bench, bar, and legal academy were
also slow to recognize the presence and importance of ADR, a situation more than rectified by both the
explosive growth of ADR activity (the ABA’s Dispute Resolution section is now its largest) and
scholarly treatment of the field. See, e.g., JAMES J. ALFINI, SHARON B. PRESS, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT &
JOSEPH B. STULBERG, MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D.
GREEN & FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2d ed. 1992).
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settlement rather than litigation to verdict and multiple appeals is the
norm.96 Nonetheless, tradition dies hard, and the judicial system appears
resistant to any adjudication device that tends to segment the proceedings
or provide alternative means of fact finding. The implicit preference is for
Article III judges to be engaged at all stages of a dispute-resolution
process that culminates in a trial event before a jury (at least in cases
subject to the Seventh Amendment guarantee, which is viewed as
permitting little experimentation with the basic model of a single jury
hearing an entire case in one sitting).97
Reservations about class actions, and even some of the more piercing
attacks, are also fueled by essentially nonpartisan, but ideological
differences over appropriate judicial policy. Professor Issacharoff has
summarized the divide well:
On one side were the proceduralist critics of the use of class actions
shorn of the protective representation of the absent class members.
On the other side were the distributionalist critics of the haphazard
and wasteful fashion in which the litigation system responded to the
asbestos crisis. For the proceduralists, the critical issues were the
process distortions that emerged from conflicted representation and
the seemingly inescapable temptation to forego the interests of the
victims of tomorrow in exchange for compensation for the
claimants of today. On the other side were those whose interests

96. The legal profession was slower still to examine party-controlled negotiation to the extent
that arbitration, mediation, and other forms of ADR involving third parties were studied. Scholarly
examination of negotiation, first through articles applying game theory and then cognitive theory, and
only recently through casebooks or textbooks, tended to follow recognition of the importance of ADR
methods and pretrial proceedings. See, e.g., RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
STRATEGY (2002); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88
GEO. L.J. 1789 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (holding that in determining
whether jury trial is required, courts should use a historical test based on whether the action would
have been tried to jury in the late eighteenth century and then whether the remedy sought would be
traditionally classed as legal or equitable); see also DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.93 (4th ed. 2005) (citing Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 319–22
(5th Cir. 1998), which held that individual jury determinations of liability, injury, and damages are
required by the Seventh Amendment in asbetsos mass tort litigation); Miller, supra note 88, at 1087–
89 (approving of Supreme Court’s functional approach to jury trial question in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), but urging more traditional approach based on history and
custom for most Seventh Amendment questions); Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The
Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 219
(2000) (stating that the “willingness to allow underlying factual issues to be decided by judge rather
than jury is at odds with core Seventh Amendment purposes”); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Dispute Resolution—Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
366 (1986) (suggesting that the summary jury trial ADR device may violate the Seventh Amendment).
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were primarily dictated by the compensatory and distributive
concerns underlying the foundations of the tort system.98
Although the proceduralist-distributionalist division was discussed
above in the context of mass tort litigation, it serves as a general
organizing principle for explaining a good deal of the philosophical divide
between those favoring more aggressive versus cautious use of class
treatment.99 Without doubt, mass tort class action litigation brings the

98. Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1926 (2002). Accord Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy,
Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 752–54 (2002).
Professor Nagareda’s analysis, as distilled by Professor Issacharoff, provides a rough alignment of the
prominent commentators of both camps. Noted proceduralists include Issacharoff, John C. Coffee,
George Cohen, Susan Koniak, and Judith Resnik. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Action Accountability]; Coffee, supra note 2; Susan
Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1045 (1995); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000). Noted distributionists include Eric Green, George Priest,
and David Rosenberg. See, e.g., Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We’ll
Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 Into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773 (1997);
George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 521 (1997); David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996); Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2. See also David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 831 (2002) (taking issue with Nagerda’s thesis endorsing non-coercive remedies in class
actions).
99. Of course, a good organizing principle or useful heuristic is not the same as a perfect
explanatory device or criterion. Knowing an observer’s relative valuation of procedural-vs.distributional concerns has significant but not foolproof predictive value. In addition, there is the
thorny operational problem of determining exactly who fits into which school of thought. By way of
full disclosure, I should note that I was happy to join an amicus brief authored by Professor Isaacharoff
and Professor Charles Silver and submitted to the Court in the Amchem case. Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Respondents, Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (No. 96-270) (urging Court to affirm Third Circuit
decision disapproving settlement in mass tort asbestos action and refusing to permit certification of
class for settlement where class could not be maintained for adjudication, a position ultimately adopted
by the Court, as I read its Amchem opinon). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997). Presumably, that makes me a proceduralist.
But on the proverbial other hand, as further described in this article, I support greater use of class
actions, even in cases where traditional proceduralists would argue that I am insufficiently sensitive to
the need for individual proof and targeted judicial inquiry. I also support a liberal attitude toward the
use of the class-action device and bankruptcy proceedings as a means of resolving mass tort claims,
particularly in the context of the seemingly unending asbestos litigation in which, as the Judicial
Conference has noted, “transaction costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two-to-one;
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and the future claimants may lose altogether” if
the claims are not resolved through settlement but left instead to work through the adjudicatory system
seriatim. See id. at 598 (quoting U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION REPORT 2–3 (Mar. 1991)).
So perhaps I am a distributionalist after all—or a lapsed proceduralist. Similarly, one can question
my classification of Professor Isaacharoff as a proceduralist. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John
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divide into starkest relief because of the purported greater variegation
found among aggregated tort claimants as compared to other types of
aggregate litigation (although the purported differences between tort and
non-tort litigation tend to be overstated), particularly the difference
between class members with clear symptoms of serious injury and class
members that may or may not develop serious injury in the future.100 But
even in non-tort litigation, there is some inherent tension in choosing
between aggregate class treatment of a matter and individual treatment of
claims. Although less pronounced, the same divide affects thinking in the
legal community over the wisdom of certifying a class in investor
securities litigation as well as in mass tort litigation.
A variant of this divide is reflected in the “everyone-has-a-day-incourt” model of litigation versus a model of litigation that permits more
aggregated and generalized adjudication, including use of “inventory” or
packaged settlements.101 On one side of this divide is the received
traditional wisdom and precedent of Anglo-American procedure, which
has historically placed significant limits on issue and claim preclusion and
has tended to insist on individualized proof of matters as a prerequisite to

Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort
Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (taking an arguably more distributionalist view of litigation).
Perhaps the proceduralist-distributionalist continuum is not a perfect vehicle for explaining attitudes
toward class actions and does not completely describe the differing major orientations toward the
matter of class treatment of claims. Although a very useful concept, it should be supplemented by
recognition of a third perspective: that of the public-policy purposivist or “policy-purposivist.” See
infra note 106 and accompanying text.
100. Asbestos claims again provide perhaps the best example. Global asbestos settlements have
tended to divide victim injuries into a handful of broad classes and to provide for set monetary awards
according to the classification of the injury, without further delineation of the varying seriousness of
particular plaintiff injuries within a class. This is such a well established approach to the problem of
asbestos mass tort settlement that Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th
Cong. (2005) (“FAIR”), the principal proposed asbestos litigation being considered by Congress, uses
the same approach. Under the FAIR Act’s schedule of compensation, all claimants with evidence of
some asbestos-related impairment would receive $25,000. Thus, a sedentary plaintiff with only lung
scarring visible on X-rays gets the same amount as an avid sports enthusiast who now finds herself
short of breath on a walk. Similarly, all asbestos victims with pleural plaque would get $100,000 under
the bill, although the amount of plaque will vary among this group. “Severe” asbestosis is to be
compensated at $400,000 while “disabling” asbestosis qualifies for an $850,000 award.
Although these amounts all make sense when measured against historical litigation experience
there is no denying that this approach of grouping claims into uniform compensation categories tends
to paper over individual distinctions within each category. It also presents issues of classification in
borderline cases that can have dramatic effect. For example, the determination of disability from
asbestosis can mean a $450,000 difference in compensation amount. See Editorial, Asbestos
Showdown, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2006 at A22 (opposing FAIR Act in part because of its broad brush
approach to valuation of claims, many of which are suspected to be based on “bogus claims from
people who aren’t even sick”).
101. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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entry of judgment.102 On the other side are a number of academic
commentators who have eloquently argued for use of more flexible,
alternative means of proof in order to permit litigation of disputes that
would be cumbersome, if not impossible, to litigate under the traditional
model.103 There is some tacit but little explicit support in the judiciary as it
evolves toward relaxations of the traditional approach in some areas. For
example, federal courts during the last few decades have taken a broader
approach to issue preclusion by, for example, removing the mutuality
requirement104 and permitting use of offensive issue preclusion.105 To a
degree, this jurisprudential divide is but a cousin to the divide in non-legal
society between those who prefer things customized and those who take
comfort in the standardized or uniform, pitting those who desire handmade goods in tension with those willing to trade romance for consistency
with machine-made goods.
In addition to the proceduralist-distributionalist tension (perhaps at
times a schism), there is an arguable, essentially unnamed, and not as well
articulated third camp with far fewer self-identified adherents. For
purposes of discussion, I call this the “policy-purposivist” perspective on
class actions (indeed on civil disputing and the justice system in
general).106 Under the policy-purposive approach, a court or commentator
is most concerned with having the Rules of Civil Procedure interpreted
and applied in a manner that best advances the public policy goals and
objectives underlying the Rule, at least if this can be done in a manner

102. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 21, § 11.29 at 727 (“The courts are generally
cautious in applying preclusion against individual claims on the basis of a prior class action of which
the individual may not either have had full knowledge or have fully accepted the adequacy of its
representation of his or her claims.”)
103. See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2 (advocating use of multiple trials to develop
average outcomes and awards); Laurens Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve Federal Class Action Cases
by Jury Trial, 88 VA. L. REV. 405, 412–15 (2002) (urging “polyfurcation” and class treatment of one
or more susceptible issues in a case); Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002); Bone, supra note 7; Bone, supra note 21 (reviewing
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987));
104. Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
105. Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
106. At least I think this third camp exists. This policy-purposivist perspective has replaced the
proceduralist perspective I tended to hold in the past. As noted above, I happily joined in an amicus
brief arguing for reversal in Amchem and was in general agreement with both Amchem and Ortiz at the
time they were rendered. See supra note 99. Today, I am less enthusiastic about the practical effect of
both decisions, which was to discourage class treatment, particularly in mass torts. Although this may
indicate only evolution toward the distributionalist perspective (or merely incoherent thinking), I now
think the problem with restrictive attitudes toward class treatment is the tendency of such a
jurisprudence to make it not only less likely that “little wrongs” will be vindicated but also far less
likely that laws against fraud, anticompetitive conduct, tortious behavior, and similar bad acts will
have their intended deterrent effect.
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consistent with other goals of the legal system. The policy-purposivist is
not unconcerned with the proceduralist worries about inaccuracy, conflict
of interest, corruption, or reduced due process. Nor is the policypurposivist willing to endorse a distributionalist solution in the face of
serious countervailing procedural-cum-constitutional problems. However,
a policy-purposivist places a high value on the deterrent function of law
and the moral leadership provided by law. To the policy purposivist, it is
as important that tortfeasors, fraudulent actors, criminals, and
unscrupulous businesspersons be called to account as it is to respect the
traditional deference for individualized adjudication and concerns over
compensation. As discussed in the remainder of this article, a policypurposivist perspective leads to a more charitable attitude toward class
treatment, even at some risk to or erosion of proceduralist or
distributionalist ideals, in order to serve the larger public-policy purposes
underlying both Rule 23 and the laws creating the claims for relief made in
class litigation.
II. DIFFERENTIATING AMONG THE PURPORTED PROBLEMS OF THE CLASS
ACTION: RECOGNIZING THE ADVANTAGES OF INVESTOR CLASS ACTIONS
As discussed in Part I, the modern class action has been under attack
during much of its life. But those attacks (e.g., alleging collusive, selfserving, or inadequate settlements; in terrorem effects; and conflicts of
interest) on class actions have tended to have a one-dimensional quality.
The criticisms tend to proceed as if there is a single “class action problem”
and as if all class actions present essentially the same potential benefits,
detriments, logistical difficulties, proof problems, and so on. In actuality,
the class-action device faces different problems when deployed in
different applications.
Critics have tended to see all class actions as equally problematic (with
perhaps some greater calumny reserved for tort class actions). But mass
tort class actions, consumer class actions, and investor class actions all
present somewhat different benefits and risks. Investor class actions,
notwithstanding political rhetoric about strike suits and the merits not
mattering, are considerably less problematic than mass tort and other class
actions, particularly in cases where the alleged wrongdoing merits
punishment but the individual losses are not large. Congress appears to
have recognized this to a degree when enacting CAFA, which specifically
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carves out securities class actions from its provisions,107 although this may
also have merely been acknowledgment that two relatively recent statutes
(the 1995 PSLRA and the 1998 SLUSA) were specifically directed at
securities matters. CAFA’s securities carve-out also solidifies the popular
impression that CAFA was largely a response to perceived excessive
forum-shopping by mass torts plaintiffs’ counsel.108
The mass tort class action has fueled much of the recent debate and
backlash against class actions. Mass tort class actions were specifically
mentioned with disfavor in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966
Amendment to Rule 23 (although the Committee Note did not take the
position that tort actions could never be brought as class actions).109 In
keeping with the notion that every litigant was entitled to his or her day in
court, coupled with the view that many elements of tort injury (such as
pain and suffering, emotional distress, or loss of consortium) were
personal and idiosyncratic to the claimants, class action treatment was not
often sought for tort cases during the first two decades after the 1966
Amendment.110
The asbestos, pollution, and toxic tort claims of the 1980s gave rise to
greater consideration of the class device, leading to a boom of sorts. Key
was the 1984 Agent Orange litigation settlement brokered by Judge
Weinstein.111 Although the settlement was hailed in many quarters, it was

107. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A) (2005) (providing that the new jurisdictional grant of
section 1332(d) does not include an action that involves only a claim concerning a “covered security”
within the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998). CAFA also specifically carves out
from its jurisdictional grant cases involving government defendants, internal corporate affairs, and
fiduciary duties. See Joseph, supra note 66. In addition, these types of state class actions are not
removable under CAFA § 1453(d).
108. See Linda Pissott Reig, Charles E. Erway III & Brian P. Sharkey, The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005: Overview, Historical Perspective, and Settlement Requirements, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1087, 1091 (2005) (“increase in state court mass tort class actions was one of the factors
that prompted passage of CAFA”); see also id. at 1089 (emphasizing that securities carve-out applies
only if action is one “solely” involving securities or corporate governance; presence of mass tort or
consumer claims make carve-out inapplicable).
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s note (1966), reprinted in 5 MOORE, supra note
3, § 23App.04[2] at 23App.-13.
110. See 5 MOORE, supra note 3, § 23.23[4][h] at 23–86 (“Historically, courts have been reluctant
to certify classes in products liability and mass tort cases.”) (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst.,
Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), which noted and adhered to traditional reluctance due to
inherent difficulties with respect to commonality and management); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107
F.R.D. 719, 724 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting traditional opposition to class treatment of tort claims).
111. See In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying
class in Agent Orange litigation), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Ralph Blumenthal, Veterans
Speak Out on Agent Orange, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1984, at B1; William Glaberson, Agent Orange, the
Next Generation: In Vietnam and America, Some See a Wrong Still Not Righted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2004, at 25.
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also criticized both from the perspective of the “left” (that the settlement
undercompensated and created pressure against recognizing some
legitimately stronger opt-out claims)112 and the “right” (that the settlement
was essentially “Orangemail” in view of the weak causation evidence that
could be mustered by the plaintiffs).113
Although the Agent Orange settlement may have had its enemies, its
perceived success helped usher in the new era of mass tort class actions.
However, because class action defendants wanted global peace in
resolving such claims, pressure to reach settlement was arguably too
heightened.114 In addition, many mass tort defendants were not in the
financial position to provide full compensation to claimants.115 In some
cases, the insurance policies of the defendants were essentially the only
significant assets available for paying tort claims.116 Although these could
be substantial, they were not infinite and they were not available unless the
insurers also agreed to the settlement or were defeated in any ensuing
coverage litigation.117 The 1990s thus brought the trend toward class

112. See Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986).
113. See Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: A Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1199,
1208–12, 1218 (1993) (remarks of Hon. Ralph Winter and response by Agent Orange Special Master
Kenneth Feinberg) (referring to Editorial, Orangemail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1985, at A34).
114. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2; Silver, supra note 2 (reviewing contention that class
actions create undue pressure to settle); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298
(7th Cir. 1995) (articulating argument that certification of mass tort class virtually mandates that
defendant settle).
115. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulence Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1298 (court notes that although company
has substantial assets and sales, amount required for payment of tort damages sought by requested
class of claimants would likely outstrip company assets); In re N. Dist. of California Dalkon Shield
Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th
Cir. 1982) (same); Pruitt v. Allied Chem Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980) (same); In re Three
Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action
and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. (1987) (both
available insurance and defendant assets may be insufficient to satisfy mass tort claims).
116. See, e.g., Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F.Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (insurance policies only
assets available to pay claims); In re Acands, Inc., 311 B.R. 36 (Bankr. Del. 2004) (same). Although
the insurance may be all there is in individual cases as well, a longstanding compensation problem for
victims, see, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Beebe, 54 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1931), the situation is perhaps
more likely to occur in mass tort litigation because the same factors that gave rise to the avalanche of
claims (e.g., unsafe product, bad publicity, adverse government action) may have driven the company
out of business, leaving only available insurance to pay claims.
117. For example, the bankruptcies of several litigation defendants have spawned substantial
insurance coverage litigation. See, e.g., UNR Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 942 F.2d 1101, 1104–05
(7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois law to insurance coverage dispute); Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 958 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also Mark D. Plevin, Robert
T. Ebert & Leslie A. Epley, Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 TEX. L.
REV. 883, 889–906 (2003) (describing insurer objections to bankruptcy-related global settlements and
insurer challenges to asbestos defendant claims of insurance coverage).
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actions designed primarily as a mass tort settlement-facilitation device.
The 1982 Johns-Manville reorganization bankruptcy and establishment of
the Manville Trust had already ushered in the use of bankruptcy as a mass
tort resolution device,118 but the late 1990s and early twenty-first century
were to see a renewed round of bankruptcy activity by asbestos
defendants.119
Concerns that the class action mass tort phenomenon might be getting
out of hand provided the backdrop to the Supreme Court’s Amchem and
Ortiz decisions. Although the Amchem and Ortiz holdings are generally
viewed as having drastically limited class treatment as a device for mass
tort resolution, a Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) study suggested that
class actions continued to be widely used for mass tort settlements, and not
solely in state court.120 The study obtained survey responses from more
than 700 attorneys involved in more than 600 class actions. Based on the
responses, the FJC Report concluded that:
•

“neither Amchem and Ortiz nor federal class certification rules
were reported to have directly affected the vast majority of
plaintiff attorneys’ choice of forum”;

•

defense counsel considered the arguably more restrictive federal
procedure in determining whether to remove state class matters
to federal court;

•

“federal and state judges were almost equally likely to certify
class actions and to certify those cases for litigation and trial or

Even the absence of bankruptcy, insurers and asbestos defendant policyholders have long been in
dispute regarding the degree to which asbestos claims are covered under insurance policies and the
amount of coverage available. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1998)
(resolving dispute between asbestos defendant policyholder and its insurer regarding the number of
“occurrences” under the policy and hence the amount of insurance available to pay asbestos claims);
Keene Corp. v. Ins. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (policyholder and insurers dispute
standard for triggering coverage); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations Co., 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980) (same); see also JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 14.07,
14.09, 14.10 (3d ed. 2006) (describing years of insurer-policyholder litigation over classification of
asbestos claims, trigger of insurance coverage by asbestos claims, and appointment of relative insurer
and policyholder responsibility for claims).
To the extent insurers succeed in avoiding coverage, this obviously undermines global settlement
efforts and may prevent aggregate settlement altogether as plaintiffs and counsel race to the courthouse
in an attempt to obtain tort judgments that the company will be able to pay in the absence of insurance
or will have higher payment priority in administration of any bankruptcy.
118. See Resnick, supra note 58; Vairo, supra note 58, at 105–08 (describing Manville bankruptcy
and trust).
119. See Vairo, supra note 58, at 105–08.
120. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 83. See also SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 83.
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for settlement,” but “federal judges were more likely than state
judges to deny class certification, while state judges were more
likely than federal judges to not rule on certification”;
•

“federal and state judges were equally likely to approve class
settlements”;

•

“the rate at which proposed class actions were reported to have
been certified appears to have declined when compared to a
Federal Judicial Center pre-Amchem and Ortiz study of class
actions in four federal districts” (and in addition, there appears to
have been an increase in class actions certified for settlement);
and

•

“the percentage of class recoveries reported to have been
allocated to attorney fees appears to have been about the same as
in the previous [FJC] study.”121

Notwithstanding these FJC findings, there appears to have been a
perception that federal class actions had lost substantial utility as a mass
tort settlement device in the wake of Amchem and Ortiz. For example,
there appears to have been a pronounced shift to bankruptcy as the
preferred means of attempting to achieve global peace for asbestos
defendants, particularly in view of congressional facilitation through
enactment of section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits use of
a “pre-packaged” bankruptcy in which asbestos tort claimants-creditors
and the asbestos defendant-debtor can agree prior to filing to a streamlined
bankruptcy procedure and stipulated settlement of asbestos claims.
Notwithstanding that there appears to continue to be a good deal of
omnibus settlement of asbestos and other claims, debate also continues
regarding the aptness of aggregate treatment of such claims. Currently, for
example, the American Law Institute has underway a project regarding
aggregation of claims.122 Although the project is not limited to mass tort
claims, these clearly helped drive the project into being. And, of course, as
passage of CAFA demonstrates, after Amchem and Ortiz there remained
considerable concern on the part of class action opponents that state court

121. See WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 83, at 4 (Executive Summary). See also THOMAS
E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996).
122. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 (2005) (reviewed by ALI Members Consultative Group on May 15, 2005).
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class actions were being used as a means of avoiding the more stringent
standards prevailing under federal law.123
The concern over class treatment of mass torts, although overdone (as
discussed in Part IV, infra), is not without foundation. The notion of
“inventory” or “warehouse” settlements cuts against the grain of American
judicial ideology, with its individualistic emphasis on each claimant’s day
in the crucible of the courtroom. Although the notion may be quaint,
romantic, and unrealistic, it remains powerful and constraining,
particularly for tort claims. For most individuals, a tort claim is not only
unusual, it also grows out of a traumatic event that was a major part of the
plaintiff’s life. Consider the “typical” auto accident, medical negligence,
or fraud claim. Although there are notorious “professional” fender-bender
plaintiffs occasionally reported in the popular press, for most plaintiffs, the
events leading them to pursue tort litigation were a major life tragedy,
often one involving serious injury or death. Of course, these claims are
also highly individuated and thus highly unlikely to ever be eligible for
even partial class action treatment.
When this baseline norm is transferred to the arena of mass torts, the
system subconsciously resists group treatment of the claim, despite the
obvious fact that there are more commonalities found among asbestos,
prescription-drug, or defective-product claimants than among typical
negligence plaintiffs. This resistance to mass tort class actions holds
continued vitality despite another distinguishing feature of many mass
torts—there may be many claimants with non-trivial but non-traumatic or
non-acute injury. Thus, in a given clump of tort claims, few may be the
stuff of trial drama. Most may be examples of only relatively modest
injury that as a whole add up to a claim of substantial value. This type of
mass tort claim is different from one brought by a class of the estates of
victims of an air crash or of a cruise ship disaster. It ought to make class
treatment easier to obtain in that the court is not being asked to blur
individual differences in a high-damages trauma claim, but instead is only
being asked to make general “ballpark” assessments of similar types of
injuries suffered by a large group of similarly situated claimants.
Nonetheless, resistance to tort class actions as a concept continues.
Compared to claims arising out of a fixed course of conduct that may
give rise to an antitrust claim, a securities claim, or even a disparateimpact discrimination claim, the mass tort claim is thought to present more
pronounced issues of differentiation among the claimants, each of whom is

123. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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thought to have absorbed the blow of tortious behavior in his or her own
individual way. For the reasons set forth in Part IV, this view is
overwrought and has fomented too much resistance to class action
treatment of mass tort claims.124
An additional and related point is that the more individuated nature of
tort claims, particularly the extent of each claimant’s damages, makes it
less likely that the same attorney can represent a large group of claimants
fairly, without favoring the interests of some at the expense of others. By
contrast, non-tort claims are thought to present damage differences that are
more readily capable of objective and verifiable calculation, reducing the
risk that lawyers will unwittingly favor some clients over others and,
perhaps more importantly, making any class action settlement more
subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny.
In addition, tort claims are thought to give rise to more untested or
novel claims as plaintiffs press to prove fault in areas where scientific
evidence may only be emerging on the matter. By contrast, statutory
claims are thought to benefit from the roadmap of a statutory scheme of
definitions, jurisdiction, liability, damages, and perhaps even disputing
procedure. Class commercial claims such as fraud or misrepresentation are
also perceived as stable and not novel. According to conventional wisdom,
the commercial or statutory claim can thus more safely be entrusted to
class treatment without running any significant risk that the court will
commit adjudicative error that affects a huge number of claims.
By contrast, there is concern that class treatment of a tort action is not
appropriate if the liability and damages theories underlying the tort are not
“mature,” with parameters established by previous adjudication and
settlement.125 For emerging torts, the conventional wisdom posits that
there should be some respectable period of case-by-case adjudication
during which the assumptions underlying the claims and defenses are
tested.126 The immaturity problems posed by these emerging tort claims
are also exacerbated in that most tort claims are based on state law, which

124. See infra text accompanying note 303.
125. The concept of a mature mass tort claim is taken from Francis E. McGovern, Resolving
Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989).
126. See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative
Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 704 n.55 (1997) (noting “apparent
renaissance of mass tort class actions is associated primarily with litigation that is sufficiently mature
either to threaten product manufacturers with bankruptcy or to have revealed enough damaging
information to induce them to strive for global settlements or both.”); McGovern, Mature Mass Tort
Litigation, supra note 125, at 659; Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past & Future of Defendant and Settlement
Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 699 (1997).
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may be relatively undeveloped in many states. In addition, states may
differ significantly, making choice-of-law issues particularly important
and making the different locations of plaintiffs or defendants an
impediment to class treatment.127
This relates to another traditional judicial concern about mass torts:
their purported in terrorem effect on defendants if pursued as a class
action. Although any class certification is thought to enhance the
settlement value of the claims, the notion is that, at least for non-tort
claims, the amount of recoverable damage is fairly readily ascertainable
and cabined within some outer boundary of what a reasonable factfinder
might find to be the amount necessary to compensate for a drop in share
price, lost business opportunity, and so on. Unless there is a realistic risk
of a punitive damages award, which is thought less likely in a statutory,
contract, or commercial dispute,128 the defendant’s “worst case” scenario
can be calculated with some confidence.
By contrast, tort claims often present large elements of damages that
are non-economic (e.g., pain and suffering, loss of consortium) or
otherwise less readily amenable to objective measurement (e.g., future lost
income, future medical care). Thus, the range of case outcomes is thought
to be greater in tort cases, raising more risk of a really large, even
devastating judgment if many tort claims are added together, even if few
of the tort claims involve severe injury. For this reason, concerns over the
in terrorem effect of class certification and “blackmail” of defendants are
heightened in the mass tort context as compared to commercial claims.129
As discussed at greater length in Part III, most of these concerns
fueling reluctance to accord class action treatment to mass torts are

127. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that plaintiffs’ due
process rights may be violated if their claims are subjected to law of another state). As the Shutts
decision demonstrates, the problem is not confined to tort law. Shutts involved largely contract-based
claims for oil and gas royalties.
128. Punitive damages are generally not available in ordinary breach of contract litigation unless
the contract breach is also accompanied by conduct that constitutes an independent tort such as fraud
or conversion. See, e.g., Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W. 2d 775, 789–90 (Minn. 1975). See Note, “Contort”:
Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance
Commercial Contracts—Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510 (1985). Breach
of an insurer’s duties under a policy, if sufficiently wrongful, can support an action for bad faith
seeking punitive damages, but only in states that consider insurance bad faith to be a tort action rather
than a breach of contract action. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES
§§ 10.02, 10.06[C] (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005). See also RICHARD L. BLATT, ROBERT W.
HAMMESFAHR & LORI S. NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.4 (2003 ed.) (reviewing notable punitive damage awards, almost all of them being in tort
matters rather than simple matter of commercial failure).
129. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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overstated.130 As discussed in Part IV, many of these mass tort claims can
be accorded class treatment that facilitates prosecution of the claims—at
least for significant aspects of the case—without incurring the purported
deleterious effects of mass tort class actions.131 What is important for
purposes of this Part, however, is that tort claims, even mass tort claims,
have historically been thought to be different from the statutory or
commercial claims in ways that make tort claims less amenable to class
treatment. By contrast, statutory and commercial claims are thought to be
more apt for class treatment. These types of class actions—particularly
investor class actions—should be less problematic for a number of
reasons:
•

the body of law to be applied is often national (through a federal
statute or federal common law) or uniform (involving basic
principles of contract, fraud, fiduciary duty, or the like that are
seen as less likely to vary from state to state when contrasted
with tort law);

•

the conduct in question is thought to more often involve a
relatively small number of acts or decisions, as contrasted with
the more variegated and dispersed conduct giving rise to tort
claims;

•

the degree of differentiation between claims is muted;132

•

Certain items of damage, such as punitive damages, are not
realistically available outside the tort context. Where statutory or
commercial matters permit exemplary damages, these are
usually provided for by the statute. In addition, objective
damages formulas are thought to be more readily available for
non-tort claims.

Claims brought by investors under the federal securities laws would
appear to be particularly amenable to class action treatment as contrasted
with mass tort matters, a result consistent with case results and civil
procedure commentary.133 The applicable law is largely federal and is

130. See infra text accompanying notes 164–87.
131. See infra text accompanying note 308.
132. Contrast, for example, a securities claim in which the different plaintiffs all bought shares of
Acme Company with the asbestos mass tort in which plaintiffs may allege injurious exposure to
defendant’s asbestos through exposure to pipe insulation, walking through a construction site,
scrubbing tile, opening bags of the material, working on circuit boards, ripping up carpeting, and so
on.
133. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 23.23[4][b] (citing cases).
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quite well established. Even to the extent that duties under the securities
law have developed in an incremental fashion, such as through the
evolution and refinement of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act,134 the state of the law
today is for the most part stable and well-known. In addition, securitiesrelated actions by investors appear even more likely than other statutory or
commercial claims to be based on common or similar conduct by the
defendants. Consequently, adjudicating liability on a classwide basis
seems far less likely to raise problems in securities-related actions than in
the mass tort context.
Securities claims are frequently linked with common law contract or
fraud claims or with breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, areas of law that are
also, for the most part, not emergent but established, creating relatively
little uncertainty about how applicable law will be applied. Although
punitive damages are available for fraudulent conduct or a sufficiently
egregious breach of fiduciary duty, they are seen as more widely available
or even wildly available in tort cases. If nothing else, for all manner of
claims today, the Supreme Court’s 2003 State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell decision provides a considerable measure of
predictability as to “worst case” outcomes in that Campbell presumptively
limits punitive damages to a nine-to-one ratio with compensatory
damages, at least in cases where the compensatory award is substantial.135
Similarly, damage calculation in securities-related investor claims is
more likely to lend itself for mathematical formulas than is the case for
mass torts or other claims that might require more individuated jury
determination. In related fashion, a securities-related claim is less likely to
imperil the continued existence of the defendant companies than might a
tort class action. As discussed above, the range of damages recovery in
tort is thought to be less predictable, in view of the importance of noneconomic and future-prediction damages in tort law claims. By contrast,
the damage formula of investor-related claims is often based on a subset of
share price (rather than being unlinked to share price as a tort claim may

134. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564–67 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (describing
background and evolution of SEC Rule 10b-5, which forbids any scheme or artifice to defraud in
connection with securities transaction, including development of private right of action for aggrieved
investors); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 936–39 (5th
ed. 2003).
135. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). But see In re Simon II
Litigation, 407 F.3d 125, 128, 135, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that Campbell limitations on
punitive damages may work against class certification of punitive damages claims).
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be) or related to commissions overcharged or optimal prices not
attained.136
In addition, the amount of total injury that even a bad business can
inflict on investors is probably limited by the value of the company’s
shares. Not even stupid, wicked management can very easily take from
investors more than they have to give in legitimate investment in the
company, setting an outer ceiling on awards. Realistically, of course, the
ceiling is quite a bit lower in that even really bad business conduct seldom
takes all wealth from shareholders. Even Enron and WorldCom stock had
some value after the fall. By contrast, tortious acts by a company may
inflict injury on third parties that far outstrips the value of the company.
To take an example, a small chemical company can poison a city water
supply, resulting in liability far beyond the company’s assets and
insurance, but the same chemical company can logically only bilk
investors up to the amount of the investment.
For that reason, insurance or other resources available to a company
facing investor lawsuits are usually sufficient to settle the dispute or pay a
resulting judgment.137 For mass tort claims, however, the amount
necessary for settlement or satisfaction of claims may far outpace the
available, unexhausted insurance purchased by even a diligent risk
manager. Where insurance is generally available, this also enhances the
prospect of case resolution, apart from the class-certification question.
In addition, investor plaintiffs arguably have a different motivational
matrix than tort plaintiffs. For investor plaintiffs, litigation should be, as

136. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring) (damages in securities litigation largely linked to change in share price due to wrongful
conduct); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Law:
Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 96 (2005) (same); Merritt B. Fox,
Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1548–50 (2005) (describing damages formula as generally
being difference in share price but focusing on “fraud on the market” actions in which allegation is that
defendant fraud caused plaintiff to pay artificially inflated price for stock).
137. See Silver, supra note 2, at 1414 (stating that more than ninety percent of large public
companies have Directors and Officers liability insurance, insurance is present in eighty percent of
shareholder litigation, and insurance provides fifty to eighty percent of settlement funds) (citing Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 497, 550 (1991)). According to Professor Silver:
Because class action defendants often have insurance coverage—including
comprehensive programs containing multiple primary and excess layers—the likelihood of
their being forced into insolvency by plaintiff victories is reduced. The risk quantification
needed to prevent defendants from feigning deathly fear of class actions must therefore take
insurance into account. The well-known practice of settling at or within policy limits adds
force to this imperative. Liability insurance both protects a defendant’s assets and fosters a
climate in which a defendant’s uninsured assets are thought to be beyond claimants’ reach.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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put so well by Marlon Brando’s “Don Corleone” in The Godfather,138
“business, not personal.” Although fraud claims that destroy savings
accounts can test this concept, for the most part investor claims are
economic claims seeking economic recompense. They are not about
having a tortfeasor “pay” for disfiguring the plaintiff or having a court
vindicate an employee’s job performance (e.g., determining that
discrimination rather than incompetence explained a discharge) or a
person’s reputation. As a result, one would expect investor plaintiffs to
take a more flinty-eyed approach to claims and dispute resolution than
many of their tort or statutory brethren. Investor plaintiffs should have a
wider constituency and a longer-term view, making them particularly
“rational” about litigation matters.
Investors rationally pursuing recompense through a class action are still
subject to a good deal of lawyer control or influence in that the attorney
will generally be the person managing the litigation on a front-line, daily
basis. However, investors—particularly institutional investors—are likely
to have a good deal more control over class counsel than consumer,
discrimination, or tort plaintiffs. Although Norman Poser wisely reminds
us that institutional investors are not uniformly sophisticated or savvy,139 it
seems indisputable that the average institutional investor is relatively more
sophisticated about litigation matters than the average former construction
worker in a pack of pleural plaque asbestos claimants or the average
consumer overcharged on credit-card interest. As compared to most
litigants, institutional investors are relatively more likely to be “repeat
players” that have been through litigation before and understand the
practical potential and constraints of the process.140
Perhaps more importantly, the average institutional investor likely has
more economic and practical control over its participation in litigation and
its relations with class counsel. Even in cases presenting “injury by a

138. See MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER (1969).
139. See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to
Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1493, 1499 (“While many institutional investment officers
are highly experienced and capable, many others lack the ability or training to understand the nature
and risks of the complex investments that many securities firms sell to their customers. . . . [Further,
e]ven a sophisticated investment officer may not be able to resist selling pressure from a highly
motivated and well-trained salesperson.”).
140. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW. & SOC’Y. REV. 95 (1974). This is the seminal article articulating the distinction
between “repeat” and “one-shot” litigation participants and the impact of this distinction on claim
development, settlement, and adjudication. See also Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart
Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still Come out Ahead?, 33 LAW. & SOC’Y REV. 803, 809 (1999) (stating
that at the theoretical level the Galanter paradigm “continues to be important and provocative”).
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thousand cuts”141 and hence making class pursuit of claims clearly
preferable to individual litigation, the institutional investor may have a
sufficient critical mass of injury to present a credible threat of opting out
of a class, insisting on subclass treatment by itself or with a few others; or
may even have a statutory right to control proceedings through the lead
plaintiff provisions of the PLSRA.142 Even if the institutional investor does
not have the quantum of injury to make claim-by-claim proof
economically attractive, the institutional investor is still likely to have a
sufficient amount at stake to sharpen the organization’s interest and
motivate it to provide continued scrutiny of the progress of the litigation
and the performance of class counsel.
In addition, most institutional investors, even the relatively
unsophisticated, are nonetheless more likely than the average consumer or
tort claimant to seek a second or third legal opinion. To the extent an
institutional investor has concerns over class counsel’s performance, the
investor can consult other counsel or perhaps even employ monitoring
counsel to assess class counsel’s performance, strategic decisions, or
settlement advice. The institutional investor may even have regular
corporate counsel (in-house or outside) available. Because investor classaction litigation is a specialized field of law, it is unlikely that the same
law firm will be both regular counsel to an institutional investor and class
counsel in a major matter involving the institutional investor. Institutional
investors are in many ways the polar opposite of the seamstress plaintiff in
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,143 who had not read the complaint and at
her deposition appeared to have little understanding of the case.144

141. By evoking the metaphor of “death [injury] by a thousand cuts,” I am referring to the ability
of singularly innocuous harm or liability to become severe if it occurs with sufficient frequency. See
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 582 (2005) (using metaphor
to describe gradual small encroachment on executive power and prerogatives resulting in significant
curtailment of executive power). In ancient Chinese criminal law, death by a thousand cuts was a
literal punishment used in the most serious crimes. See generally GEOFFREY MACCORMACK,
TRADITIONAL CHINESE PENAL LAW (1991).
142. See Choi et al., supra note 2, at 871 (stating that the PSLRA lead plaintiff provision
“establishes a rebuttable presumption” that the plaintiff with the largest financial interest is best suited
to be lead plaintiff and “vests the lead plaintiff with authority to select and retain class counsel.”).
143. 383 U.S. 363, 368 (1966).
144. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1 (2004) (noting power and leverage of institutional investors and
suggesting it may be so strong, in light of dominance of the “shareholder primacy model” in
“scholarship theories with regard to the firm,” that institutional shareholders should have managementlike duties (and attendant legal responsibilities) toward corporation); Craig C. Martin & Matthew H.
Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Insitutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381
(2001) (making similar point, particularly in light of prerogatives given to large, usually institutional,
investors under PSLRA). See also Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing,

p1127 Stempel book pages.doc4/20/2006

1168

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:1127

Some institutional investors may even be proverbial “800-pound
gorillas” who are in a position to “sit anywhere they want” and effectively
run the show in an investor class action. Consider CalPERS, the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System, which controls billions of dollars
in investments and may be a major force in any class claim in which it is
involved.145 Although perhaps not frequently, institutional investors have
certainly shown their ability to flex their muscles when so inclined. In one
case, large institutional investors investigated a putative class action,
concluded the claims were without merit, and urged dismissal of the
case.146 As relatively sophisticated, relatively well-heeled litigants or
prospective litigants, institutional investors are in a position to exercise
substantial control over a matter, including the selection and activities of
counsel. Institutional investors may even hold “beauty contests” to select
counsel from among attorney supplicants seeking class-counsel status
from institutional investors.
This is not to suggest that investor litigation is a type of disputeresolution Nirvana made all the more perfect by the presence of
institutional investors in a putative class.147 As noted above, not all
institutional investors have the expertise, resources, or will to play the
litigation monitoring and claim “purifying” role that they are at least
capable of playing. For example, in the Choi-Fisch-Pritchard empirical
examination in this Symposium, the authors found that there was only
mixed evidence of increased institutional-investor participation despite the
lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA.148 It appears that private
institutions have not increased in participation, although the authors did

15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994).
145. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533, 540–41 (1997). In In re California Micro Devices Securities Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D.
Cal. 1996), CalPERS successfully intervened through its own monitoring counsel in a case involving
allegations of breach of fiduciary duty:
When plaintiffs’ counsel proposed to settle the case on terms that did not involve any
monetary payment to the company, CalPERS [which owned 1.3 million shares of defendant
W.R. Grace] objected to the settlement. In addition to permitting CalPERS to intervene, the
court appointed CalPERS’ counsel to serve as co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs, thereby
allowing CalPERS full participation in the settlement negotiations.
Fisch, supra at 540–41.
146. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (1996).
147. But the most recent scholarly examination of the securities class actions suggests that this
genre of lawsuit performs much better than the era’s critical rhetoric against the class action would
suggest. See Sephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465
(2004).
148. See Choi et al., supra note 2, at 877–78.
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note a correlation between enactment of the PSLRA and a “substantial
increase in involvement by public pension funds.”149 However, the distinct
possibility that the PSLRA lead plaintiff provisions and the presence of
institutional investors does not rid class actions of problematic aspects
hardly negates the advantages institutional investor litigation would appear
to enjoy over other types of class action litigation.
On the whole, there is good reason to be more optimistic about investor
class actions, even if one is something of a class-action skeptic in other
areas, particularly where the matter involves the significant presence of
institutional investors. Consider the recent seeming efficacy of the class
action brought against WorldCom directors, bankers, and accountants for
failure to stop the company’s massive fraud on investors.150 Billions of
dollars have been obtained in settlements.151 The lead plaintiff in the
litigation is New York State Comptroller Alan Hevesi, representing the
state’s public employees’ benefit fund, which undoubtedly has enough at
stake to have justified individual litigation.152 But even for this type of
litigant, in a case in which punitive-damages exposure was non-trivial, the
economics of the case favored class-action treatment. The results appear to
have been extremely successful. It is hard to attack class-action claims
brought by investors, particularly institutional investors, that appear to
bring compensation, vindication, and deterrence after a major financial
scandal.
This prompts the question (at least for me): why does there continue to
be considerable resistance to class treatment of investor claims, even those
carried forward by the supposedly more responsible and politically
favored institutional investors? Although investor class actions have not
faced the hostility visited on mass tort class actions, there nonetheless
remain a significant number of cases in which courts could accord greater
class treatment to investor claims but refuse. In short, there should
probably be more class treatment of investor claims than we currently
see—why has this not occurred?

149. Choi et al., supra note 2, at 872.
150. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
151. See, e.g., Michael Bobelian, WorldCom II: Some Class Action Defendants Settle; Others
Prepare for Trial, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 2005 at 5 (“Citigroup . . . forked over $2.57 billion to injured
shareholders and bondholders.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Bank of America Settles Lawsuit Over
WorldCom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005 at C1 (reporting Bank’s agreement to pay $460.5 million in
settlement with WorldCom investors); Ben White, J.P. Morgan Settles WorldCom Suit for $2 Billion,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005 at E1.
152. See White, supra note 151, at E1; Morgenson, supra note 151, at C1.
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One answer is the simple legal realism of contemporary politics and the
power of the “cosmic anecdote.”153 Powerful economic and political forces
would prefer that class actions not be available at all, and perhaps that civil
liability not exist at all. To the extent that class actions permit prosecution
of claims that would otherwise not be brought, this class of potential
defendants and their ideological sympathizers oppose class actions and
will expend political capital in pursuit of curtailing, reducing, or
eliminating class treatment of claims. As a practical matter, the class
action cannot be eliminated. It enjoys too much intellectual support, its
rationale being essentially unassailable, unless one is taking the position
that small injuries should simply be “lumped” by victims. It also enjoys
enough political and social support that killing the class action is not a
realistic political option.
But the class action is subject to being wounded and constrained as a
result of effective political assault. The 1995 PSLRA demonstrates one
example of such curtailment.154 The 2005 CAFA another.155 Although
critics cannot destroy the class action, they certainly have proven capable
of weakening it or making it more difficult to deploy156—a result preferred
by corporate America—even if the legislation does not result in a net
decrease in class action litigation.157 A certain segment of the body politic
simply does not like litigation, particularly plaintiff claims and recoveries.

153. A cosmic anecdote is a well-known, oft-repeated story that makes a rhetorical point about an
issue and enjoys wide acceptance as an accurate portrayal but lacks empirical support. See, e.g.,
Herbert Kritzer, Lawrence Marshall & Frances Kahn Zemans, Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic
Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269 (1992).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 45–51 (discussing PSLRA).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 62–81 (discussing CAFA).
156. See Stephen C. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act? (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Paper No. 558285; USC CLEO Paper No. C04-11; USC Law
Sch., Olin Paper No. 04-16; NYU Law & Economics Paper No. 03-04, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=558285 (concluding that additional restraints of PSLRA are deterring
some meritorious claims where proof of fraud or damage is difficult to obtain).
See also Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & Adam C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More?
Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Mich. State Univ. Research Paper
No. 02-011, Stanford Law and Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 249, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=349500 (concluding that PSLRA has encouraged plaintiffs’ counsel to
focus on stronger investor claims). As noted in the Choi-Fisch-Pritchard paper, the two hypotheses are
not inconsistent. Choi et al., supra note 2. Changes in the law may in fact encourage more attorney and
claimant emphasis on stronger claims where proof of liability or damages is more readily apparent, but
this does not mean that the de-emphasized or forgone claims were without merit. On the contrary, they
may be the “innocent victims” of well-meaning reform or the casualties of politically motivated efforts
to effectively immunize securities defendants from at least some category of claims for which the
defendants should, at least in theory, be held to account for their wrongdoing.
157. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 936–37 (finding that enactment of PSLRA correlated with increased number of
securities-fraud claims against issuers, a result the author suggests may stem from efforts of plaintiffs’
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In addition, of course, investor class actions, like mass tort class
actions, have presented some major public-relations opportunities for their
adversaries. Despite all the evidence that can be marshaled in support of
the social value of class actions, coupon settlements, settlements that pay
lawyers more than class members, and defendant-packaged settlements
can be made to look very bad in the theater of politics. In that atmosphere,
even a small moment of levity mixed with candor can produce a sound
bite that comes back to haunt. Consider William Lerach’s now famouscum-infamous comment that as a class action attorney, he has “the greatest
practice in the world because [he has] no clients.”158 But although political
exploitation is a given, it is also the case that many class action claims are
problematic or were arguably handled in ways that enriched lawyers at the
expense of parties. Certainly, the sudden pull of locales like rural Illinois
or Mississippi for class action situs looks far more strategic than real to
most observers.159 (Recall, however, that most of this sort of drive to bring
class actions in purported “judicial hellholes” involves mass tort litigation
and not investor claims).160
III. CONTINUING LOST OPPORTUNITIES TO EMPLOY CLASS TREATMENT:
THREE ILLUSTRATIONS
The different intellectual approaches to aggregate litigation combine
with different political perspectives to produce a good deal of division
over the proper sphere of class treatment. My argument is that class
treatment can be used even more that it has been and should continue to be
widely used, particularly for investor claims. However, an analysis of a
more flexible approach to class treatment also suggests that class actions

counsel to cast a wider net as a means of risk distribution and cost spreading, out of concern that
victory in securities fraud matters was made more difficult by the PSLRA).
158. See In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(quoting Lerach as further stating “I bring the case. I hire the plaintiff. I do not have some client telling
me what to do. I decide what to do.”); Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of
Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1381 (2001) (reiterating quote and
noting that Lerach has been labeled the “King of Strike Suits”). The quotation originally appeared in
William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, Oct. 11, 1993 at 52, and has been prominently
repeated in subsequent attacks on class actions. See, e.g., Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, The Class
Action Industrial Complex, FORBES, Sept. 20, 2004, at 150.
159. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . .
In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 169–85 (2001) (describing thousand-fold increase in
class action filings in Madison County, Illinois in late 1990s as plaintiff counsel sought favorable
venue; describing cases with only minor connections to the county); Kimberly Jade Norwood,
Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 278–79 (1996)
(noting plaintiff counsel preference for Madison County and other favorable jurisdictions).
160. See supra text accomanying notes 60–61.
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have significant potential for expanded use in mass tort matters. The
remainder of this Part addresses two instances where class-action
treatment was refused, one in a mass tort context161 and the other in an
investor’s securities action.162 Also addressed is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recently imposed hurdle for pleading and proving securities-fraud
damages, a substantive rule that discourages and limits the availability of
class treatment for such cases.163 These illustrations show instances in
which a more flexible approach attempting to utilize class treatment, rather
than erring against use of class treatment, would better serve the justice
system and society.
A. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
In the now well-known In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. case, the
Seventh Circuit felt sufficiently upset about a trial judge’s certification of
a class as to issues of negligence that it granted mandamus to overturn the
certification.164 Although the panel split two-to-one on the issue, the
majority opinion by Judge Richard Posner was influential in discouraging
use of issue class actions.165 The putative plaintiff class in Rhone-Poulenc
alleged that Rhone-Poulenc and other defendants had been negligent in
failing to heat-treat blood supplies used to make blood solids administered
as part of the treatment of hemophiliacs. As a consequence, thousands of
hemophiliacs became HIV-positive.166
Because of the problems of individualized injury, the trial court was
unwilling to certify the matter as a class action but did invoke Rule
23(c)(4)(A) to certify a class on the issue of whether defendants were
negligent in either (a) failing to adopt heat treatment as a preventative of
Hepatitis B (which was a known danger prior to HIV and where the
Hepatitis heat treatment would have also eradicated the HIV in the blood
stocks) and (b) failing to implement heat treatment or other preventatives
of HIV prior to 1985.167 The district court’s plan was to try the issue of
negligence standing alone. A defense verdict would end the litigation on a
classwide basis. A plaintiff class verdict would establish a preclusive

161. See infra text accompanying notes 164–77.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 178–97.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 205–16.
164. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
165. A LexisNexis search indicates that Rhone-Poulenc has been cited 133 times by courts and a
quite amazing 355 times by commentators, attesting to its impact.
166. Id. at 1296.
167. Id. at 1295–97.
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finding of negligence that could be employed by class members in
subsequent litigation in which they sought to prove liability on the part of
defendants and injury due to defendant’s negligence.168
The Seventh Circuit panel majority took the view that the question of
negligence could not be divorced from the issues of causation and
comparative negligence that would be necessary to decide in resolving the
remainder of the claims.169 In addition, and perhaps somewhat more
famously, the court stressed the coercive power of class certification
regarding settlement,170 even though the majority simultaneously indicated
that it was not really basing its decision on public-policy concerns about
settlement dynamics.171 Neither of the majority’s assessments is very
persuasive.
First, consider the question of whether negligence determinations are
inextricably intertwined with issues of causation and comparative
negligence. On one level, it is hard to take the Seventh Circuit’s seeming
contention about comparative negligence seriously. What did the
hemophiliacs do that can be considered comparatively negligent? Should
they have conducted their own blood-stock screening as a check on the
expertise of Rhone-Poulenc and others? That seems absurd. If by
comparative negligence the court meant other sources of HIV infection,

168. Id. at 1296–97.
169. Id. at 1303.
170. Id. at 1298.
171. Id. at 1299. The court stated as follows:
[D]efendants did not mention their concern about settlement pressures until the oral argument
of this appeal [but this is not waiver]. For obvious reasons, they did not point out . . . that if
mandamus is denied they will be forced to settle—for such an acknowledgment would greatly
weaken them in any settlement negotiations. We should be realistic about what is feasible to
put in a public brief.
We do not want to be misunderstood as saying that class actions are bad because they
place pressure on defendants to settle. That pressure is a reality, but it must be balanced
against the undoubted benefits of the class action that have made it an authorized procedure
for employment by federal courts. We have yet to consider the balance.
Id. Although the majority’s refusal to find waiver by the defendants in failing to make the coercion
argument can perhaps be justified on public policy grounds (a court should be able to make a sound
decision and should not be led to an unsound decision because of the mistakes of the litigants), its
commentary on the realpolitik of the adversary system seems unrealistic. Is Judge Posner really
suggesting that plaintiffs and counsel will only know that a finding of defendant negligence gives them
settlement leverage if Rhone-Poulenc and the other defendants concede this in a brief? Before making
this assessment, Judge Posner spent the preceding paragraphs regaling the reader with the many
sources of authority in the public domain that make the case for the coercive power of class
certification, including Judge Friendly’s famous 1973 comment to that effect. Id. at 1298–99 (citing
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973), seven other sources from
secondary legal literature, and three circuit court cases). The argument that class certification unfairly
coerces defendants to settle was by 1995 a fixture of law and litigation. Rhone-Poulenc was perfectly
capable of making the argument in a brief if it so chose.
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this seems to be either (a) a separate part of the causation inquiry or (b) the
type of fact-finding that is not dependent on the fact-finding addressing the
question of the vendor’s due care or lack thereof.
As to causation, this seems a clearly separable matter and not a blended
question as to “whether the harm to the plaintiff followed in some sense
naturally, uninterruptedly, and with reasonable probability from the
negligent act of the defendant.”172 One can assume a fact of blood-supplier
negligence and then conduct a separate inquiry as to whether a plaintiff’s
HIV was brought about through tainted blood or some other cause. The
court’s view is particularly odd in view of its statements earlier in the
opinion that hemophiliacs, needing chronic infusion of blood solids, are
almost sure to develop HIV and AIDS from tainted blood solids.173
On the question of class certification and pressure to settle, the court is
perhaps even less persuasive. According to the court, class certification on
the negligence issue gave unreasonable leverage to the plaintiffs because
the defendants had prevailed in twelve of thirteen individual trials on the
matter but had not enjoyed the benefit of preclusion. By contrast, a
plaintiff class victory on the issue of negligence would put defendants in a
position where the best they could do in subsequent litigation was hope for
some limitations on causation and damages, but where defendants were
sure to be held liable for at least some large damage awards. According to
the court, the trial judge’s issue certification would tear asunder
defendants’ previously tenable defense strategy.
All of a sudden they will face thousands of plaintiffs. Many may
already be barred by the statute of limitations, as we have
suggested, though its further running was tolled by the filing of
[the] class action.
Suppose that 5,000 of the potential class members are not yet
barred by the statute of limitations. And suppose the named
plaintiffs in [the case] win the class portion of this case to the extent
of establishing the defendants’ liability under either of the two
negligence theories. It is true that this would only be prima facie
liability, that the defendants would have various defenses. But they
could not be confident that the defenses would prevail. They might,
therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability
(conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to

172. Id. at 1303.
173. Id. at 1295.
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roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense
pressure to settle.174
As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, this is simply too excessively
bleak a picture of the realities of the situation.175 Even after an adverse
class finding on the issue of negligence, Rhone-Poulenc and similarly
situated defendants could continue to interpose several substantial legal,
economic, and practical barriers to liability, retaining the option of
settlement if this was rationally seen as the best option. In addition, it is a
bit hard to weep for a defendant if the court tries the matter and finds the
defendant to have been negligent in a manner that exposes tens of
thousands of innocents to a deadly virus, received in connection with use
of a product for which the defendant was well compensated. Also, most
rational commercial actors in the position of Rhone-Poulenc have
substantial liability insurance in place—or at least had the opportunity to
put such insurance in place as part of a sound risk-management strategy.176
In general, as Judge Rovner’s dissent put it:
[E]ven if the possibility of a settlement were relevant to the first
mandamus requirement, and even if it had been asserted by
defendants in support of their petition, I still cannot agree with the
majority’s premise that [the trial court’s] order in fact will prompt a
settlement. Contrary to the clear implication of the majority’s
opinion . . . the class portion of the anticipated trial in this case
would not go so far as to establish defendants’ liability to a class of
plaintiffs; it would instead resolve only the question of whether
defendants were negligent in distributing tainted clotting factor at
any particular point in time. Even if defendants were faced with an
adverse class verdict, then, a plaintiff still would be required to clear
a number of hurdles before he would be entitled to a judgment. . . .

174. Id. at 1298 (citations omitted).
175. In particular, the argument that settlement pressure is too “intense” to withstand has been, in
my view, quite thoroughly discredited in Silver, supra note 2. See supra text accompanying notes
341–51 for further discussion of weaknesses in the “blackmail” thesis of class actions, which takes
several forms including that expressed in Rhone-Poulenc. See Silver, supra note 2, at 1360 (stating
that the blackmail charge has been made in four distinct versions, none of which is persuasive).
176. Whether the insurers will pay when they should and as promptly as they should (or whether
the insurer has a valid defense to coverage) can be quite another matter. See generally JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 128, Ch. 2 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp.
2005) (providing an overview of insurance coverage litigation). But the question of insurance coverage
and collection is a separate matter that should not be invoked by the defendant as a basis for avoiding
adjudicated liability.
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The defendants will thus have ample opportunity to settle should
they lose the class trial.177
As discussed in Part IV, I not only see Rhone-Poulenc as a failed
opportunity to utilize Rule 23(c)(4)(A) certification of a common issue but
also as a lost opportunity to employ flexible means of proof and case
processing that can reach questions of damages more efficiently and
effectively than individual trials on causation and damage.
B. Newton v. Merrill Lynch
In cases where a denial of class treatment really does appear to change
the settlement and resolution dynamic, one can make a strong argument
that courts should be looking less at resisting litigation and more at
maximizing the possibility of fair compensation to the claimant and
holding true to the deterrence rationale of the law in question. A strong
example is Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,178 In
Newton, the Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to refuse to
certify a class in a 10b-5 securities claim on the ground that the investors’
claims, alleging injury by the defendants’ misconduct in failing to obtain
the “best execution” feasible for the share trades of class members, failed
to meet the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule
23(b)(3).179
Earlier in the litigation, the circuit court had reversed the trial court’s
rejection of plaintiffs’ theory of liability, ruling that a “duty of best
execution” existed and applied to the defendants.180 The Third Circuit
reversed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants and
remanded for further proceedings, stating:
[W]e believe that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
defendants misrepresented that they would execute the plaintiffs’
orders so as to maximize the plaintiffs’ economic benefit, and that
this misrepresentation was intentional or reckless because, at the

177. Rhone-Polenc, 51 F.3d at 1307 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
178. 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
179. Id. at 186–93; See Brian J. Wanamaker, Note, Class Actions and Rule 10b-5: A Critique of
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (2002). See also Poser, supra note 139 (reviewing
broker liability under Rule 10b-5 generally).
180. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc), cert. denied 525 U.S. 811 (1998). The Newton litigation had an extensive litigation history,
“travel[ing] up and down the Third Circuit over several years.” Wanamaker, supra note 179, at 998 n.5
(reviewing case history).
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time it was made, the defendants knew that they intended to execute
the plaintiffs’ orders at the NBBO [National Best Bid and Offer, a
posted price used by the National Association of Securities Dealers]
price even if better prices were reasonably available. A reasonable
trier of fact could thus find scienter with respect to a material
misrepresentation, as well as the other elements essential to a
Section 10(b) fraud claim.181
In Newton, a class of plaintiff investors argued that they were injured
when defendant broker-dealers failed to disclose that the brokers were
failing to give the best execution to their transactions. Plaintiffs styled this
as a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 on the part of lead defendant Merrill Lynch and other large
brokers PaineWebber, Inc. and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In essence, the plaintiffs’ theory of the case was that commercial
brokers owe customers (both institutions and individuals) a duty to take
advantage of readily available technology when conducting trades so as to
attain the best possible price that day for the investor. The plaintiffs (who
numbered in the thousands) argued that the defendant brokers made no
effort to attain best prices and best trade execution. Instead, without
disclosing their conduct to the investors, the brokers automatically used
the price provided by NBBO system for companies listed on NASDAQ
(the National Association of the Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System). Plaintiffs argued that use of the NBBO price for all trades
frequently resulted in increased costs to the investors. According to
plaintiffs, this behavior by defendants constituted a material
misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5 because the brokers failed to inform
the investors of this problem before accepting the investors’ business.182
One need not read too much into the uncontested facts of Newton to
conclude that there was no real factual question as to the defendants’
conduct. They appear to have used the NBBO price, period. Consequently,
even though adjudication of Newton as a class action would have required
some fact-finding in this regard, the matter was essentially subject to
stipulation. Where the broker-defendants argued vociferously, however,
was on the question of plaintiff reliance and injury. According to the
defendants, plaintiffs could not prevail unless reliance was proven—as to

181. Newton, 135 F. 3d at 274–75.
182. In re Merrill Lynch, 911 F. Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1995). See also Wanamaker, supra note 179, at
998–99, 1001–06.
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each transaction—because reliance is an essential element of a Rule 10b-5
action.183
The Third Circuit, in addition to being hospitable enough to the merits
of the claim to impose a duty of best execution upon the defendants, was
willing to apply a presumption of reliance184 but was unwilling to presume
injury from the practice, even as a rebuttable matter, in part because of the
“loss causation” language of the PSLRA.185
In this case, defendants allegedly executed trades solely at the
NBBO price. Depending on the facts of each trade, the NBBO listed
price may or may not have provided a class member with the best
price. Therefore, economic loss to the plaintiffs cannot be presumed
by the purchase or sale of a security at the NBBO price, and we will
not presume it across the class.186
As a result, the court of appeals was unwilling to permit class
certification on the grounds that common issues did not predominate and
that the class action approach was not a superior means of managing the
litigation.187
Because plaintiffs sought not only declaratory and injunctive relief but
also damages, certification of the damages claim would need to satisfy
both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).188 Although the
court found that the proffered Newton class satisfied the Rule 23(a)
requisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy,189 the

183. 259 F.3d at 174.
184. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 177 (3d Cir. 2001).
[T]he investors have alleged that the broker-dealers failed to disclose their policy of executing
NASDAQ trades at the NBBO price. Like a securities dealer’s failure to disclose its policy of
overcharging investors, defendants’ execution of investors’ trades at the NBBO price, when
better prices may have been available from alternative services, constitutes a potentially
fraudulent common course of conduct from which reliance can be presumed. We will not
require each plaintiff to prove he relied on a practice which defendants did not affirmatively
disclose. . . . [T]he burden of rebutting a presumption of reliance is properly placed on
defendants here.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 177 (stating that the PSLRA provides that “[i]n any private action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged
to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000) (alteration in original)).
186. Id. at 180–81. The court further stated: “In sum, we conclude that the putative class would be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance but not of economic loss. Therefore, their claims do not
warrant a rebuttable presumption of class-wide injury.” Id. at 181.
187. Id. at 186–91 (“Because economic loss cannot be presumed, ascertaining which class
members have sustained injury means individual issues predominate over common ones.”).
188. Id. at 181.
189. Id. at 181–86.
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attempt to attain class status foundered when the appellate court found that
the common questions of the defendants’ legal duties and conduct did not
“predominate” over what the court saw as individual issues regarding
whether class member investors in fact suffered economic injury.190
Consequently, the court found the Newton class inapt for certification
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).
As the court noted, reliance is an essential element of a successful 10b5 claim. While the court was willing to make a rebuttable presumption of
reliance, the consequences of reliance for each class member were seen as
an “uncommon” question of fact precluding class certification.
To state a claim for securities fraud under § 10 of the Securities
[Exchange] Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must
demonstrate: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) scienter on
the part of the defendant; (3) reliance on the misrepresentation; and
(4) damage resulting from the misrepresentation.191
The court described the third and fourth requirements as follows:
Under Rule 10b-5 causation is two-pronged. Reliance, or
transaction causation, establishes that but for the fraudulent
misrepresentation, the investor would not have purchased or sold
the security. Loss causation demonstrates that the fraudulent
misrepresentation actually caused the loss suffered.192
The court declined to treat the question of injury from a failure of
disclosure regarding defendant sales practices as the equivalent of “fraud
on the market,” a type of 10b-5 action in which courts have permitted a
rebuttable presumption that all buyers and sellers during the time of the
market fraud were affected by the fraud. The court reasoned that although
investors may
be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance under the “fraudon-the-market theory,” this is because “in an efficient market the
misinformation directly affects the stock prices at which the
investor trades and thus, through the inflated or deflated price,
causes injury even in the absence of direct reliance.” Reliance may

190. Id. at 187–90.
191. Id. at 173 (quoting earlier Newton opinion, Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1998)).
192. Id. at 172–73 (citations omitted).
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be presumed when a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission
impairs the value of a security traded in an efficient market. [But
h]ere plaintiffs’ claims do not involve an omission or
misrepresentation that affected the value of a security in an efficient
market. Therefore, a presumption of reliance [causing injury] based
on this theory would be inappropriate [for the Newton claims].193
In addition, the Newton court stated:
It is important to recognize that the facts of this case do not
resonate with those typical of securities violations under Rule 10b5. Customarily those claims involve a fraudulent material
misrepresentation or omission that affects a security’s value.
The alleged material nondisclosure here consisted of a brokerdealer accepting an investor’s order under the implied
representation of the duty of best execution.194
So defined, the question before the court was thus a more
individualized inquiry into what each investor may or may not have
thought the brokers would do and the degree to which the sharepurchasing decisions of the investors were premised upon reliance, if any,
upon broker efforts to close requested transactions at the best feasible
price through diligence in the duty of best execution. The court was
unwilling to treat the broker-defendants’ seemingly apparent
acknowledgment of failure to seek best execution and failure to inform
investors as the factual equivalent of a misleading company press release
or conference-call statement.
In the Third Circuit’s view, the type of wrong alleged by the plaintiff
investors was simply not broad enough or uniform enough to justify
invocation of the type of rebuttable presumption available for fraud-onthe-market cases in which class certification is sought. Indeed, the court
seemed to view the case as fairly individualized notwithstanding that there
seems to have been a company policy (at all three of the major brokeragehouse defendants) of using the NBBO price because it was less work than
scrounging around for better prices in order to save a few bucks for the
company’s customers. The court stated that a rebuttable presumption of
reliance might be available in this case:

193. Id. at 175–76 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d 1410,
1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)).
194. Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
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While it seems apparent that some class members likely knew of
defendants’ practice, this knowledge does not necessarily invalidate
the presumption. When defendants fail to disclose material
information about a uniform practice involving the purchase or sale
of securities, plaintiffs may be entitled to a presumption of reliance
which defendants may rebut. Presuming reliance class-wide is
proper when the material nondisclosure is part of a common course
of conduct.195
However, while the court found sufficient evidence of the required
common course of conduct to support application of a rebuttable
presumption of reliance, it would not make a presumption of economic
loss, reasoning that the broker-defendants use of NBBO share prices as
their yardstick would in alternating and episodic fashion sometimes
benefit investors (when it was the best price available, thus satisfying the
duty of best execution) and sometimes harm investors (when better prices
were available outside the NBBO system).196
The alleged injuries in Newton arise out of the execution of
hundreds of millions of trades, not a single act of fraudulent
conduct. The distinct facts among the hundreds of thousands of
plaintiffs involving hundreds of millions of trades will determine
whether securities violations occurred. Because plaintiffs’ claims
will require an economic injury determination for each trade, we
hold the putative class fails to satisfy the predominance
requirement.197
The court also shut the door to the putative class by taking the position
that plaintiffs’ proffered expert evidence on class member damages did not
suffice because it constituted a damages-calculation formula rather than a
means for permitting aggregate proof of injury to class members.198
In an effort to gloss over this requirement [of proving injury],
plaintiffs suggest their expert could calculate the amount of

195. Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 180–81. The court stated:
In this case, defendants allegedly executed trades solely at the NBBO price. Depending on the
facts of each trade, the NBBO listed price may or may not have provided a class member with
the best price. Therefore, economic loss to the plaintiffs cannot be presumed by the purchase
or sale of a security at the NBBO price, and we will not presume it across the class.
Id.
197. Id. at 190.
198. Id. at 187–88.
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damages each class member sustained thereby removing proof of
injury as an obstacle to certification. In a sworn declaration,
plaintiffs’ expert, provided no model formula, but instead projected
that he could devise a formula that would measure damages among
the class and serve as a plan for allocation. We are not convinced.
But even if plaintiffs could present a viable formula for calculating
damages (which they have not), defendants could still require
individualized proof of economic loss.199
The Newton court’s analysis resisting class certification has a certain
formalist appeal and persuasiveness, but it functionally reflects an undue
limitation on class treatment in exactly the type of case that the drafters of
Rule 23 (at least the 1966 Amendment) had in mind. A number of large
vendor defendants with considerable control over a business transaction
fail to advise the customer of an important fact that results in loss to the
customer but savings to the vendor (which saves the resources it would
otherwise expend seeking the best available price). The amounts in
question may vary and are not, in general, large in each instance.
However, the cumulative effect is to permit the vendors to enjoy a
substantial benefit at the expense of uninformed customers to whom they
supposedly owe a fiduciary duty. Consequently, although the entirety of
the economic harm and the shift in wealth from customers to vendors is
quite large, individual customers (even institutional investors) will
probably find it uneconomic to prosecute a civil claim.
This sounds like a classic case for use of a class action, but class
treatment is deemed unavailable. One can thus add the Newton case to the
list of situations in which judicial reluctance to utilize the class action
device (in whole or in part) redounds, as a practical matter, to the benefit
of the well-heeled, allegedly defrauding party, which escapes being called
to account for its misdeeds. Another example includes tortious conduct
that results only in relatively small injury in a situation where individual
litigation will not be inexpensive.200 Another occurs when claimants are
adversely affected as a group, in connection with a type of claim that may
require substantial proof at trial, perhaps even the development of fresh
facts and making of new law, where the costs of civil prosecution are
disproportionate to the amount of injury to particular class members.201

199. Id. (footnote omitted).
200. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 35, § 10.20 at 642 (class actions “are often
brought in situations in which each class member’s claim is too small to support litigation by itself”).
201. See id. § 10.20 at 640–44. See id. at 642 (class actions enable plaintiffs to “pool their
resources to litigate on a more equal footing with institutional litigants such as corporations and
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In these and other cases, it seems unquestionable that class-action
treatment would be appropriate on a practical level and socially valuable.
However, because of the strictures imposed on its application, Rule 23 too
often seems unavailable, even in small part, to address these claims. Some
of this may be the inexorable result of the Rule’s text. For example, Rule
23(b)(3) states that a damages class action must be “superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.”202 The Newton court read the Rule as requiring that a class
action “must represent the best” available method of fairly and efficiently
resolving the controversy.203
One hates to quibble or engage in excessive semantic debate, but
rephrasing the already perhaps overly daunting “superiority” inquiry as a
requirement that class-action treatment be the “best” way of resolving a
matter seems, at a connotative level, to raise the stakes in a manner
making it less likely that a purported class action will satisfy the criteria.
Although to say that something is “superior to” the alternatives is
essentially to characterize it as the best alternative, there is something a
little more daunting at the margin of insisting that class treatment be the
best treatment of the case.204 The Newton court’s choice of words betrays
the degree to which it was perhaps insisting on too much from the classaction device as well as erroneously taking an implicit all-or-nothing
approach to class treatment. Part IV of this Article presents suggestions for
permitting more common use of the class action device, occasionally using
Newton and other cases of failed opportunity to illustrate how these more
flexible approaches to Rule 23 might permit greater prudent use of class
treatment without offending other systemic norms.

government agencies” although this also leads to allegations that class treatment is too coercive as
respects institutional litigants).
202. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
203. Id. at 191.
204. It is worth noting that the ALI is at least experimenting with different terminology that will
lessen focus on concepts like “predominance” and “superiority” of class treatment, in part out of
concerns similar to those expressed in this Article.
In casting the aggregate treatment of common issues in terms of fidelity to substantive law,
finality in adjudication, and feasibility in judicial administration, this Section draws on a
similar typology developed in Allan H. Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A
New Theoretical and Practical Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV.
[995] (2005). In so doing, this Section consciously breaks from much of the terminology and
organization of existing law with regard to aggregation through class actions.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 122, § 2.03 cmt. b.
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C. Dura Pharmaceuticals
Less than two weeks after this Symposium, which featured spirited
debate over the case,205 the Supreme Court decided Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,206 unanimously adopting a quite strict
view of the “loss causation” section of the PSLRA and refusing to
consider proof of a misleading positive disclosure as establishing a
presumption of injury from securities fraud. Although the Court’s decision
in Dura Pharmaceuticals (which demonstrated hostility toward securities
fraud claims generally and to class claims by implication) was not an
encouraging development for the functional, policy-purposivist approach
to class treatment proposed in Part IV, it is not in direct opposition to these
proposals. The loss-causation provisions of the PSLRA require that a
securities plaintiff prove that his or her loss was caused by securities
violations, particularly violation of Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act.207
However, the PSLRA requires only that there be proof of loss—it does not
specify the acceptable methodologies for demonstrating such proof.208

205. Compare Coffee, supra note 8 (presented at the Eleventh Annual ILEP Conference April 8,
2005) (arguing in favor of a restrictive view of loss causation and for reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo decision that permitted presumption of causality when
misrepresentations were made by a company) with Patrick J. Coughlin, Eric Alan Isaacson & Joseph
Daley, Eleventh Annual ILEP Conference: What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? A Response to
Professor Coffee (Apr. 8, 2005), http://law.wustl.edu/wulq/conference/2005response-dwa-rev.pdf
(defending the Ninth Circuit result and arguing that corporate misrepresentations that inflate price
inevitably “cause” subsequent losses when the share price drops). Professor Coffee’s analysis is not
part of this Symposium Issue but is published at 60 BUS. LAW. 533 (2005) in juxtaposition with
Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 507 (2005)
(taking the opposing view for reasons largely in accord with the analysis of Coughlin et al., supra).
206. 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005)
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). As Professor Coffee correctly notes, different portions of
the securities laws may be treated differently for purposes of assigning the burden of proof to litigants.
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 544–46 (noting that in sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, “Congress
placed the burden of disproving loss causation on the defendant,” but in PSLRA and sections 9 and 18
of the 1934 Act, burden is on plaintiff).
208. The relevant text of the PSLRA simply states that the plaintiff has “the burden of proving
that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages” and does not discuss acceptable methodologies for proving loss
causation. § 78u-4(b)(4). The legislative history is similarly open-ended on the issue of the nature of
acceptable proof. For example, the Conference Committee Report stated:
The Conference Committee also requires the plaintiff to plead and then to prove that the
misstatement or omission alleged in the complaint actually caused the loss incurred by the
plaintiff in new Section 21D(b)(4) of the 1934 Act [§ 78u-4(b)(4)]. For example, the plaintiff
would have to prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artificially
inflated as the result of the misstatement or omission.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
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Nonetheless, the Court’s restrictive and formal approach to the issues
before it does suggest undue continuing hostility toward such claims,
albeit hostility arguably derived from Congress’s expression of concerns
about abuses of securities class actions as reflected in the PSLRA. This is
in unfortunate contrast to some of the Court’s other opinions of Spring
2005, which tended toward a more functional approach, with better
analysis and decision-making.209 It is, however, consistent with another
strand of the current Court’s jurisprudence: protection of corporate
interests out of concern that claims based on relatively “little” wrongs may
have outsized economic consequences by excessively punishing the
business entity, thereby unnecessarily hurting its constituents. For
example, news accounts of the oral argument before the Court in Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States,210 uniformly reported that the Justices’
questioning of the government was sharp and even hostile, reflecting the
view that taking down a then Big-Six accounting firm was simply
punishment disproportionate to the pseudo-“crime” or semi-crime of
shredding documents.211 Not surprisingly, the Court subsequently reversed

209. See, e.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005) (holding Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) exempt from bankruptcy estate despite IRA funds being technically subject to immediate
withdrawal on demand but practically not so because of substantial penalties for early withdrawal and
because IRAs were functionally similar to other pension plans with age-based right to proceeds);
Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs alleging age
discrimination may proceed under “disparate-impact” theory and are not confined to proving
“disparate treatment” in order to prevail in view of similarity of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) to Title VII, which has long recognized disparate-impact cause of action; however,
ADEA disparate-impact action is narrower than that of Title VII); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (permitting private right of action under Title IX of Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), by teacher claiming retaliation for standing up for
rights of women’s sports team because permitting action served functional purpose of enforcing Title
IX and effecting statutory goals); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (stating that application of
death penalty to juveniles violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in view of lack of national
consensus on the issue, worldwide consensus that executing children is morally wrong, and substantial
evidence that children’s reasoning and emotions differ substantially from those of adults, making
juveniles less culpable for even heinous crimes). See also infra text accompanying notes 451–52
(suggesting that the 2005 Supreme Court decisions reflect a more expansive functional analysis rather
than restrained formalist approach, but noting that the Court continues to frequently resort to more
formalist methodology, as reflected in Dura Pharmaceuticals).
210. 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (requiring proof of consciousness of wrongdoing, intent and a nexus
between the corrupt persuasion and a particular federal proceeding for federal obstruction of justice
and thus holding that the jury instructions were erroneous, requiring reversal), rev’g 374 F.3d 281 (5th
Cir. 2004). The circuit court opinion had rejected a challenge to the federal government’s theory of the
case in prosecuting the now-defunct accounting firm for obstruction of justice.
211. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Hints at Curbing Strategy on White-Collar Crime,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2005, at C3 (“[S]everal justices expressed open disdain during oral arguments
for the sweeping theory the Justice Department used to secure the criminal conviction of Enron
Corp.’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen LLP.”). For example, Justice Anthony Kennedy
characterized the government’s notion of criminal activity as a “sweeping position that will cause
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the conviction in a unanimous opinion, but one softpedaling the costs of
erroneous prosecution and emphasizing violation of due process where the
jury instructions failed to convey the mens rea requirement for
conviction.212 Although the result may be perfectly justified on doctrinal
grounds, it undoubtedly stemmed as well from a more problematic view
that law enforcement should tread carefully and not unduly threaten
private economic interests, a result quite consistent with the Court’s
resistance to securities fraud claims as reflected in the Dura
Pharmaceuticals opinion.213
The current Court, although not uniformly formalist or textualist,
seems to have a soft spot in its jurisprudential heart for business entities214

problems for every corporation or small business in this country.” Id. at C3. See also Tony Mauro,
Andersen’s Paper Jam: Did Arthur Andersen Take A Bad Rap for Tossing Documents, or Is It Exhibit
A for Corporate Corruption?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1.
212. Arthur Andersen v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
213. One can also seriously question whether the Court’s protectiveness of business entities is
appropriate in light of the conduct in question and whether the Court’s implicit calculus is correct (that
the end of a business is a social harm that outweighs permitting the business to “get away” with that to
which the government objects). See generally BARBARA LEY TOFFLER WITH JENNIFER REINGOLD,
FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (2003) (describing an
Andersen of institutionalized bad behavior that arguably was more of a harm to its clients, securities
markets, and society than a valuable employer and generator of wealth); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron
Traders on Grandma Millie And Making Out Like Bandits, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4, at 7
(reproducing communications between Enron employees in which they mocked consumers and
congratulated themselves on gouging the public on energy sales, including statement that “we need a
blackout” to facilitate reduced government regulation of energy industry). Put more simply, perhaps
some businesses, even big, formerly respected ones, deserve the legal death penalty as a fair
punishment for their own wrongs and to provide a deterrent to similar behavior by other such
businesses. See also Gretchen Morgenson, All That Missing E-Mail . . . It’s Baaack, N.Y. TIMES, May
8, 2005, § 3, at 1 (noting that emails claimed to have been lost by Morgan Stanley as a result of
September 11 terrorist attack and that were consequently not available to plaintiffs remained in
existence and have surfaced in suit against Morgan brought by wealthy financier Ronald Perelman; rediscovery of the e-mails “may force Morgan Stanley to defend itself against countless investor cases it
had previously won.”). The implication of the article is that Morgan did not try very hard to locate this
information in response to prior discovery requests.
In addition, the Court’s implicit economic calculus seems empirically incorrect. Although there is
certainly a large, uncomfortable dislocation of the workforce when a business entity closes its doors,
the workers, particularly skilled workers, do not stand in soup lines forever. They take jobs at other
firms doing similar work. One should seriously question the “killing the golden goose” rationale and
“Chicken Little” fears that underlie much of the case for leniency against commercial wrongdoing. If
the same rationale were applied to criminal activity or civil wrongs by individuals, the justice system
would act with leniency in order to keep the defendant engaged in economic activity, for the good of
his employer, his family, etc. Although these pleas sometimes are persuasive at sentencing, this is
disfavored in cases of serious wrongdoing. In civil actions, these factors are irrelevant and juries are
precluded from considering them. Why should the standard be relaxed for business entities and white
collar crime?
214. To the extent that the Court has sympathies for what it perceives as a downtrodden
commercial community, this may be in part simple reflection of contemporary socio-political and
socio-legal attitudes. See John Gibeaut, Back in Business: After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, an
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and a concern that thin claims may nonetheless have excessively coercive
impact when aggregated. In that sense, Rhone-Poulenc and Newton are
arguably in accord with Dura Pharmaceuticals. But the Court has by no
means foreclosed functional approaches to expanded class treatment in
appropriate cases, Amchem and Ortiz notwithstanding. To a large degree,
the Court’s recent jurisprudence is primarily limited in scope, with
opinions that do not go much beyond what is necessary to decide the
instant case.215 Consequently, Dura Pharmaceuticals is not definitive bad
news for securities plaintiffs and supporters of class treatment, although it
obviously is not good news, either. Dura Pharmaceuticals is, however, a
problematic opinion reflecting the type of analysis that unnecessarily holds
back both the securities laws and Rule 23 from achieving optimal effect.
The Dura Pharmaceuticals case arose out of the purchase of shares in
the company by Michael Broudo and others during the time period of
April 15, 1997 through February 24, 1998. The Broudo plaintiffs
contended that shares purchased during this period had been pumped up in
price by “several press releases indicating satisfactory development and
testing of the Albuterol Spiros Device and claiming rising sales of Ceclor
CD, both of which [Plaintiffs] allege were known to Dura and the
individual defendants to be untrue.”216 Plaintiffs pointed to six separate
press releases they alleged contained misrepresentations. Some parts of the
statements seemed relatively innocuous and could arguably be seen as
mere public-relations speak.217 Others contained more factually declarative
statements that, if untrue or misleading, would constitute material
misrepresentations.218 During the class period, company stock reached a
high of $53 per share. At the close of the class period (February 24, 1998),

Aggressive SEC Cracked Down. But a Favorable Political Environment Finds Corporations Battling
Back, A.B.A. J., May 2005, at 40.
215. See CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999).
216. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted).
217. See id. at 935–36. The June 5, 1997 press release stated, for example, that the company was
“pleased with the results to date” of the Albuterol Spiros product and that the company was “preparing
the NDA [New Drug Application] for filing in the latter half of this year.” Id. The June 15, 1997 press
release stated the company was “pleased with Dura’s performance in the second quarter of 1997.” Id.
at 936. Similar low-key but boosterish language is found in parts of all the six challenged releases. Id.
at 935–36.
218. See id. The April 15, 1997 release stated that “Patient dosing was completed for clinical trials
needed for NDA (new drug application) submission of Spiros albuterol . . . .” Id. at 935 (alteration in
original). The June 5, 1997 release stated that the company had completed “clinical trials necessary”
for submitting a NDA for the Albuterol Spiros product. Id. The July 15, 1997 release stated that the
company had “completed clinical trials necessary for NDA (new drug application) submission and
[was] on track to file the Albuterol Spiros NDA on behalf of Spiros Corp. in the second half of 1997.”
Id. at 936. The November 10, 1997 release stated that the company had in fact submitted a NDA “with
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Dura revealed that it expected lower[-]than-forecast 1998 revenues
and 1998 earnings per share (“EPS”) due to, inter alia, slower-thanexpected sales of Ceclor CD. Dura’s stock then dropped from $39
1/8 on February 24, 1998 to $20 3/4 on February 25, 1998, a 47%
one-day loss. Throughout the remainder of 1998, Dura’s business
declined. In an April 16, 1998 conference call with stock analysts,
Dura revealed that as early as December 1997, wholesale channels
had been clogged with many months of excess inventory and that
actual sales of several products, including Ceclor CD, had in fact
been declining. Later, in November 1998, Dura also revealed that
the FDA found the Albuterol Spiros device not approvable due to
electro-mechanical reliability issues and chemistry, manufacturing,
and control concerns.219
The Broudo plaintiffs contended that they had purchased inflated drugcompany stock on the basis of misstatements by the company and were
injured when the share price came crashing back to earth as the truth about
the company’s situation gradually came out.220 On its face, this does not
seem a far-fetched theory of loss. If a vendor lies about the rosy prospects
for two of its key prospects, this logically increases the value of the
company and hence the cost of purchasing a portion of the company. If
these lies are later exposed, the value of part ownership (i.e., the value of a
share of stock) logically goes down. Those who bought at the fib-inflated
price and were still holding shares when the price became truth-adjusted
suffered a loss. This seems inarguable.
However, as the Dura Pharmaceuticals defendants pointed out, the
price of a stock can decline for many reasons unrelated to specific
misrepresentations. In the Dura Pharmaceuticals case in particular, the
chronology of descent in company share prices was not particularly good
for the plaintiffs because there was not one “big bang” company
announcement of past misrepresentation, stripped of other bad news,
followed by an immediate drop in share price. The linkage asserted by the
Broudo plaintiffs was more attenuated. Consequently, the defendants
contended that the loss asserted by the plaintiff class was insufficiently

the FDA [Food and Drug Administration] for Albuterol Spiros.” Id. The January 20, 1998 release
claimed that market share of Ceclor CD had grown “from 8% at the beginning of 1997 to 25% by
year-end.”
219. Id.
220. Id. at 936–39.
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direct to qualify as an acceptable theory of loss causation under the
PSLRA.221
The trial court accepted the defense’s contentions and granted a motion
to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, giving plaintiffs leave to
amend. The plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint that was
dismissed with prejudice, the trial court holding that the plaintiffs had
failed to adequately allege “any relationship” between the FDA’s nonapproval of the Albuterol Spiros device and the “February price drop.”222
The trial court took a similar view of the allegations of misrepresentation
regarding Ceclor CD and the drop in share price.223
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that an allegation of directly or
closely linked causality between defendant misrepresentation and loss of
share value was not necessary. “In this circuit, loss causation is satisfied
where ‘the plaintiff shows that ‘the misrepresentation touches upon the
reasons for the investment’s decline in value.’”224 According to the Court
of Appeals:
[I]t is necessary in the [securities fraud] pleading to allege 1) that
the stock’s price at the time of purchase was overstated and 2)
sufficient identification of the cause for this overvaluation.
Appellants have pled that the price of the stock was overvalued in
part due to the misrepresentations by Dura and the individual
defendants that the development and testing of the Albuterol Spiros
device were proceeding satisfactorily and that FDA approval of the
device was imminent. Accordingly, the district court erred by
finding that appellants failed to plead loss causation sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss with regard to statements concerning
the Albuterol Spiros device.225
In addition, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
determination that the allegations of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint
did not adequately allege scienter, which is also required for a successful
Rule 10b-5 “scheme or artifice to defraud” claim,226 and could not be

221. Id. at 936.
222. See id. at 936–37.
223. See id. at 937.
224. Id. at 937–38 (citing and quoting Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)
and McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992) and citing Provenze v. Miller, 102 F.3d
1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996)).
225. Id. at 939.
226. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1126 (9th ed. 2003).
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cured through further amendment. The Ninth Circuit noted the governing
law of liberal attitude toward amending pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 and concluded that “[b]ecause it appears that
[plaintiffs] had a reasonable chance of successfully stating a claim if given
another opportunity, the district court abused its discretion in denying
leave to amend the [second amended complaint].”227
The Supreme Court granted certiorari228 and reversed.229 The Court’s
unspoken rationale for granting review was the importance of the losscausation question, which had not been addressed in any detail by the
Court in light of the relatively recent passage of the PSLRA. The express
reason for granting review was “[b]ecause the Ninth Circuit’s views about
loss causation differ from those of other Circuits that have considered this
issue.”230 The division of the circuits appears to have existed for several
years in view of earlier Ninth Circuit precedent consistent with the Broudo
v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. opinion of the Court of Appeals.231
Apparently, the hydraulic pressure of disuniformity finally became too
much for the Court to ignore. Or, perhaps the Broudo claims struck the
Court as particularly fuzzy, too indefinite to permit deployment of the
coercive power of a class action.
Dura Pharmaceuticals is both a loss-causation case and a particularityof-pleading case, which may have been a combination that made it
particularly vulnerable to a decision restricting class plaintiff claims. In
light of the six (count ‘em, six) allegedly fraudulent press releases,232 it
seems odd that the Broudo plaintiffs did not simply add a few sentences in
their amended complaint alleging greater linkage between their purchase
of misrepresentation-inflated shares and their losses when corrective

227. Broudo v. Dura Pharms, Inc., 339 F.3d at 941.
228. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004).
229. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
230. Id. at 1630 (citing Ninth Circuit opinion as inconsistent with Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt.,
LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223
F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); and Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447–48 (11th Cir.
1997) and also citing a pre-PSLRA loss-causation case, Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680,
685 (7th Cir. 1990)).
231. See 339 F.3d at 938 (citing to Ninth Circuit precedent from 1996 and 1999 permitting a
showing of loss causation where alleged fraud “touches upon the reasons for the investment’s decline
in value” as well as pre-PSLRA precedent to same effect) (quoting Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059,
1066 (9th Cir. 1999)).
232. If the facts stated in the six challenged company press releases were incorrect, they almost
certainly were the result of fraud. A reasonably competent company knows whether it has actually
completed clinical trials or submitted an NDA and what its sales figures are for a given time period. It
is not very likely that any of the misstatements challenged by the Broudo plaintiffs was the result of
mistake or inadvertance, suggesting that the plaintiffs would have relatively little difficulty proving the
scienter necessary to satisfy Rule 10b-5.
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information reduced the value of those shares. Even in the absence of a
single pivotal corrective announcement and immediate decline in share
price (a “dream scenario” of sorts for a securities plaintiff wishing to have
no problem satisfying the loss-causation requirement), one would expect
that the Broudo plaintiffs could have alleged a lot more connection
between Dura’s purported misrepresentations and their losses and
remained comfortably within the boundaries of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.233
Presumably, the Broudo plaintiffs made a conscious decision to allege
less rather than more on this point in hopes of attaining a favorable ruling
from the Ninth Circuit that could be used as future precedent in favor of a
presumption of loss causation and which would generally make loss
causation a reduced obstacle to successfully surviving a motion to dismiss.
Such a ruling, if allowed to stand by the Supreme Court, would make it
easier for securities plaintiffs to reach a more advanced stage of the
proceeding, to obtain discovery, and perhaps to attain class certification—
all of which would give the plaintiff class significant settlement leverage.
In addition, a presumption of loss causation that is inadequately rebutted
could be an important procedural and evidentiary tiebreaker for securities
plaintiffs in cases actually reaching trial. Consequently, there appears to
have been some considerable method to the strategy of the Broudo
plaintiffs. But the Supreme Court treats this strategic course more as
madness or evidence of a weak claim that is unworthy of the legal rule
sought by plaintiffs.234 In addition, the Court trotted out the now familiar
cudgel of the purported “in terrorem” effect of class certification.235

233. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a claim have “evidentiary
support” or that party and counsel making the claim reasonably believe it will have evidentiary support
after adequate discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). Violation of Rule 11 is subject to sanction. FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(c). Section 1927 permits the court to impose sanctions on parties that unnecessarily
multiply or elongate civil actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000). Both provisions are, like ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.1, rules forbidding attorneys (and their clients) from commencing frivolous
litigation (or frivolously defending or conducting litigation). See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 301 (2004). In the absence of contrary evidence, it seems unassailable to argue that
misrepresentation-inflated share prices have a ripple effect that causes harm to shareholders
unfortunate enough to still be holding their shares when more accurate information forces a market
correction and downturn in price, regardless of whether the downturn is abrupt or gradual.
234. The Court stated:
[P]laintiffs’ lengthy complaint contains only one statement that we can fairly read as
describing the loss caused by the defendants’ “spray device” misrepresentations. That
statement says that the plaintiffs “paid artificially inflated prices for Dura’s securities” and
suffered “damages[.]”The statement implies that the plaintiffs’ loss consisted of “artificially
inflated” purchase “prices.” The complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share price fell
significantly after the truth became known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the
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If, contrary to the Court’s implicit assessment of the strength of the
Broudo claims and the design of Broudo counsel, the case is viewed as an
attempt to seek a liberalized standard of proof that would permit more
liberalized pleading (notwithstanding the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) and PSLRA that fraud be pleaded with particularity),
the proceedings below and the case itself make considerably more sense.
As a result of the Court’s opinion, the particularized pleading requirements
of the PSLRA have effectively been strengthened in that securities
complaints must now allege loss causation with more specificity and less
attenuation if the claims are to survive a motion to dismiss. Unfortunately,
the Court’s decision operates as a “judicially activist” expansion of the
pleading requirements beyond the text of the statute and the apparent
intent of Congress. The text of section 21(D)(b) of the PSLRA (15 U.S.C.
78u-4(b)) “imposes particularized pleading requirements for falsity and
scienter allegations, but imposes no burden of pleading loss causation at
the lawsuit’s earliest stages.”236
The Court’s holding regarding pleading requirements under the PSLRA
is obviously a setback for the Broudo plaintiffs,237 at least in terms of legal

allegation of purchase price inflation alone sufficient. The complaint contains nothing that
suggests otherwise.
Dura Pharms., 125 S. Ct. at 1634 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
235. According to the Court, allowing the Broudo plaintiffs to proceed based on their thin
contentions as to the linkage between misrepresentation and damages would allow plaintiffs to abuse
the situation:
It would permit a plaintiff “with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the
settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will
reveal relevant evidence.” Such a rule would tend to transform a private securities action into
a partial downside insurance policy.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) and
citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31, and the partial dissent of Justices White and O’Connor in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, the 1988 case in which the Court officially recognized and accepted the
“fraud-on-the-market” claims, which had been recognized for some time in the lower courts).
236. Couglin, Isaacson & Daley, supra note 205, at 24 (italics omitted).
237. And without doubt, lawyer observers see Dura Pharms. v. Broudo as a loss for securities
plaintiffs and a win for securities defendants. See Peter Geier, ‘Loss Causation’ Becomes Reality,
NAT’L L.J., May 9, 2005, at 13 (noting influence of Dura Pharmaceuticals for ongoing securities
litigation, including criminal sentencing for securities fraud, in news story reporting case where
convicted defendant received lighter sentence on theory that there must be sufficient causal connection
between defendant fraud and injury to company to merit stiffer criminal punishment); The Supreme
Court Raises the Bar for Shareholder Class Actions, WEST CLEALERT (email advertisement of April
27, 2005, EDT) (on file with author) (advertising panel discussion CLE on Dura Pharmaceuticals,
emphasizing the decision as one restricting class treatment of securities claims as well as one adopting
heightened standard of proof of loss causation, and stating that “the Supreme Court reined in suits by
shareholder” and “ruled that shareholder must allege and prove a clear connection between a
company’s misrepresentations and subsequent loss in stock value before they can recover damages in
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doctrine. But it may not be utter and complete defeat for the plaintiffs.
Presumably, now that the Court has set national standards on loss
causation, the Broudo plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their
complaint notwithstanding the trial court’s earlier dismissal, which took
place when the trial court adopted a standard of loss causation that was
legitimately open to challenge by the plaintiffs and on which plaintiffs
prevailed before the Court of Appeals. There conceivably could be a third
or even fourth amended complaint in Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals
that cures the purported deficiencies of the first and second amended
complaints.
As to the question of the substantive legal standard of proof for loss
causation, which is technically a different (but related) question from
aptness for class treatment, the Supreme Court’s analysis seems almost
breezily superficial. For example, the Court took issue with the “basic”
understanding of the Ninth Circuit that purchase of a misrepresentationinflated security is a sufficient allegation of loss.238 The Court found this
view “wrong” because normally “an inflated purchase price will not itself
constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.”239
Part of the Court’s attack on the Ninth Circuit was empirical. The
Court decreed that
the logical link between the inflated share purchase price and any
later economic loss is not invariably strong. Shares are normally
purchased with an eye toward a later sale. But if, say, the purchaser

fraud-on-the-market litigation”). See also Kathy D. Patrick, Ease Burden on Plaintiffs, NAT’L L.J.,
June 20, 2005, at 26 (shareholders’ counsel criticizes heightened pleading standard of PSLRA). But
see Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAWYER 1547 (2005) (viewing Dura
Pharmaceuticals as narrow decision leaving several open questions that could (and in his view should)
be resolved in favor of fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs in securities litigation).
238. Dura Pharms., 125 S. Ct. at 1631. It is important to remember that the Ninth Circuit opinion
on loss causation adopted a liberal standard of proof. It did not embrace a socialist standard of proof or
strict liability for misrepresenting corporations. Rather, the Ninth Circuit opinion merely permitted the
case to go forward if the plaintiffs alleged that the claimed fraud “touched upon” their losses and held
that this created a presumption of loss that was also presumably rebuttable (the Court of Appeals
opinion did not expressly address the strength of the presumption of the procedural and evidentiary
implications at trial). The Ninth Circuit opinion did not say that the Broudo plaintiffs won merely
because they survived a motion to dismiss. In fact, had certiorari not been granted, the case was to
have been remanded in any event and the plaintiffs would have been required to cure pleading
deficiencies if they expected to continue with the case, a result that is not all that far from what I argue
should happen in the aftermath of the Court’s decision. See Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d
933, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2003). Seen in this light, the Ninth Circuit decision is more of a pleading
opinion and less an opinion on the substantive law of the PSLRA.
239. 125 S. Ct. at 1631.
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sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out,
the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss.240
Although the Court’s statement is true in the narrow sense, it gives a
misleading picture of investing and implicitly holds out what should be a
disfavored type of “investor”—the quickie day trader—as the norm, rather
than the patient “buy-and-hold” investor. Empirically, the Court simply
seems mistaken. For respectable investors and institutional investors of the
type to whom one would think the securities laws would provide most
protection, the buy-and-hold strategy seems far more in vogue than quick
in-and-out trading. Witness the near-icon status (despite problems of
General Reinsurance and its dealings with AIG) of Berkshire-Hathaway
Chairman Warren Buffet, who clearly preaches and practices a long-term
investment philosophy.241 Many Berkshire-Hathaway shareholders
probably have no plans to sell, unless necessary for living expenses but
will make the holdings part of their respective estates (especially if the
estate tax is eliminated). Certainly, most investors are likely to hold even a
mediocre stock for ten months, the length of the class period in Dura
Pharmaceuticals.
Whether the Court is empirically correct about investor behavior or I
am correct about investment behavior is perhaps not important. But it
certainly seems important that the Court is indulging in the empirical
assumption that much investment is not even long-term enough to permit a
presumption that investors duped into paying a price of ten times the true
value of a stock because of false statements about its impending product
breakthroughs probably lose money as a result of those false statements
when they sell the stock for a reduced price after the truth trickles out. At
the very least, one would expect the Court to provide some empirical
support for its sweeping view that so much investing is jackrabbit
investing as to preclude this seemingly reasonable presumption.
Perhaps more important, the Court’s armchair empiricism leads it to
render an opinion that may foreclose investor plaintiffs from having a
chance to prove that (a) they indeed held their fraud-inflated shares for
months rather than days and (b) that when they ultimately sold, the shares
were worth less because the falsity of the earlier claims had become

240. Id.
241. See Karen Richardson, Questions Follow Buffett to the Mike This Year, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2005, at C1 (noting Buffett’s popularity and hero-status as the “Oracle of Omaha” largely because of
his investment strategy of taking the long view and stating that his popularity appears intact despite
recent bad publicity resulting from reinsurance subsidiary’s involvement in sales of insurance product
to American International Group (AIG) that are viewed as suspect by some regulators).
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apparent. Notwithstanding the intent of the PSLRA to require pleading
particularity commensurate with or somewhat greater than Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), it seems a little harsh to require precise allegations of
loss in complex cases, prior to discovery and the opportunity for expert
forensic or economic analysis of the manner in which the market
ultimately discovered prior misstatements and reacted to them.
A major part of the Court’s analysis was not empirical but formalist.
The Court stated that “as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
possesses equivalent value.”242 This quite astounding contention by the
Court has the sort of “pure logic” one sees in sophomoric philosophical
questions on the order of “If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears it,
does it make a sound?”243 It is hair-splitting “logic” rather than an honest
attempt to assess the reality of a situation.
If I pay platinum prices for gravel based on misrepresentations of the
seller, I am uninjured in only the most hyper-technical sense. I have parted
with a platinum-sized amount of money that could have been deployed in
a host of investments or in enjoyable consumptive expenditures. In return,
I received gravel; I just have yet to discover it is gravel and not platinum.
Although I may have been sufficiently deceived that I will not discover the
loss for some time, it seems undeniable that I have indeed suffered loss. If
nothing else, I could have used the money to buy bronze or copper, or
perhaps even silver or gold, rather than the gravel I now have on my
hands. Only if I am fortunate enough to pass this hot potato on to another
fool who pays platinum prices will I avoid loss. This may happen in a
minority of cases in which duped investors purchase inflated shares—but
it cannot “logically” be the dominant scenario as the Court suggests. Most
investors are likely too slow to realize that they bought hype-inflated
gravel rather than true platinum and there probably is not a large enough

242. 125 S. Ct. at 1631.
243. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE/THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS (G.F. Warnock ed., Open Court
Publ’g Co. 1986) (1710/1713). This caricature of a deep philosophical inquiry has made the rounds of
popular culture for decades. I first heard it on television’s All in the Family as character Michael
Stivic, Archie Bunker’s leftist son-in-law played by Rob Reiner, employed the analogy to express the
emptiness of experiences if not shared with his wife (Archie’s daughter, played by Sally Struthers), as
part of Michael’s attempt to make amends for a previous slight. Although one can of course argue that
things do not “exist” unless perceived, this is a rather homocentric view of the world. Of course the
tree makes a crashing sound when it falls, regardless of whether any human being is in the vicinity.
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supply of additional fools to permit the first wave of defrauded investors
to sell out on good terms before the music stops.
The Dura Pharmaceuticals Court attempted to justify its crabbed
interpretation of loss causation on the basis of a very strained, brittle
formalism that crosses into the realm of the unrealistic and unhelpful. The
Court’s syllogism seems to be: if the fraudulently misinformed market
says you have a $100 stock, then you by definition have a $100 stock,
even if the truth will inevitably make it a $10 stock, until the exact date
that particular revelations of truth bring particular changes in price.
Although this may be “correct” in a narrow sense, it does not mean that
Congress adopted this view or that the Court should adopt this view in the
absence of clear congressional command.
Applied to actual share purchases, the Court’s analysis becomes even
weaker. Assume, for example, that I buy Enron stock at $90.75 a share, its
high (at least according to the class complaint filed in the Southern District
of Texas244). Enamored of the new energy trading skills of the “smartest
guys in the room,”245 I hold these shares for months, thinking they will
make a strong cornerstone for my retirement. What I do not yet know, but
what will soon be known to the world, is that Enron is a house of cards.
Within weeks or months, my investment will be essentially worthless,
Enron employees will be out on the street, and the Houston Astros will
play in a renamed ballpark. But until that day of reckoning, according to a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, I am rich, rich, rich. This contention is
not “pure logic” so much as pure poppycock.
More defensible portions of the Dura Pharmaceuticals opinion
analogize the 10b-5 securities claim to common-law fraud and hold 10b-5
claims to the stringent standards that have historically been applied to
fraud claims, thereby making it inappropriate in the Court’s view to permit
a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss unless the complaint alleges
some rather strong and specific wrongdoing linked to an actual loss.246
Finding the Broudo complaint wanting in this regard, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit and found that the alleged misrepresentations must be
asserted to cause the alleged losses in a causal chain that is not too
attenuated. If this had been all the Court said, fans of strong securities laws
might be disappointed at the Court’s view of the shortness of the
permissible causal chain, but they would at least not be dismayed by the

244. Complaint at 12, Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Tex.) (No. H-01-4198).
245. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2003)
(describing massive, ongoing fraud that led to collapse of Enron).
246. 125 S. Ct. at 1632–33.
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Court’s strained “logic” and odd perception that the Congresses of 1934
and 1995 saw securities markets as mostly day traders rather than buyand-hold investors.
Further undermining the persuasiveness of the Court’s decision,
however, is that the Court took a more restrictive view of the PSLRA loss
requirement than did the Solicitor General, who argued that the PSLRA
does not require dismissal of claims such as Broudo’s but only that
plaintiffs like Broudo demonstrate that “the inflation in the price of the
security attributable to the misrepresentation” be eliminated or reduced in
order to claim damages for the purported fraud.247 Professor Coffee
considered this an excessively modest position, which he presumably is
happy that the Court rejected in favor of a more extensive narrowing of the
criteria for pleading and proof of loss causation.248 I disagree and find it
troubling when the Supreme Court takes a more restrictive approach
towards securities fraud claims than the Bush Administration, which
prides itself on being pro-business regarding such matters.249
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he securities statutes seek to maintain
public confidence in the marketplace” and acknowledged the deterrent
function of these laws. “But,” continued the Court, the statutes “make
[private rights of action] available, not to provide investors with broad
insurance against market losses, but to protect them against those
economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”250 There are two
problems with this passage of the Dura Pharmaceuticals opinion. First, it
is the Court’s only mention of the deterrent purpose of the securities law,
and it is only a passing mention. Even in a brief opinion, this suggests that
the Court is giving short shrift to this important part of the law and policy
of securities regulation, particularly in light of its precedents recognizing
the fraud-on-the-market theory251 and the liability of third parties (in

247. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Dura Pharms., Inc.
v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-932).
248. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 547.
249. Anne E. Kornblut, Bush Wants a Cap on Malpractice Awards; Partisan Issue Touches ’04
Presidential Race, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2003 at A3; Dana Milbank, The Political Mind Behind
Tort Reform, WASH POST, Feb. 25, 2003 at A21 (describing top presidential advisor Karl Rove’s
significant involvement in Bush Administration support of tort reform).
250. 125 S. Ct. at 1633.
251. Fraud-on-the-market theory, which was approved by the Court in Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988) is a broader, more policy-centered securities fraud cause of action than individual claims,
which tend to focus of course on what was said or done to a particular claimant, whether and how
much the particular claimant lost, and what he or she requires to be made whole. By contrast, fraudon-the-market theory seeks to make for “clean” securities markets and a level playing field between
investors and issuers and sellers. Consequently, the public policy of deterring fraud and the focus is on
the impact of misrepresentation or nondisclosure on the market as a whole more than the individual
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addition to the share issuer) to investors252 and refusing to permit
securities-fraud damage awards to be reduced by purported tax savings.253
Second, the Court is engaging in sloganeering rather than analysis.
Although it may sound good at a Chamber of Commerce meeting to decry
use of securities laws as de facto “insurance against market losses,” the
real legal question before the Court is considerably less political and the
consequences of giving an answer favorable to securities plaintiffs are
considerably less apocalyptic than the Court’s prophecy of an inefficient,
government-enforced de facto insurance program for incompetent or
unlucky investors who can enlist an attorney in their cause.254 The

and his or her losses. This suggests a more charitable and expansive view as regarding proof of loss in
fraud-on-the-market cases. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1274–94 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006) (also regarding Dura Pharmaceuticals holding as
not drastically altering this approach); Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547,
1547–1551 (2005).
252. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that attorney could be guilty of
securities fraud on the basis of purchasing and trading stock in company based on inside information
acquired from representing company’s purchaser prior to public disclosure and sale). Ironically, the
Court cited O’Hagan in its brief nod to the deterrence rationale underlying the securities laws.
Although the Court had not forgotten its existence, perhaps it had forgotten its implications.
253. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (holding that party adjudicated to have
committed securities fraud and caused damages cannot have damages award reduced by the “tax
shelter” benefits the defrauded investor enjoyed from purchasing the shares at issue). Again,
apparently oblivious to the irony, the Dura Pharmaceuticals case cited Loftsgaarden as it had cited
O’Hagan a sentence earlier. O’Hagan and Loftsgaarden are so different in approach as to make one
wonder whether the same Court was involved (although, of course, it wasn’t precisely the “same”
Court because of personnel changes). O’Hagan and Loftsgaarden are both relatively expansive in their
applications of the securities laws. Dura Pharmaceuticals is not. More important, O’Hagan and
Loftsgaarden are functionalist analyses of the legal issues before the Court rather than formalist
opinions. O’Hagan and Loftsgaarden, as the Court perhaps implicitly acknowledges, are opinions that
treated the underlying deterrent purpose of the securities laws as important. They are opinions
influenced by public policy as well as text and doctrinal analysis (e.g., the “elements of fraud”
discussion employed in Dura Pharmaceuticals, 125 S. Ct. at 1631–33) and represent very good, even
outstanding examples of the Court taking a policy-purposivist approach to the controversy as well as a
functional approach to legal analysis.
254. With this rhetorical move (saying that the securities laws are not intended to be an insurance
policy against market decline), the Court too credulously follows the political-public-relations gambit
of industry defendants at the expense of closer legal and public-policy analysis. The discussion in
these parts of Dura Pharmaceuticals (the Court used the market-insurance analogy twice, 125 S. Ct. at
1631–32, 1634) is reminiscent of a similarly overly credulous embrace lower courts often give to
insurer arguments that a general liability policy is “not a performance bond,” thus wrongfully refusing
coverage when a policyholder is sued for the alleged property damage inflicted by construction
defects. See, e.g., Farmington Cas. Co. v. Duggan, 417 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2005). The “not a
performance bond” slogan is smart public-relations rhetoric by liability insurers, in part because it is
true at a general level. However, when one actually looks closely at the relevant liability insurance
policy language and the allegations of the third party’s claim, it becomes clear in many cases that the
claim is covered and that the insurer’s rhetoric, although initially persuasive, does not withstand casespecific scrutiny. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 176, at ch. 14A (discussing general liability
insurance and construction defect litigation). Compare American Family Ins. v. American Girl, Inc.,
673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004) (majority correctly assessing the insurance-coverage issue before the
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question before the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals was simply whether a
case could proceed and whether plaintiffs could perhaps recover if they
proved violations of Rule 10b-5 and provided sufficient evidence, after
discovery, to demonstrate losses occasioned by the fraud-pumped
purchase price and the subsequent sale after corrective information had
resulted in a decline in share price.
This is not really a sweeping standard of “causation by presumption” as
decried by Professor Coffee.255 Rather, it is a modest recognition of the
seemingly unassailable reality that positive misrepresentations increase
share prices and that prices usually come back to earth when the
misrepresentations become known. To be sure, other factors may also
depress share price during the same time period. It would be too proplaintiff a rule to fix a set damages formula based on share-price inflation
at the time of purchase. But is it too pro-plaintiff to require the corporate
defendant, which has access to quite a lot of information, to carry the
burden of proving that something other than correction of the previous
fraud accounted for the lower price paid to plaintiffs that sold their shares?
Professor Coffee’s argument against the Ninth Circuit approach is
considerably better than the Court’s. Although he, like the Court,
succumbs to the overwrought contention that anything beyond a narrow
approach to loss causation turns securities litigation into market-decline
insurance,256 Professor Coffee addresses more forcefully the policy
questions underlying securities claims. He argues that permitting plaintiffs
like Broudo to bring cases without a sufficiently direct link between
material misstatement and financial loss will result in some investors
being compensated for a “phantom loss” at the expense of other investors,
who will at least indirectly pay the purportedly injured investors when the
business entities found liable pass the cost on to shareholders generally,
including those that are not part of the plaintiff class.257 Even if a
settlement or judgment is funded by insurance, the company will usually
be responsible for a significant retention and such settlements are likely to
increase future premiums, resulting in increased costs borne by all future
shareholders.258

court) with id. at 86 (Crooks, J., dissenting) and id. at 89 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (both dissents
embracing too uncritically the “not a performance bond” argument).
255. See Coffee, supra note 8.
256. Id. at 535.
257. Id. at 534, 538.
258. Id. at 534–35, 542. At least this is what underwriting and insurance theory would predict.
However, as commentator Thomas Dubbs observed at the ILEP Conference, the market for Directors
& Officers (“D & O”) liability insurance, including insurance covering corporate-entity liability,
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Professor Coffee describes these types of claims as “essentially
pit[ting] one class of shareholders (those who traded within the class
period) against all other shareholders” and concludes that “[i]nherently, in
the secondary market context, such actions generate wealth transfers from
the latter class of generally non-culpable shareholders to the former
class.”259 He also argues that it is bad social policy to “maximize the
number and amount of these intra-shareholder wealth transfers” because of
the “considerable transactions costs extracted by the legal profession,”
which means that permitting recovery to plaintiffs like the Broudo class
will “produce net losses in the real world.”260
In addition, maintains Professor Coffee, class actions like the Broudo
claim direct their fire at the wrong target:
[S]ecurities litigation in this context inherently results in a wealth
transfer between two classes of public shareholders, neither of
whom is necessarily culpable. Worse still, even if we assume that
fraud was present, the beneficiaries of the fraud are the persons who
sold at inflated prices—the selling shareholders—and they escape
without incurring any cost when liability is later imposed on their
former corporation.261
In addition, one might add that there is no guarantee that even a
successful securities-fraud claim will result in payment by the persons
often most responsible for the fraud: constituents of the corporation that
approved misleading press releases, cooked the corporate books, or
otherwise misled investors to the detriment of both investor and
corporation.262
Professor Coffee’s legal-doctrinal analysis is similar to the Court’s, but
more sustained and sophisticated in its assessment of congressional intent.

appears to move as much or more in relation to factors such as the cost of capital, interest rates, and
the overall economic climate as in response to a particular policyholder’s claims experience. Thomas
Dubbs, Esq., Panel III. Class Actions and Institutional Investors, Remarks of ILEP Conference (Apr. 8,
2005). Mr. Dubbs currently is a lawyer primarily representing securities plaintiffs, but he previously
was counsel to Kidder, Peabody & Co. and is quite familiar with the purchase of D & O policies. His
comments are in accord with many assessments found in insurance trade literature and with anecdotal
information I have heard from brokers and counsel. To the extent this disjunction between insurance
pricing and claims experience is the rule rather than the exception, it weakens the argument that
successful securities claims inevitably raise costs for shareholders outside the plaintiff class, at least in
cases where insurance covers most of a settlement, which appears to be the norm in securities class
action litigation.
259. Coffee, supra note 8, at 534.
260. Id. at 534.
261. Id. at 541–42.
262. See id. at 542–43.
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He argues that the PSLRA loss-causation provisions, however broad or
narrow they may be, clearly put the burden of persuasion upon the
plaintiff. Consequently, he further argues, any sort of presumptive
causation shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant in an
impermissible manner at odds with the positive law of the PSLRA and the
intent of Congress.263 Professor Coffee’s analysis is provocative and
undoubtedly will be persuasive to many readers. More important, perhaps,
it captures the essence of a unanimous Supreme Court’s view, even if the
Court’s analysis was less comprehensive. But the Coffee assessment also
overstates the purported problems with the Ninth Circuit’s more
liberalized approach to loss causation and understates the deleterious
effects of requiring something too close to direct causation at the pleading
stage of the case. Although I realize that criticizing Coffee on corporate
law matters is a bit like criticizing Warren Buffet’s investment decisions,
Professor Coffee’s attack on the Ninth Circuit’s approach to loss causation
and his implicit endorsement of the Supreme Court’s approach (which he
accurately predicted, at least as to basic outcome) has several flaws. In
addition, Professor Merritt Fox, a similarly eminent authority on securities
law, also takes issues with the Coffee assessment.264
First, calling the Ninth Circuit approach “causation by presumption” is
a bit of rhetorical excess. Although if Dura Pharmaceuticals had
progressed to trial and plaintiffs had been accorded a presumption of loss,
this hardly would have guaranteed victory for the class plaintiffs. Before
they could enjoy the presumption, they would need to (a) amend their
complaint on remand before the trial court to correct shortcomings noted
by the Ninth Circuit; (b) develop sufficient information through discovery
and investigation to withstand expected defense summary-judgment
motions in which (i) the defendants’ fact witnesses would deny scienter or
perhaps even the inaccuracy of the statements at issue and (ii) the
defendants’ expert witnesses would contend that loss of share value
resulted from factors other than the market becoming aware of the
inaccuracy of prior statements about Spiros Albuterol and Ceclor CD; (c)
prove that the fact statements of the press releases were materially
inaccurate and that the defendants possessed scienter; (d) establish that the
class plaintiffs bought stock at a fraud-inflated price and sold at a truthdeflated price; and (e) defeat the defendants’ expected evidence suggesting
that other factors accounted for the market decline. Professor Coffee’s

263. Id. at 535, 544–47.
264. See Fox, supra note 205.
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assessment glosses over litigation realities by suggesting that the Broudo
plaintiffs are on easy street after the Ninth Circuit decision.265 In my view,
they are only being given entrance to a potentially long and winding road.
Second, and relatedly, Professor Coffee assesses the purportedly dire
effects of the Ninth Circuit approach as if the Court of Appeals had
created an irrebutable presumption of causation when investors purchase
fraud-inflated shares. Although the Ninth Circuit does not belabor this
point, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals was at most giving the
Broudo plaintiffs the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of loss causation
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss if the claim was properly pled.
Third, although Professor Coffee gives better consideration to the
deterrence rationale of the securities laws and the Ninth Circuit’s approach
than does the Supreme Court,266 he nonetheless understates the case for
deterrence and undermines its application. According to Professor Coffee:
[F]or deterrence to work, the costs must fall either on the culpable
or at least on those who are the best cost avoiders—that is, those
who can take effective precautions to minimize the risks. As a
practical matter, this means that actions directed against corporate
managers, controlling shareholders, auditors, underwriters or other
gatekeepers should have some desirable deterrent effect, but when
the liability simply falls on the corporation, as the residual risk
bearer, the deterrent effect is dissipated.267
The point is well-taken and one wishes the Court had leavened its
holding with some indication that it supported apt securities class-action
claims against the type of potential rogues’ gallery sketched by Professor
Coffee. Unfortunately, the Court threw away this important tool for

265. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 537. Contrary to my view and that of Professor Fox, supra note
205, at 525, Professor Coffee asserts that he is the academic commentator who truly appreciates the
importance of procedure and of litigation realities that Professor Fox (and, by my implication, me as
well) overlooked. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 539. For the reasons set forth above and in the text
accompanying this footnote, I disagree. See infra text accompanying notes 266–74 (acknowledging
and disputing Professor Coffee’s settlement coercion argument). Professor Coffee is overemphasizing
the defendants’ difficulties and plaintiffs’ advantages under the Ninth Circuit approach. To be sure, he
does a good job of showing that application of the court’s standard can lead to litigation and damagecalculation complexities, see Coffee, supra note 8, at 537–39, and by implication establishes that the
Supreme Court decision makes things simpler. But, of course, if the U.S. legal system really wanted to
make life simpler for corporations, officers, and directors, it could simply abolish securities-fraud
liability altogether. The fact that permitting recovery for misrepresentation leads to occasionally
difficult questions of proof and extensive litigation simply establishes that permitting recovery to
injured plaintiffs is not cost-free. It hardly follows that permitting recovery is not worth the cost.
266. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 542–43.
267. Id.
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policing the securities markets when it extinguished aiding-and-abetting
liability in its 1994 Central Bank of Denver decision.268 Congress
compounded the error by not reinstating aiding-and-abetting liability and
overturning Central Bank of Denver when enacting the PSLRA in 1995.269
By criticizing the Ninth Circuit approach to loss causation because it fails
to go after the real villains of corporate fraud (the agents) and instead
seeks recompense from the corporation itself, Professor Coffee is allowing
the “best” (a world with aiding and abetting liability) to be the enemy of
the “good” (a world where a reasonably broad approach to loss causation
brings more deterrence than exists under a narrow regime of loss
causation).270 He appears to take the position that no deterrence is better
than some deterrence, in that he advocates precluding claims like those in
Dura Pharmaceuticals in part because they do not pursue the appropriate
targets of wrongdoing. More likely, he means that the costs of Dura-like
actions outweigh the benefits, but this is both unclear in his article and far
from clear as a matter of empirical fact.
In addition, Professor Coffee appears to overlook the degree to which
liability suffered by the corporate entity should encourage a rational
corporation (through better controls, supervision, etc.) to take steps that
will reduce the chances of future claims and enable it to ultimately force
errant constituents to pick up the tab. For example, a corporation can
require officers and directors to indemnify it for intentional liabilitycreating behavior or can withhold portions of a salary or bonus as a hedge
against such liability. Although this is not feasible for middle and lowerlevel employees, it probably is worth pursuing for high-ranking, highly
paid officers.271 Unfortunately, corporate boards appear to have
irrationally gone in the other direction in recent years, perhaps the most
notorious example being Tyco’s agreement to compensate former CEO
and current criminal defendant Dennis Kozlowski should he be convicted
of a crime (any crime, not just some regulatory problem attendant to his
duties for the company).272

268. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
270. See supra text accompanying note 304 (criticizing restrictions on class treatment as example
of allowing an ideal of the “best” to thwart the “good” of positive if imperfect use of class treatment).
271. Directors may present a different situation because of the difficulty in obtaining qualified
directors, particularly after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (2005). In today’s
market, the Directors appear to have the leverage to request insurance coverage, indemnity
agreements, and other protections. In contrast, officers seeking to attain or retain corporate
employment at six- and seven-figure compensation are likely to bend to reasonable corporate requests.
272. See Roger Lowenstein, A Boss for the Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003 § 6, at 42 (“In 2001,
shortly before his supposed crimes [Kozlowski was subsequently convicted] came to light, Kozlowski
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These sorts of examples of government attacks on corporate
misfeasance perhaps strengthen Professor Coffee’s case. However, there is
no guarantee that the government will always be diligent in pursuing such
actions. In fact, one can of course argue that today’s relative upsurge in
criminal prosecutions of white collar crime is merely the result of underregulation and inadequate supervision of these individuals and entities
during the 1990s. Also, many of today’s administrative or prosecutorial
initiatives against corporate wrongdoing could easily have never occurred
or could have been reversed or nullified. For example, if a prosecutor
declines to pursue action against the Enrons or Koslowskis of the world,
that may end the enforcement effort as a practical matter. Although
notorious company chieftains such as John Rigas (Aldelphi) and Bernard
Ebbers (WorldCom) were convicted and received stiff sentences, Richard
Scrushy (HealthSouth), was acquitted despite the testimony of several
former employees implicating him in fraud of similar magnitute.273
As to SEC regulation, it currently appears to hang by a thread. In April
2005, the Commission adopted a regulation that accomplished much of
what was sought by the Newton plaintiffs: a requirement that brokers
exercise a duty of best execution in conducting stock trades.274 However,
the commission vote on the matter was three to two, and many in the
Republican party criticized Chairman William Donaldson, a Bush
appointee, for being insufficiently sensitive to industry concerns by siding
with the majority.275 Because administrative enforcement, even in the most

demanded a contract that guaranteed his severance [with pay], even if he committed a felony. The
directors might have reasonably asked if Kozlowski were plotting a little arson or, perhaps, a discreet
murder. Instead, they met his terms.”). See also In Brief, EVENING STANDARD (London), Mar. 31,
2004, at 32 (reporting $72 million in bonuses given to Kozlowski alone); Lawrence K. Cagney &
Catherine Marten, Executive Compensation Litigation: Lessons to be Learned, Landmines to be
Avoided, 576 PRACTICING L. INST. TAX L. & PRAC. 779, 793 (2003) (reporting that Kozlowski and
Tyco CFO Swartz were accused of fraud totalling more than $600 million through unauthorized
compensation and stock sales).
273. See Kim Clark, For Whom Enron Tolls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 2006 at 46
(noting convictions of John Rigas (former CEO of Adelphi Communications), Bernard Ebbers (former
CEO of WorldCom), Dennis Kozlowski (Former TYCO CEO) and others as well as acquittal of
HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy); Stephen Labaton, Four Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as
Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006 at C1 (same).
274. See SEC Adopts Regulation NMS and Provision Regarding Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
SEC NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 7, 2005 at 1.
275. Floyd Norris, Split SEC Approves Rule Requiring Best Price in Stock Trades, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 7, 2005, at 13. See Greg Farrell, Donaldson Steps Down as Head of Divided SEC, USA
TODAY, June 2, 2005 at 1B; Ken Herman, Chairman of SEC to Depart; Critics Say Donaldson Too
Fond of Regulation, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 2, 2005 at E1. Subsequently, Donaldson resigned, and
he is to be replaced by Congressmen Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), who almost certainly would not
support the regulation, although “sources familiar with his thinking” stated he would not work to
repeal it. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Andrew Parker, Nominated SEC Chief “Will Not Seek To

p1127 Stempel book pages.doc4/20/2006

2005]

CLASS ACTIONS AND LIMITED VISION

1205

non-partisan of agencies, is subject to practical political constraints, courts
must shoulder a significant role in efforts to deter bad securities practices.
Most important, however, the Coffee argument is insufficiently
supportive of the deterrent rationale of securities law because he refuses to
hold a fraudfeasor liable unless there is nearly direct and irrefutable
evidence that disclosure of the fraud caused an immediate and finely
calculable reduction in share price. Although I acknowledge that he (and
the Supreme Court) can argue that this was the will of Congress, it ought
to give all of us pause to think that this construction of the PSLRA means
that American law is unwilling to impose civil liability against a
fraudulent actor absent a smoking gun. Logically, the practical effect of
this protective “no harm, no foul” defense must be to make actors more
willing to engage in fraud. They have whatever incentives might exist to
prompt fraud (e.g., pumping up the share price; getting a bonus; helping a
merger go through, etc.), while after Dura Pharmaceuticals, the
disincentives for fraud are substantially reduced: you will only be
punished for fraud you commit if it happens to inflict injury in a manner
that can be demonstrated under the Court’s narrow view of the PSLRA.
Similar criticisms of Professor Coffee’s analysis have been put forth by
Professor Fox276 and Messrs. Coughlin, Issaacson, and Daley.277 The latter
note that corrective disclosure of corporate fraud sometimes comes so late
in the day that the corporation has been liquidated or reorganized in
bankruptcy and argue (persuasively, in my view) that applying the Court’s
notion of adequate loss causation leaves investors in such companies
uncompensated or undercompensated. By definition it is then too late to
recover, but only then has sufficient loss linked to fraud been shown under
the Dura test.278
They also note that as a practical matter, the efficient markets posited
by economists and case law often reflect a decline in share price due to

Undo” Donaldson Reforms If Confirmed, FIN. TIMES (London), June 29, 2005 at 1. I remain skeptical.
See also Symposium, The SEC at 70, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825–1186 (2005), which contains
several valuable articles presenting variant views of the SEC’s effectiveness and future. Although the
Symposium contributors represented a wide range of views, all appear to agree that the SEC and
corporate regulation in general, change over time. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for
Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The SEC at 70: Let’s
Celebrate Its Reinvigorated Golden Years, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2005) (taking quite
opposing views of the best future course of securities regulation infrastructure, but both seeing SEC as
agency going through historical phases).
276. Fox, supra note 205.
277. Coughlin, Isaacson & Daley, supra note 205.
278. Id. at 12 (“[R]ecovery should not be denied merely because the defendants manage to
conceal their fraud until after the company failed and its stock was worthless.” (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977)).
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prior misrepresentations before those misrepresentations formally come to
light.279 In the world of efficient markets, observers often smell smoke
before the fire can be spotted, and certainly before the fire is officially
acknowledged by any corporate pyromaniacs. Further, Couglin et al. note
that many wrongdoers will be adept at covering the tracks of prior
misstatements, making it difficult as a practical matter to prove all
damages resulting from fraud if restricted to the Supreme Court’s narrow
concept.280 To the extent that they are correct, the Dura Pharmaceuticals
holding chooses to give greater protection to the rights of a perhaps
unjustly accused corporate defendant than to a perhaps excessively
litigious former shareholder.
Although the Court’s position can perhaps be justified by the
congressional intent underlying the PSLRA or a more general notion of
protecting the rights of the accused, it cannot be justified by a damages
theory generally. There is no evidence that application of the Ninth
Circuit’s approach to loss causation would result in more wrongful
inculpation of innocent defendants than that the Court’s approach will
result in wrongful exculpation of culpable defendants.281
Professor Fox puts the loss-causation debate in its historical context,
which suggests that Congress intended to codify case law on the subject
rather than to impose a substantially higher burden on securities-fraud
plaintiffs.282 The term originated in the Second Circuit, where the Court of
Appeals historically took a more stringent view of pleading under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and was considered by many to be protective

279. Id. at 13 (citing various sources, including BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN
WALL STREET 185 (6th ed. 1996) (“Research indicates that, on average, stock prices react well in
advance of unexpectedly good or unexpectedly bad earnings reports.”)). But see Lynn A. Stout,
Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS.
LAW. 1435, 1436 (2005) (“During the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, efficient market theory and the
principal-agent model wielded tremendous influence over academic thinking about corporate
takeovers. More recently, however, corporate scholars have begun to look at each of these ideas more
carefully. Neither is holding up especially well to closer scrutiny.”) Even if Professor Stout is correct
as to efficient market theory as respects hostile takeovers, this does not appear to me to undermine the
validity of fraud-on-the-market actions by securities purchasers, which does not presume much about
the behavior of corporate leaders but instead makes the reasonable assumption that share prices reflect
information about the company, both good and bad. Consequently, the spreading of good but false
information logically defrauds the market of purchasers.
280. Coughlin, Isaacson & Daley, supra note 205, at 14.
281. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996) (noting that choice of rule or approach will have differential effects
on whether defendants are held culpable and hence will also affect degree of deterrence of securities
fraud).
282. Fox, supra note 205, at 508–11. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374
(2d Cir. 1974); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
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of corporate defendants, at least as compared to other courts. But the
Second Circuit did not require smoking-gun proof of loss, only a
reasonable linkage, and found that loss causation was “rather easily
[shown] by proof of some form of economic damage.”283 A prominent
Fifth Circuit decision stated that loss causation was shown if the alleged
misrepresentation “touches upon the reasons for the investment’s decline
in value”284—a verbal test not far different from the Ninth Circuit
articulation that was struck down by the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals.
Professor Fox notes that the traditional measure of damages in a Rule
10b-5 action has always been the plaintiff’s “out-of-pocket” losses, and he
argues persuasively that a purchaser of a fraud-inflated security does
indeed suffer an actual loss on the day of purchase when she buys a stock
that would sell for half that amount in the absence of the material
misstatements.285 “Price inflation [from missrepresentation] is the type of
loss that most closely corresponds with this measure of damages.”286
Perhaps most important, Professor Fox reads the legislative history of the
PSLRA to require only this showing of loss causation, thus eliminating
congressional intent as a justification for the Court’s intellectually
unsatisfying Dura Pharmaceuticals opinion.287 Equally important,
Professor Fox appears to place more importance on the deterrent function
of the securities laws than does Professor Coffee.288
Professor Fox also argues convincingly that the very nature of a fraudon-the-market claim requires an application of the traditional rule, similar
to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, rather than the Supreme Court’s approach
and that in these types of cases, the traditional dichotomy between
transaction causation and loss causation is not helpful.289 He also levels
significant criticism at two of the appellate court decisions embraced by
the Supreme Court in its Dura opinion, finding that each has “serious
problems.”290 Concludes Professor Fox:

283. Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380. See Fox, supra note 205, at 508–11.
284. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
285. Fox, supra note 205, at 515–19.
286. Id. at 528.
287. See id. at 528 n.71 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep).
288. See id. at 529–30 (noting his agreement with Coffee that the compensatory rationale for suits
such as the Dura claim is not strong, but arguing that such claims are supportable under a theory of
deterrence).
289. Id. at 513–15.
290. Id. at 518–19 (criticizing Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d. 1441 (11th Cir. 1997)
and Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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[A] plaintiff who sells before full market realization of the truth
should have his damages reduced or eliminated by the extent to
which the price continues to be inflated by the misstatement. But
full elimination of this price inflation . . . does not require that price
at time of plaintiff’s sale be below the price he paid. . . . Other
factors may have increased share price by more than the full
deflation reduced it. . . . [T]he problem of sales prior to full
deflation is, for a number of reasons, better considered in terms of
the determination of individual damages rather than causation.291
Professor Coffee would undoubtedly respond to my criticisms that he
understates the “hurdles of litigation” faced by plaintiffs by noting that
most cases settle and that once the Broudo amended complaint survives a
Rule 12 motion to dismiss as a class action (or an action likely to receive
class certification), it has substantial settlement value that will prompt the
Dura defendants to reach for their checkbooks (or at least the insurers’
checkbooks) rather than continue to test the bona fides of the Broudo
claims through protracted, expensive, adverse-publicity-generating
litigation.292 Although this alternative view of “litigation reality” cannot be
blithely dismissed, it must be recognized for what it is: the by-nowfamiliar-to-the-point-of-being-hackneyed “litigation blackmail” argument
of class-action coercion. As discussed previously and subsequently, this
argument is overstated in the abstract and in application, particularly if the
case is problematic.293 For example, in the Ninth Circuit’s Broudo v. Dura
decision, there does appear to be substantial ground for arguing a “no
harm, no foul” defense to a finding of misleading corporate press releases.
Under these circumstances, the Dura defendants would seem well
positioned to fight on (or have their insurers fight on their behalf). At best,
they may win total victory after trial and appeal. The realistic worst-case
assumption is that their efforts will drive down the cost of settlement,
probably to something within the limits of their insurance coverage.
Even assuming that Broudo v. Dura was inevitably destined for a
substantial settlement payment to plaintiffs (and counsel, of course) had
the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, the public-policy question
remains: is that so bad? Professor Coffee and other critics of the Ninth
Circuit approach (including, I think, the justices of the Court) too quickly

291. Id. at 519.
292. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 540.
293. See Silver, supra note 2; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2; supra text accompanying notes
137–39.
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take the position that the litigation reality of settlement pressure in a class
action results in inappropriate payments by defendants and excessive
pressure on corporations, over-deterrence if you will.294 Persuasive
scholarly analysis has convincingly refuted the all-too-commonly held
notion that class certification unfairly leverages innocent defendants into
unreasonable settlement of meritless claims.295 Courts and commentators
should simply stop continuing to invoke this canard as a rationale against
class treatment, at least until such time as the case for the idea of the poor,
downtrodden, lawyer-abused corporate defendant is given at least some
convincing empirical support. At this juncture, there is of course some
evidence of substantial settlement payments in particular class action
cases. There is also evidence of what appear to be occasions of abuse
(“quickie” settlements; coupon settlements, etc.). But this hardly suggests
that securities-fraud defendants are in general overpaying for the
consequences of their misconduct. At this juncture, an equally convincing
case can be made that these defendants are seldom forced to fully
internalize the cost of the wrongdoing they inflict on securities buyers and
the market.
To a large degree, this divide over whether securities class actions
over-punish or under-enforce mirrors the debate surrounding the PSLRA,
in which proponents of the law argued, largely on the strength of one
study of a small cluster of cases, that the merits did not matter to
settlement, while others argued that settlement outcomes were related to
the strength of plaintiffs’ claims.296 Congress, rightly or wrongly, adopted
the former view in promulgating a law that was designed to make it harder
to successfully sue under the securities laws and to use procedural barriers
(e.g., the requirement of pleading with particularity) as a proxy for more
searching judicial inquiry into the quality of claims.297 On that basis, a
reasonable court might determine that a narrow view of loss causation and
an expansive view of the particularized pleading requirement is
congressionally commanded.
If the Supreme Court had adhered more to this type of analysis in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, the decision would be less subject to criticism but still
incorrect, at least in my view. Courts interpreting statutes need to be
mindful that legislation is not only positive law but that it varies in the
degree to which it is truly “public-spirited” legislation rather than mere

294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra text accompanying notes 137–39.
See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2; Silver, supra note 2.
See supra text accompanying note 156.
See supra text accompanying notes 47–51 (discussing enactment of PSLRA).
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interest-group legislation.298 Although one can argue that the PSLRA was
the former (and particular parts of the law such as the “Lead Plaintiff”
provisions appear to have genuinely been added to the Act in the spirit of
public interest),299 the claim-reducing, defendant-protection aspects of the
PSLRA are more in the nature of interest-group legislation designed more
to protect corporate securities defendants than to limit abuses of the
securities laws. Under these circumstances, the better course for courts is
to interpret the law in a way that minimizes its interest-group
characteristics and maximizes its public-regarding aspects.300
Applied to Dura Pharmaceuticals, this suggests at a minimum that a
more functional and less formal approach is in order. In addition, it
suggests that the public is better served by adopting, at least in the early
stages of litigation, a liberal approach to pleading loss causation rather
than a more restrictive approach. A more functional approach to pleading
loss causation will not unduly burden defendants, while the more
restrictive approach may well eliminate claims in which contentions of
defendant fraud have merit. Although the more liberal approach imposes
some costs on defendants from increased litigation, these costs are worth
bearing in order to reduce the likelihood that fraud will go unpunished
because of the defendants’ good fortune to have complex economic factors
surrounding post-fraud decline in share price.
Dura Pharmacueticals thus stands as an example of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that is not encouraging, but that does not directly foreclose a
more functional approach to class treatment of securities claims, one that
will give some renewed impetus to such claims in the service of deterring
fraud. After a decade of class actions under attack, the time is now ripe for
considering such approaches, particularly now that more class actions will

298. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997) (making distinction between public-regarding and private-regarding
legislation).
299. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 2, at 876 (noting that lead plaintiff provision of
PSLRA resulted rather directly from suggestion made in Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the
Money do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995)). See also S. REP. NO. 104–98 at 11 n.32 (1995) (acknowledging
influence of Weiss & Beckerman article on the legislation).
300. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). Of course, even if everyone
would agree that public-regarding legislation should receive more expansive, charitable interpretation
than private-regarding statutes, there would remain substantial differences of opinion as to
classification and notions of the public interest generally. Professor Macey, for example, may favor
purpose-oriented statutory construction but is quite opposed to regulation. See Jonathan R. Macey,
Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994).
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be in federal court, subject to a more unified body of substantive and
procedural law.301
IV. MAKING “GOOD” OUT OF A BEST/BAD SITUATION: AN ARGUMENT
FOR GREATER USE OF CLASS TREATMENT OF MATTERS
The history of the modern class action is a classic case of making the
“best” (individuated, detailed, full-scale Article III jury-trial adjudication)
the enemy of the “good” (fair, reasonably just, efficient resolution of
disputes involving rights that might otherwise lack vindication in a
completely individuated justice system).302 To the extent the judicial
system (including legislators and executives as well as the judiciary)
insists on permitting class treatment of claims only in cases where class
adjudication is a near-perfect method of resolution and ignores the
practical consequences of failing to permit class treatment, the system
permits an idealized norm (the purportedly perfect individualized justice
of a full-dress individual trial) to unnecessarily impede benefits that may
accrue from utilizing partial class treatment or applying pragmatic (rather
than perfect) adjudicative tools.
Although the “best should not be the enemy of the good” maxim is a
cliche, perhaps even a trite one, it has achieved cliche status for a reason: it
well captures the tendency of human beings to compare an option not with
its realistic alternatives but with some hypothetical, idealized alternative.
An evaluation of class-action treatment of disputes requires that the
class action be compared to individual litigation as it actually takes place,
rather than to idealized individual litigation. Making the best the enemy of
the good occurs when courts and policymakers reject class treatment of a
matter merely because class treatment will not be completely equivalent to
the romanticized concept of individual litigation or because the posited
class members may in theory have some divergence of interest.
More commonly (no pun intended), courts unnecessarily resist class
actions in situations where the damages of each class member require

301. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
302. In commentary at the Symposium Conference, Professor Francis McGovern preferred to use
the terminology of not “making the perfect the enemy of the good.” Although I am forever hidebound
from having first heard the expression using “best” rather than “perfect,” Professor McGovern’s word
choice may better capture my point in that I am to a degree accusing class action opponents of not only
an unrealistic insistence that class treatment be better than the idealized baseline of individual
litigation, but also that a class treatment solution be “perfect” or nearly so because of the purported
perfection of the individual case treatment it displaces.
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some arguably individuated proof.303 Where this occurs in situations of
highly common questions of defendant conduct, defendant liability, or
important elements of a claim, denying class treatment seems to elevate
unnecessarily the question of damages. Although common questions must
predominate and the matter must be triable, at least in part as a class
action, this hardly means that intra-class uniformity on damages should be
a complete bar to class certification.
To the extent the judicial system has allowed the nostalgic vision of
individuated justice to prevent fully optimal use of class treatment, this
mythical “best” has indeed become the enemy of a more utilitarian but
attainable “good”—the resolution of legitimate claims in the most costeffective manner likely to achieve the social goals of compensation to the
injured and deterrence of disfavored behavior. Arguing against class
treatment based on an implicit view that individualized adjudication is a
pearl beyond price seems particularly hypocritical in an era when courts
have increased their use of summary judgment substantially, giving rise to
serious concern that individual judges have rushed to prejudgment of the
facts (or the conclusion that there are no genuinely disputed facts) in order
to prevent trial of claims.304 Although this concern seems most serious in
discrimination litigation (where white male judges seem astonishingly
willing to label problematic behavior beyond Title VII liability as a matter
of law),305 more aggressive summary judgment, which began in earnest in
1986 with the Supreme Court’s blessing,306 undoubtedly affects all claims

303. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Syst., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (Named
plaintiffs “were not members of the class of discriminatees they purported to represent.”); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs
challenging armed forces reserve membership of members of Congress did not have standing to sue
since the interest alleged was “held in common by all members of the public”).
304. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment,
100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering
View of Summary Judgement, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95
(1988).
305. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999) (arguing that summary judgment is granted frequently for
defendants in sexual harassment Title VII claims where there is substantial evidence of outrageous
treatment that reasonable jurors (or open-minded judges) could regard as making the workplace
“hostile”); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
“Pretext-Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991) (noting same
problem at Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 stages of sex discrimination trials); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts
and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34
B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993) (stating that summary judgment is inordinately granted in error in Title VII
cases).
306. In the now-famous trilogy of 1986 cases, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the Court strengthened the defendant’s procedural hand regarding
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and works against the very day-in-court ideal that these same summaryjudgment-granting judges then invoke to deny class treatment.
Rather than clinging to as much of the nostalgic vision as remains
embraced by courts, a better approach would begin by accepting that there
is an inherent tradeoff in this realm of jurisprudence, and thus an inherent
tradeoff facing courts deciding whether to permit class treatment of a
matter. On at least a rough theoretical level, for many cases the tradeoff is
fairly straightforward. On one hand, permitting aggregation will often
permit recovery that would otherwise never come (to even a meritorious
claimant) because the economics of individual litigation are too
discouraging. On the other hand, permitting aggregation may often give a
nonfrivolous but relatively weak claim307 greater leverage, and class

application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Prior to these 1986 Supreme Court decisions, the prevailing law and
practice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was regarded by many as making summary judgment too hard to
obtain even where the plaintiff’s claims were weak. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note
35, § 4.10, at 258 (“For many years [prior to 1986], the motion was rarely used to terminate litigation
because, as administered, the party against whom the motion is made was not rigorously required to
meet the evidence offered by the moving party, and a genuine issue of fact was regarded as presented
if there was the ‘slightest doubt’ as to what the fact were.”). See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (Court supports denial of summary judgment motion in antitrust case on
basis that jury might disbelieve only witness offering evidence on point because witness was identified
with defendant).
Recall that Rule 56(c) provides that the party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Prior to this trilogy, parties opposing summary
judgment (usually plaintiffs) tended to be able to defeat the motion by showing that there were
contested facts as between the litigants. In its 1986 decisions, the Supreme Court shifted both the law
and the practicalities of summary judgment by requiring that a “genuine” issue be one in which the
nonmoving party had substantial evidence in its favor, a quantum akin to what is required in order to
survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (then known as a
“directed verdict”). Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. In addition, the Court emphasized that any
factual dispute must relate to a “material” fact defined as one necessary to sustain an essential element
of the claim in question. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
In both Liberty Lobby and Celotex, the Court also emphasized that if the movant had satisfied its
initial burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact, Rule 56(e) imposed significant
burdens on the nonmovant to come forth with “specific facts” supported by affidavit or other
reasonably reliable material to demonstrate that trial of the case was necessary (or trial of a particular
claim regarding motions for partial summary judgment). In the third case of the trilogy, Matsushita,
the Court demonstrated the degree to which it was willing to support grants of summary judgment
even in large or complex cases when it supported summary judgment in a complex antitrust case
alleging price fixing, with the Court further tending to dismiss the plaintiffs’ proffered factual evidence
because it was inconsistent with prevailing economic theory.
The net effect of the 1986 summary judgment trilogy, as it came to be called, was to encourage
Rule 56 motions and increase their changes of success. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra
note 35, § 4.10, at 258–59 (describing Celotex as revealing a Supreme Court “stance much more
supportive of summary judgment”). See Stempel, supra note 304, at 100–08 (noting degree to which
1986 trilogy altered federal summary-judgment practice); Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for
Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) (same).
307. Prospective class-action defendants consistently complain that aggregation gives even
frivolous claims coercive power over them and forces unnecessary defense and settlement. This
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adjudication may be cumbersome or may risk error that could in theory be
avoided if the matter were individually litigated.
Class treatment thus may permit life to a claim that would otherwise
die, but does so at the cost of the traditional day-in-court ideal and at the
potential cost of giving claimants an advantage disproportionate to the
merits of the claim. In addition, settlement of such matters accorded class
treatment may be unduly generous to counsel, relative to class members,
and may create problems of conflict of interest that would not arise for
individual cases.
In conducting this hypothetical balancing of interests, it seems
unquestionable that the factors favoring class treatment are real and
substantial. For many claims, even claims of some magnitude,
individuated litigation is not a realistic option, even for institutional
investors or well-heeled claimants willing to invest litigation resources to
prove a point.
This traditional notion underlying the need for the availability of the
class-action device had as its archetype the sort of modest chiseling (of
investors, consumers, tenants) that, although quite real, could not
conceivably justify individual litigation for even the most rabid moralist
wanting to right even the smallest of wrongs. Examples justifying class
treatment would include overcharges of only a few dollars, or perhaps
even a few cents, on a transaction.308

argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the judicial system has ample means of screening
meritless claims. At worst, defendants may be required to expend non-trivial litigation resources
establishing the frivolousness of a claim. But if the claim really is frivolous, this should not be a major
problem. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of
Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (1991). In
addition, for commercial defendants facing class actions or other complaints, reasonable expenditures
made in defeating a claim are generally tax deductible while a natural person’s litigation costs are not
deductible. See I.R.C. § 162a.; Edward L. Rubin, The Code, The Consumer and the Institutional
Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 27 (1997) (noting substantial impact this may
have on balance of economic coercive power when individuals and businesses are involved in
litigation).
308. In this sense, the traditional reluctance of courts to support class treatment of a case strikes
me as a bit odd in that our legal system permits a goodly number of claims where there is arguably
little real injury to the claimant. Consider, for example, what can happen in a Truth-in-Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2000), claim in which there is some technical deficiency that supports liability.
Something as trivial as a failure to use the appropriately large font type may constitute a violation of
the Act but may have (by everyone’s admission) not caused any actual harm to the borrower receiving
the undersized disclosure materials. (The theory underlying the Act is that harm from violation of the
Act is presumed because it frustrates the purpose of comparison-shopping by consumers). For most
truth-in-lending violations, the amount of provable out-of-pocket injury is small. A typical violation is
not the type of situation that would itself engender a claim, absent special statutory incentives such as
fixed penalties or attorney fee-shifting. To be viable, this type of claim had to be created by the legal
body politic, with new grounds for liability (e.g., small font type is a ground for liability even if not
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In the modern world of litigation, the economics of disputing are
sufficiently daunting that even some pretty large claims are probably not
worth suing over—even where the wrong is clear—unless the amount of
individual injury is in the tens of thousands of dollars. Unless an attorney
fee-shifting or recovery provision is in effect, even winning claimants will
lose when any gross recovery is netted out by payment to counsel (under
either an hourly-fee or contingent-fee arrangement). Add to this the
problem that the entire gross recovery will probably be taxable to the
claimant, even though the net to plaintiff will often be a third (or more)
less because of counsel fees and costs.309 Although recovery of pre- or
post-judgment interest will help, the availability of punitive damages is
severely curtailed after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling establishing
stricter limits on punitive damages, including a (rebuttable) presumption
that a punitive-to-compensatory ratio greater than nine to one is
unconstitutional.310

fraudulent or misleading), minimum penalties, and a change in the American rule requiring each party
to bear its own fees and costs. The statutory penalties for impermissible electronic surveillance provide
another example. Even if the only statement wrongfully overheard is “No, I don’t want to subscribe to
any more magazines,” the penalty is the same. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (2005). Both the wiretapping
and truth-in-lending penalties are designed more for deterrence than compensation linked to injury.
This seems not to bother the body politic. Why, then, should class treatment of securities, consumer,
and tort claims be treated differently, since they also foster greater deterrence of disfavored behavior?
In contrast to wiretapping and truth-in-lending cases, in every damages class-action situation the
class members will at least purportedly have actually lost something of value. To be sure, the value
might be small. But it cannot be said that class treatment permits creation of a cause of action and
compensation that would not otherwise exist. It takes legislation or common law precedent to do this.
Class actions merely permit aggregation of claims that otherwise already exist (at least in theory)
under the law but that are unattainable because of the small amounts of individual injury involved. Yet
courts and Congress resist class treatment while simultaneously being willing to create new causes of
action. To me, this is inconsistent.
309. See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (holding that, as a “general
rule,” where award to individual litigant constitutes income, the amount of income to be reported to
the IRS must also include portion of recovery that will never actually be enjoyed by plaintiff, but will
instead be paid to attorney as contingent fee). However, as the Banks Court points out, the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 26 U.S.C.A. § 62(a)(19) (2005), essentially defangs the Banks holding in
that, under the Act, taxpayers may deduct counsel fees and court costs paid in connection with a claim
of unlawful discrimination) (i.e., the type of actions pursued by Banks and consolidated plaintiff
Banaitis). The Banks Court’s relatively short opinion does not address possible consequences of the
holding for other types of plaintiffs’ claims. See Steve R. Johnson, Major Changes to Taxation of Tort
Damages, NEV. LAW. April 2005 at 12 (commenting on Banks decision).
310. See State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (striking down $145
million punitive-damages award in connection with $1 million compensatory-damages verdict in case
involving jury findings of egregious and sustained bad faith by insurer). On remand, State Farm’s
position before the Utah Supreme Court was that any award in excess of the one to one ratio suggested
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion was per se unconstitutional. Although the Utah high court
rejected this position, see Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 411–12 (Utah
2004), it illustrates the degree to which Campbell gives powerful new leverage to defendants.
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In short, the traditional assumption that without class-action
availability many worthy but relatively modest claims will wither seems
sound. In addition, even a plaintiff with these admittedly non-trivial
amounts at stake must endure the many uncompensated costs of litigation
(e.g., stress, inconvenience, public or personal opprobrium) as well as
delay and risk of loss. Where the liability issues presented by the claim are
closer, the amount at stake must be higher, or simple cost-benefit analysis
makes individual disputing unlikely. Most important, courts should not
lose sight of the deterrence rationale underlying law, particularly the
securities laws that are designed to foster sound markets.311
The arguments used on the other arm of the scale balancing classaction benefits and detriments seem less solid. This part of the balancing
equation posits that although class treatment of claims may give life to
otherwise moribund small claims this gain comes at the cost of (a)
“averaging” or “bureaucratizing” justice rather than making a finely-tuned
individual determination; (b) enhancing the value of the claim because of
the force of aggregation, even to the point of creating an in terrorem effect
that may permit defendants to be “blackmailed” into settlement of weak or
even highly-suspect claims; or (c) creating a system in which defendants

In other cases since Campbell, a norm appears to be evolving, consistent with dicta in Campbell,
that a double-digit multiple of punitive damages may be appropriate in situations where there is
sufficiently reprehensible behavior by a defendant, but only small amounts of injury to the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–78 (7th Cir. 2003) (ratio of more
than thirty-seven to one permitted in case involving injury to hotel guests from bedbugs where
compensatory award was only $5,000). See also Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d
224 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming punitive damages award of $150,000 in case involving $2,000 contract
claim, based on holding that attorneys fees and costs could be included, due to defendant’s bad faith,
within “compensatory damages” for purposes of calculating the punitive damages ratio).
Even with this sort of potential “escape hatch” from Campbell’s presumptive nine to one ratio,
this hardly changes the economics of individual versus class pursuit of small claims. Relatively few
cases are strong punitive-damages cases.
311. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999);
Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167, 175 (1997). Professor Fisch stated as follows:
The deterrence rationale provides powerful support for lawyer-driven litigation. To the extent
that class suits provide a financial incentive for lawyers to search out and redress corporate
wrongdoing, the fees awarded to class counsel are justified by the social utility of the suits.
Corporate decisionmakers are encouraged by the possibility of class litigation to comply with
the law instead of taking the risk that wrongdoing will be undetected or will produce harms
too small to warrant litigation. Moreover, if deterrence rather than compensation is the
primary objective of class litigation, it becomes less important to justify departures from the
traditional litigation structure.
Id.
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may most effectively purchase peace by overcompensating class counsel
relative to class members.312
Although these concerns are more than legitimate, they are also more
than a bit overdone and, in some cases, directly at odds with what appears
to be the greater empirical reality. Perhaps most egregious in
overstatement is the notion that the American judicial system produces
perfect justice in individually litigated cases. The arguments on this arm of
the class-action balancing scale appear dramatically incorrect.
First, it tends to overlook the almost immutable fact that if the claims
are not accorded class treatment, they will not be brought at all. Thus, the
question is not: “How would class treatment look as compared to
individual adjudication?” Rather, the actual question is: “How does class
treatment compare with having the claims eliminated entirely, without
regard to their merit?” Phrased in this second, more realistic sense, it
seems to me unassailable that the correct answer is that class treatment is a
far better alternative to allowing claims to die an early death unlinked to
their merits—so long as the claim is not permitted to proceed without
some vetting by the judicial system. If in fact the claims are baseless, this
can be tested through Rule 11 motions, Rule 12(b)(6) motions, or other
procedural devices to ensure that the claims kept alive through class
treatment are not worthless, useful only for aggregated extortion.
Second, the traditional assumption about the goodness of individual
litigation is seriously flawed. Individual litigation is often a messy
endeavor. Sometimes it reaches sound results. Sometimes it reaches results
that most onlookers would regard as bizarre, incorrect, or simply absurd.
Some of this is of course the fault of another American institution that,
like the individual day in court, has mythic, iconic status out of proportion
to reality—the civil jury. At the risk of sounding like a tort reformer even
to the right of Victor Schwartz,313 juries are simply not what they are

312. This phenomenon can take the form of settling as a means of paying purported extortion in
the form of legal fees to class counsel, who in theory control the litigation because of their relatively
greater power over the named plaintiffs and class members in contrast to the typical individual lawsuit.
Or it can take the form of paying settlement dollars to resolve a meritorious claim, but doing so in a
manner in which a disproportionate share of the settlement funds are paid to class counsel rather than
to the class members themselves.
313. Schwartz is former law professor and Dean of the University of Cincinnati College of Law
who in private practice has been among the most prominent proponents of tort reform and vocal critics
of perceived excesses of American litigation. He has served as general counsel for the American Tort
Reform Association and published extensively. See Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of
Justice Through National Punitive Damages Reform, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1573, 1610 (1997) (referring
to Schwartz testimony before Congress as general counsel of ATRA); Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A.
Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrisomone, Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform
by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (1999); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens,
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cracked up to be in the litigation folklore of America. One can even make
a case that the Seventh Amendment itself is in need of reconsideration.314
But I am not attempting to write a brief for repeal. I am simply arguing
that the jury-driven individual trial is not the ideal resolution it is held out
to be by the traditional American folklore of litigation.
In addition, it seems undeniable that both juries and judges can reach
inconsistent assessments of what is essentially the same conduct by
litigants. The same case that results in a defense verdict in Colorado may
bring a plaintiff’s verdict in Iowa. This is hardly an inspiring portrait of
individualized litigation. Although state law and jury pool differences may
explain some of the inconsistency, it is just as likely that the people in
general are simply inconsistent much of the time.315 Similarly, different
judges often reach different determinations regarding contested facts or
competing legal analyses.316 In essence, this means that there is no “one”

Federal Product Liability Reform in 1997: History and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64
TENN. L. REV. 95 (1997).
314. Although civil juries may at times be a reflective oracle of the community and can avoid the
occasionally jaded attitudes of the judge, they can also completely misunderstand legal, scientific, or
business concepts. They may be swept with emotion that overcomes or even supplants reason, in their
determinations of who did what to whom and why. They may also be inclined to rule based on the
race, ethnicity, gender, status, attractiveness, fame, or occupation of the litigants or lawyers. They may
reach results as a matter of compromise, rather than sound analysis. They may resent being pulled
from regular life, and this resentment, or simply fatigue from being required to deliberate at length,
may adversely affect their decisions. In some cases, jurors may even be more interested in writing a
book about the experience rather than faithfully discharging their duties. Of course, one can make
similar criticisms of judges or administrative adjudicators who, like jurors, are human beings capable
of emotional and heuristic error. But at least judges are professionally trained to avoid these pitfalls
and are subject to the further discipline of the requirement that they provide a written analysis of their
factfinding that is subject to appellate scrutiny and legal commentary.
315. Recently, for example, criminal prosecutors purport to have noted a “C.S.I. Effect,” named
for the popular television program about police forensic investigations, in which jurors are disinclined
to convict criminal defendants in the absence of forensic, laboratory-like evidence of the type the
jurors are used to seeing each week on the show. Several seemingly strong cases, based on seemingly
credible eyewitness testimony and non-forensic circumstantial evidence, resulted in acquittals that
surprised observers. See, e.g., Jane Ann Morrison, “CSI Effect” May Have Led Binion Jurors to
Demand Harder Evidence, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 2, 2004 at 1B; Richard Willing, “CSI Effect”
Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at 1A. But see Mark Hansen, The
Uncertain Science of Evidence, A.B.A. J., July 2005, at 48 (noting that some evidence experts are
skeptical about existence of purported C.S.I. Effect).
316. A particularly vexing example of this takes place in the field of insurance, which is largely
governed by state law and hence is less subject to doctrinal unification through the pronouncements of
the U.S. Supreme Court or overarching federal legislation. To the contrary, the primary federal
legislation in this area, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (originally enacted in 1945),
cedes most insurance lawmaking authority to the states. As a result, one can see for insurance cases
that consistency is hard to come by, even from judges, without a final authority. In many areas of
insurance-policy construction involving identical policy language and essentially identical background
facts, decisions by judges (that’s right, judges merely conducting contract interpretation and “applying
the law,” not some erratic lay jurors) divide roughly in half, and often by 180 degrees, over questions
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individual adjudicative alternative to class treatment of a matter. There
instead is a range of individual adjudicative outcomes that must be
compared to the likely more cohesive class result that will come, warts and
all, from class treatment of the matter.
Another fallacy tending to overweight the arm of the scale resistant to
class actions is the notion that choosing class treatment creates
dramatically higher pressure on defendants to settle claims, in the interests
of avoiding a loss on a “bet the company” case. Although this may be true
for the truly classic small-value case (e.g., a pattern of eighty-seven-cent
overcharges), in which denial of class certification essentially strips the
case of settlement value as well as continued viability, it is probably not
true for many securities, commercial, or tort claims. Although many of
these claims will be less attractive to litigate individually, they will not
necessarily screech to a halt upon denial of class treatment. In a significant
subset of the claims, plaintiffs can still credibly threaten to press on
individually, especially with the most compelling cases, the largest
instances of injury, or the most pro-plaintiff settings for trial.
And, as what might be termed the “second wave” of asbestos litigation
demonstrates, a multitude of smallish claims, even many of suspicious
strength, presents significant concern to defendants if adopted by lawyers
willing to invest institutional resources in prosecuting the matters.317 Even
when a defendant has ample unexhausted insurance in place and insurers
willing to engage in protracted defense litigation, a swarm of such cases

such as the meaning of the pollution exclusion, whether land cleanup costs come within liability
coverage, whether a government action is a “suit” requiring a defense, whether an insurance policy
may be assigned, what constitutes “use” of an automobile, whether punitive damages may be
recovered for bad faith, whether an insurer may recoup litigation defense costs from a policyholder,
allocation of policy proceeds, application of value policy statutes, and other matters of significant
importance. See EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INSURANCE LAW 676–792 (3d ed. 2004) (reproducing and discussing cases from different states in
which state high courts took diametrically opposed views of legal issues); STEMPEL, supra note 128,
§§ 14.03–14.14 (discussing divergence of state supreme courts when interpreting identical language of
insurance policies).
317. See Randy J. Maniloff, Asbestos: Insurance Coverage Issues On a Changing Landscape,
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: INS., July 9, 2002, at 1 (noting trend of asbestos litigation in which “[t]he
[p]eripheral [a]sbestos [d]efendant [b]ecomes [a] [t]arget,” a phenomenon that has come to be called
the “second wave” of asbestos litigation, as distinguished from the first wave, which was largely
directed toward asbestos manufacturers as target defendants). Many of the claims in this second wave
are for relatively minor injuries (e.g., plaque in the lungs) as opposed to major asbestos-related disease
such as mesothelioma. Many of the claimants are physically asymptomatic, but fear or expect that they
will develop asbestos-related health problems in the future. See also Alison Frankel, A Well-Oiled
Machine, AM. LAW., (LITIG. 2004), available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/litigation2004/
weitz.html (describing Weitz & Luxenberg, a very successful plaintiffs’ firm with an infrastructure
specializing in asbestos claims, both serious injury claims and minor injury or fear-of-injury claims,
and the degree to which the firm has been able to keep asbestos litigation from fading away).
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poses a serous distraction for company personnel and presents an adverse
picture to the financial community. If it can be done for the right price,
settlement will be preferable for the defendant, particularly if insurance
dollars will pay a substantial portion of the settlement.318
And, not surprisingly, such settlements do not involve the highly
individuated bargaining and assessment typically presented by the
traditional legal folklore. Instead, they tend to be mass inventory
settlements rendered according to a few key criteria on which the
adversaries agree.319 This is not at all bad. It arguably provides
compensation to claimants/victims (albeit with counsel and transaction
costs consuming a significant share) roughly equivalent to what would, on
average, result from the far less efficient, higher transaction-cost route of
individuated disputing and settlement seriatim.
But for now, my concern is not so much whether such results are good
or bad in a cosmic sense. Rather, my point is that this result—en masse,
formulaic, inventory settlement—obtains under either the class or nonclass option. Most mass-tort inventory settlements found in cases like
asbestos claims, other toxic torts, or prescription drug claims take place
without any help from class certification.320 For many cases, refusing class
treatment does not materially change the likely outcome. Under such
circumstances, is there any reason for much continued judicial reluctance
to accord class treatment for these cases? At least in the class-action mode,
the court will retain considerable authority over the final shape of
settlement, rather than leaving the matter entirely to the less guided market
forces affecting plaintiffs, defendants, and counsel.
This reality is hammered home by the apparent aftermath of Amchem
and Ortiz. Although these cases placed significant limits on use of the
class-action device for settlement only, limiting class treatment in cases of
class conflicts or divergence of member interests, Amchem and Ortiz
hardly brought mass settlements to a screeching halt. To the extent that
settlement class-action treatment was unavailable, particularly for mass
asbestos claims, litigants discovered that bankruptcy (including the pre-

318. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (2002) (summarizing history of asbestos litigation, emphasizing
magnitude, and estimating that transaction costs such as counsel fees consume two-thirds of funds
spent on asbestos claims); White, supra note 58, at 1319 (noting that an estimated 100 million people
have been exposed to asbestos).
319. See Charles W. Schwartz & Lewis C. Sutherland, Class Certification for Environmental and
Toxic Tort Claims, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1997); Ronald W. Davis, Amchem and Antitrust: Have
the Ground Rules for Antitrust Class Actions Changed?, ANTITRUST, Fall 1997, at 39.
320. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 99; Coffee, supra note 2.
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packaged bankruptcy device authorized by Congress in 1994) might
suffice quite well for permitting resolution on terms similar to what might
result from settlement in the class-action context.321
Rather than continuing to fight the inevitable drive toward settlement,
the judicial system should relax its concern that “too much” class
treatment may yield “too much” settlement. First, it is a bit hard to say
what constitutes excessive settlement in a world where disputants want to
settle. Second, it is not at all clear that a more relaxed judicial attitude
toward class treatment will lead to any significantly greater settlement
activity than already found outside the class context. As previously
discussed, permitting more class-action activity with less formalist
resistance to class treatment may even result in sounder settlements that
are judicially supervised in at least a modest way.
To the extent that settlement results in the absence of class
certification, it is also far from clear that this is a good development. In
theory, settlements without certification should be lower, at least if the
critics of class actions alleging in terrorem effects are correct. But this
hardly answers the question of whether the settlement is a good, fair, or
optimal resolution. One can as easily make a case that class treatment
improves settlement results by providing settlements more commensurate
with harm inflicted by the defendant. To the extent that class claims are
weak on the merits, this arguably supports class treatment as well. A
successful defense motion against a weak class claim can do more to
eliminate or reduce defense payments, on a practical level, than can a
series of many such defense motions in a multitude of individual cases.
Successful defense efforts in a class action can also provide preclusion
protection for a defendant.
A. Issue Class Actions as an Alternative to Refusing Certification
One clear improvement to contemporary class-action practice would be
greater use of Rule 23(c)(4), which provides: “When appropriate (A) an
action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each

321. See Resnick, supra note 58, at 2046 (noting bankruptcies of asbestos makers and installers
Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., Keene Corp., and “at least a dozen other asbestos
manufacturers deluged with thousands of personal injury claims”); Vairo, supra note 58, at 106–07
(noting that more than seventy asbestos companies are in bankruptcy proceedings).
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subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.322
While use of subclasses has been discussed with some frequency, the
use of Rule 23 to provide class treatment of particular issues in litigation
has been relatively overlooked, at least during the past decade. According
to one commentator,
[U]ntil the mid-1990s, courts used Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify issue
classes presenting a common core of issues concerning the
defendant’s conduct or product notwithstanding downstream
variability for individual class members as to damages, and as to
some aspects of liability, such as proximate causation and reliance.
In the late 1990s, the salutary trend toward issue litigation
stopped short, following a prominent pair of court of appeals
decisions, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. and Castano v. American
Tobacco Co. Since then, courts have become wary of certifying
class actions requesting monetary damages that involve any
appreciable downstream variability. Notwithstanding the underlying
common core of the harmfulness or wrongfulness of the defendant’s
conduct or product, courts have focused on the varying
consequences to individual class members. In so doing, courts have
repeatedly rejected class certification when cases have required
resolution of individual issues of any significance.323
One need not completely agree with Professor Romberg’s empirical
assertion that issue certification is in decline to support greater use of Rule
23(c)(4)(A) class treatment as a way to streamline resolution of issues, in
hopes of facilitating settlement on matters that may not be fully amenable

322. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
323. Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of
Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 252 (footnotes omitted). Professor
Romberg also states that, as of the time he wrote, “no scholarly commentator has addressed issue
certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in any depth whatsoever.” Id. at 253–54. This statement is not
merely rhetorical flourish designed to present his own very fine article as particularly novel. There
simply is, other than the Romberg article, no very extensive discussion of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issue
certification in the legal literature. Even stalwart treatises such as Moore’s Federal Practice, Wright &
Miller, and Newberg on Class Actions (which seems to say something about nearly every class-action
decision ever written) do not engage in any serious, sustained discussion of issue certification. But see
Susan E. Abitanta, Bifurcation of Liability and Damages in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: History,
Policy, Problems, and a Solution, 36 SW. L.J. 743, 747–57 (1982) (discussing issue certification to
some degree). See also Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J.
709 (2003) (criticizing use of class treatment of issues and arguing contra Romberg).
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to class treatment.324 Certainly, prior to Rhone-Poulenc, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co.,325 and the most recent assault on class actions,
courts appeared more receptive to class treatment of issues. For example,
the famous Agent Orange settlement resulted in part because of the
commonality of the military-contractor defense issue raised by defendant
dioxin makers.326 The equally famous Dalkon Shield litigation involved
certification of an issue class.327 Certification of only liability issues has
occurred in other mass tort matters.328
Professor Romberg is correct in seeing Rhone-Poulenc and Castano as
influential cases setting back use of class treatment in situations where it
might be quite beneficial. The Rhone-Poulenc and Castano decisions had
an impact favoring restriction on class treatment of mass tort matters. As
described in Part III, Rhone-Poulenc refused to certify, even on an issue
basis, a putative class of plaintiffs injured by HIV-tainted blood as a result
of Rhone-Poulenc’s failure to implement reasonable screening procedures
for donated blood.329 Castano refused to certify, even on an issue basis, a
putative class of plaintiffs injured by use of tobacco products.330 RhonePoulenc has been cited more than 500 times, more than 300 times in
secondary legal literature alone (and, as the math would suggest, has been
cited in nearly 200 court decisions).331 Castano has been cited more than
800 times—more than 300 times in legal periodicals and more than 400
times in judicial decisions.332 Rhore-Poulenc and Castano are prominent
opinions because they involved newsworthy products and claims, were
decided by prominent federal appeals courts, and provided strong (albeit,
in my view, incorrect) argumentation against even partial class
certification in mass tort matters involving any significant divergence of
individual class-member damages. In addition, Rhone-Poulenc was

324. There are, of course, those who oppose Professor Romberg’s proposal (and mine) for
increased use of issue class treatment. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 323 (criticizing the use of issue
classes as undermining the class-certification requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). For the reasons
set forth in this article, I find the case against issue class treatment unpersuasive.
325. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
326. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1987).
327. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989).
328. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1439 n.389.
329. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). See supra notes 164–77 and
accompanying text.
330. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). See supra text accompanying
notes 323–24.
331. “Shepardization” of Rhone-Poulenc using LexisNexis (May 5, 2005).
332. “Shepardization” of Castano using LexisNexis (May 5, 2005).
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authored by prominent Circuit Judge Richard Posner, a magnet for both
academic praise and criticism.333
Even if Rhone-Poulenc and Castano were correctly decided, Rule
23(c)(4)(A) remains both a viable part of Rule 23 and a good idea in many
cases. Ordinary civil litigation frequently is bifurcated on questions of
liability and damages. At a minimum, this suggests that issue certification
could frequently be granted in class actions, which often involve a rather
small core of allegedly improper conduct even if they also involve a
multitude of plaintiffs incurring arguably dissimilar consequences from
this core of alleged defendant misconduct.
Further, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) permits certification of issues smaller than
the question of liability. For example, in a tort claim the court could certify
a class as to a common element of the claim (e.g., existence of a duty or
breach of a statutory duty). Outside the mass tort context, one could easily
envision an issue class certified on the question of whether a particular
proxy statement was false or misleading—or whether a particular entity
was aware that it was omitting material facts from press releases. There is
no requirement that issue certification resolve any particular proportion of
the case. Resolution of a single issue common to the class is sufficient, so
long as the result does not waste judicial resources.334
To the extent a Rule 23(c)(4)(A) certification of an issue permits
resolution of a contested matter in class litigation, it holds substantial
possibility for providing some significant economies of scale, even if the
class action as a whole is never certified. A decision on a key element of
liability, the liability question itself, or key damages questions can lay out
for the disputants a puzzle square that makes the remainder of the board
relatively easy to navigate for purposes of determining the settlement
value of the case.

333. Like the other moths attracted to the flame of the Posnerian pen, I confess to having engaged
in both. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Inconsistently Sensitive Mind: Richard Posner’s Cerebration
of Insurance Law and Continuing Blind Spots of Econominalism, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 7 (2000)
(generally praising Posner’s insurance coverage opinions but criticizing opinion holding that
Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to policy terms and coverage); Ann C. McGinley &
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner’s Pragmatism and Pregnancy
Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193 (1994) (criticizing Posner’s Title VII analysis in opinion
dismissing pregnancy discrimination claim).
334. See Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995);
Romberg, supra note 323, at 265; William W. Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should
Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1265 (1996). See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 158
F.R.D. 485, 488 (D. Wyo. 1994) (certifying class as to some common issues); Wadleigh v. RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (certifying common negligence and breachof-fiduciary-duty issues).
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In the case of a “bifurcated” class action, it is envisioned that after
determination of the certified issue as to the named plaintiffs, remaining
issues will be resolved in later stages of the same lawsuit with the intent of
binding all class members to the result. In contrast, a “partial” class action
involves issue certification and determination of the certified issue, after
which time individual class-member damages claims will be prosecuted in
subsequent individual lawsuits—but with the class members who bring
individual damages or enforcement actions enjoying the benefit of
preclusive effect as to the issue(s), including any liability determination or
binding finding of fact, made in the issues-class adjudication. To obtain
relief, absent class members must “file a separate lawsuit—one in which
the common issues already resolved will have preclusive effect.”335
Conversely, a defendant victory on the certified issue(s) would give the
defendant the benefit of preclusive effect in fending off later litigation.336
Even where the class action involves so-called “negative value” claims
and “substantial individual issues of damages, counterclaims, or individual
defenses,” issue class treatment can deliver significant economies of scale
to a matter, lowering transaction costs at least for the portions of the case
subject to issue class treatment and probably for later contested matters as
well, in view of the tendency of resolution of one issue to limit the range
of outcomes on other issues. The “lowered transaction costs of a collective
trial on common issues will allow for societally desirable compensation
and optimal deterrence of wrongful conduct.”337
In addition to being more efficient than individualized litigation, the
issue class-certification process is likely to attract the attention of the
litigants and other interested parties and to sharpen their focus regarding
the stakes of the case. Put in attorney vernacular, both plaintiffs and
defendants are likely to bring their respective “A Teams” to the task of
litigating the issue or issues under dispute. By contrast, individual
litigation has chronically presented difficult problems of issue preclusion.
Even in cases where it would appear that an issue was unavoidably
presented and apparently decided during earlier proceedings, courts have
been reluctant to grant broad issue preclusion. Some of this is undoubtedly
because of a relatively formal approach to the doctrinal requirements of
issue preclusion, but some of this is also likely to have been the result of
courts’ more functional concerns that earlier litigation outcomes should

335. Romberg, supra note 323, at 254.
336. Id. at 255.
337. Id. at 264.
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not bind forever unless it is clear that both sides put forth their best efforts
on the matter.
Issue certification would also seem to present less “unfair” pressure on
defendants to settle. Aggregation of entire claims, at least in theory,
always increases pressure on the defendants by raising the stakes and
potential damages amount. Aggregation of the liability component of a
case through a bifurcated action arguably has similar effect. But any
hydraulic pressure to settle due to issue certification must logically be
correspondingly smaller in an issue class than for an entire case because
the amount of aggregation is smaller. In addition, the consequences of a
class-wide decision on an issue, although of moment, are not by any
means conclusive. Consider an issue class pertaining to a single element of
a Rule 10b-5 claim or product liability claim. A defendant may lose the
issue certified, and this may certainly amount to handwriting on the wall—
but only to a degree. The defendant may still defend as to whether other
elements of the liability aspect of the claim are satisfied, including
questions of causation (a particularly strong defense in light of Dura
Pharmaceuticals. The defendant may, of course, continue to defend as to
whether damages were suffered and in what amount.
In the ongoing debate over class actions, class-action critics have not
been appropriately called out regarding their excessive doomsday scenario
for class defendants. According to the conventional wisdom of the critics,
a defendant faced with a certified class—or even partial class treatment of
an aspect of the case—is at such grave risk that it cannot afford to contest
the matter vigorously. Perhaps this is true in some cases, but there is a
substantial argument to the contrary.338 Where the merits of a class claim
are truly weak, class counsel would appear to be taking the greater risks.
Without significant results, class attorneys are unpaid (or at least not as
well paid as they could have been pursuing other cases). If defendants are
disinclined to offer anything more than nuisance-value settlements and
have correctly identified the claim as weak, it would seem to be class
counsel that is at risk. After years of litigation, thousands of hours in lost
counsel time and probably six figures of out-of-pocket expense, class
counsel may find that the case ends in a defense verdict.
Even if the plaintiff class succeeds at trial, defendants continue to have
at their disposal an array of procedural and substantive defenses, most
obviously including post-trial motions and appeal, with the occasional shot
at en banc consideration or Supreme Court review. And all along this way,

338. See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2; Silver, supra note 2.
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each defendant retains the option of offering to settle, an offer that most
rational class members and counsel will consider if the offer is
reasonable.339 Although there are similar plaintiff options after a defense
verdict, plaintiffs generally have far less leverage in these matters. By
contrast, defendants normally have both their own money and substantial
insurance that can be called upon to attempt resolution if the defendant has
miscalculated the strength of the class claim at trial. In short, it is generally
easier to play defense than offense in litigation, and loss on a class issue
matter is not fatal for defendants.340
In defending class treatment against the allegation that it results in
litigation blackmail, I am for argument’s sake giving some credence to the
contention. However, as Professor Silver has powerfully demonstrated,
there is no solid ground for believing that class treatment leads to any
litigation blackmail.341 He assessed the blackmail argument at length and
found that the contention takes at least four separate forms, none of which
withstands scrutiny.
In its original form, raised shortly after the 1966 Amendment to Rule
23, observers contended that class actions created inordinate pressure to
settle because they were not triable.342 Time has shown this contention to
be incorrect, but it persists nonetheless as class-action opponents
frequently cite the two most prominent, prestigious (but erroneous)
purveyors of this view, Henry Friendly and Milton Handler.343

339. This is a point succinctly put in Judge Rovner’s dissent in Rhone-Poulenc. In re RhonePoulene Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1307 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (stating that “defendants will thus have
ample opportunity to settle should they lose the class trial” and fare poorly in subsequent proceedings).
340. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the Adversary System: The Enduring
Problems of Distrust, Misunderstanding and Narrow Perspective, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 313 (1993)
(arguing that dynamics of litigation make defense considerably easier than prosecution as a practical
matter).
341. Silver, supra note 2. In addition, Professor Silver notes something that in retrospect seems
almost obvious but that has largely escaped the legal profession and the public in the throes of anticlass action rhetoric and sentiment: the very term “blackmail” is completely inappropriate to the
situation. By definition, blackmail occurs when one threatens to take action permitted by law (e.g., to
report an incident to police, to inform a cuckolded spouse, to sue) unless paid. Class-action plaintiffs
have already taken legal action (by suing) and will continue to engage in this very public prosecution
of their contentions unless paid. Thus, the “problem” of which class defendants complain is the very
opposite of blackmail. Id. at 1388–89.
342. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 118–20 (1973); Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
343. See Silver, supra note 2, at 1361–69. In particular, Silver notes a key, but often overlooked,
fact that tends to undercut not only this but essentially all of the anti-class action “blackmail”
arguments.
Consent provides the standard normative foundation for settlements, including class action
settlements on the defense side. . . . Friendly shows only that defendants settle because they
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Another version of the blackmail argument contends that blackmail
occurs when claims are small because defendant resources will be drained
in defending these claims, while such defense could be avoided in the
absence of aggregation. Of course, this criticism is one that wishes Rule
23 did not exist. The policy in favor of vindicating small wrongs through
class treatment clearly trumps any sympathy one might engender for
defendants that would have otherwise been able to “get away with”
inflicting small wrongs on a large number of people. Still another variant
of the blackmail argument claims that settlement pressure is too
overwhelming when large claims are aggregated. This is the thesis of
Rhone-Poulenc and, to a lesser extent, cases like Castano (and, more
recently, the In re Simon II Litigation tobacco class action)344 that deny
class treatment out of a fear that certification forces defendant companies
to choose between settlement and an unacceptable risk of bankruptcy. Yet
another variant finds claim size irrelevant.345
After assessing in depth the arguments that class treatment induces
undue settlement pressure, Professor Silver finds them all lacking logical
and empirical support.346 In particular, he debunks much of the RhonePoulenc opinion’s resistance to class treatment for fear of excessively
coercing the “poor” blood products manufacturer.347 Professors Hay and

fear losing at trial. Ordinarily, this fear poses no challenge to consent. It is a reason for
thinking that a defendant is right to settle, not for thinking that a defendant is coerced.
This point is fundamental. All American civil justice systems generate settlement
pressure by forcing parties to risk losing at trial. Few judges complain about this, even though
fear of losing at trial typically generates cheap settlements because plaintiffs and their lawyers
are more risk averse than defendants. Many advocates of tort reform want to turn up the
pressure to settle by making trials even riskier and more expensive than they already are.
Ordinarily, then, the fear of losing at trial (whether coupled with risk aversion or not)
does not justify a blackmail claim. . . .
....
. . . When the threat [of aggregation] is absent . . . the pressure on the defendant is
unacceptably low and absent plaintiffs receive inadequate representation. In class actions,
then, deficient settlement pressure raises due process concerns. Maximum pressure does not.
Id. at 1366–68 (footnotes omitted).
344. 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
345. See id. at 1361.
346. Id. at 1369–96
347. Id. at 1376–79. In addition Professor Silver notes, drawing on the work of Professor
Tidmarsh, that the HIV claims treated by the Rhone-Poulenc majority as too weak to stand without the
pressure of class certification presumably did have some merit and “legitimate” settlement value, in
that they were resolved for $100,000 per case without the benefit of class treatment. Id. at 1380 (“A
year and a half after Posner decertified the Rhone-Poulenc class and seemingly in deliberate defiance
of his opinion, the parties negotiated a class-based settlement that paid $100,000 per ‘case’ of HIV
infection, exclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs, which were provided for separately.”) (citing JAY
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Rosenberg, in a shorter but equally persuasive analysis, reach largely the
same conclusion.348 None of the sources asserting an extortionate impact
of class treatment come close to the sophistication of these analyses.
Rather, they are long on rhetoric and the “cosmic anecdote” (e.g., a
businessperson or defense lawyer “tells” the author that beleaguered
defendants overpay to avoid in terrorem class litigation). As Professor
Silver suggests, until there is a more persuasive normative or empirical
case for the “litigation blackmail” argument, the term should be shelved.349
At some point, the legal profession must resist the anti-litigation, antilawyer, pro-business political rhetoric of the time and face facts. The
“litigation blackmail” argument against class treatment is essentially a
Potemkin village.350 It has an initial superficial persuasiveness but upon
closer inspection appears to be an illusion.
In addition, certification of issues permits the matter to proceed
piecemeal. Parties declining to settle and electing trial are engaged in a
process of rolling, iterated feedback. As more information becomes
available through the resolution of class-certified issues, the defendant is
able to reassess its settlement posture and make more informed decisions
than it could in the absence of Rule 23 (c)(4)(A) certification and
adjudication of the issues.351 Issue certification can thus provide useful

TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 92–
93 (1998)).
348. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1392–94.
349. See Silver, supra note 2, at 1430 (“Given the sad state of the duress theory, judges hardly are
justified in using it at all, let alone in employing incendiary phrases like legalized blackmail. The hard
work of thinking the theory through has not been done. Judges should focus on this aspect of the
project and leave the task of demonizing plaintiffs, trial lawyers, and trial judges to others.”).
350. A “Potemkin Village” is something that has an external or superficial look of size or
substance but is in fact a shell. The term is taken from efforts of Grigori Potemkin, an 18th Century
minister to Russia’s Catherine the Great. He arranged to have entire facades of towns built without
building actual and functional facilities or populating the phony villages. The false front Potemkin
Villages were designed to reassure the Empress as she toured the countryside. See generally JOAN
HASLIP, CATHERINE THE GREAT (1977).
351. Certainly, this sort of iterated feedback appears to be present in non-class litigation, which
suggests that decisions on issue class matters will provide a similar impact on approaches to aggregate
settlement. As Professor Silver stated:
Settlement negotiations have a sorting effect, as parties resolve those cases upon which they
agree and jockey over the order in which the remainder will be adjudicated. . . . By settling
good cases for large amounts and defending bad ones aggressively, defendants can
manipulate the trial record to their advantage and drive down settlement values in pending
cases.
Id. at 1378. Accord TIDMARSH, supra note 347; Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious
Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92 (1997); Joseph Sanders,
The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992).
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guidance for dispute resolution with much less of the coercive-cumextortionate element thought to flow from class treatment.
As applied to the problems presented in mass torts and securities
claims, issue class actions continue to hold promise. Most obviously, a
more liberal attitude toward use of issue classes would bring a different
result in the Rhone-Poulenc litigation. Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s
reversal, the trial judge had authorized a partial class action.352 Similarly,
in Castano, the Fifth Circuit reversed a trial court’s issue certification on
the question of whether tobacco companies “fraudulently failed to inform
consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of nicotine
in cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature.”353 Both cases were wrongly
decided; the courts of appeals should have permitted the issue classes
approved by the trial courts.
Castano is particularly incorrect in that it committed what seems to be
a clear error of rule interpretation doctrine by reading into Rule
23(c)(4)(A) the requirement that the issue certified under this portion of
Rule 23 be also subject to the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that common
questions “predominate,” if the matter as a whole is to be certified as a
class action. The Fifth Circuit appears to have simply fabricated this
requirement in order to deal a setback to a type of litigation it disliked.
There is nowhere in the legislative history of Rule 23 any suggestion that
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) should not be accorded its plain meaning.354 Rule
23(c)(4)(A) clearly states that a matter may be brought as a class action
“with respect to particular issues.” The text of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) does not
state that class treatment can only be given regarding particular issues that
predominate in the litigation. The Fifth Circuit’s holding thus runs rather
dramatically contrary to the text and legislative history of Rule 23.
Castano also runs counter to what seems to have been the intent of the
drafters and what surely is the purpose of the Rule. If the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement is added to Rule 23(c)(4)(A), this essentially
reads the latter provision completely out of the Rule. A portion of the rule
permitting issue classes loses almost all utility if it is subject to the same
criteria required for certification of an entire action. According to the
Castano approach, any case that qualifies for Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issue class
treatment will also always qualify for certification of the entire matter
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). But if Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and Rule 23(b)(3) are

352. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994). See supra notes
323–24 and accompanying text.
353. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
354. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 23.App.01–23App.200 (Historical Appendix).
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congruent or co-dependent as contended the Fifth Circuit, why have Rule
23(c)(4)(A) at all?355 The seemingly obvious answer (to one not blinded by
anti-tobacco litigation zeal) is that the two provisions were not meant to be
read in tandem and the issue class action was not intended to be subject to
the predominance requirement imposed upon class certification decisions
affecting the entire lawsuit.
In addition, Castano appears to have proceeded on the basis of what we
now know to be a view of the “facts” slanted in favor of the defendants.
The Fifth Circuit described plaintiffs’ theory of the case as “novel and
wholly untested,” implying that the plaintiff class was perhaps in the grip
of some wild conspiracy theory about the evils of the tobacco industry.356
Not long after Castano was decertified, documents unearthed in discovery
pursuant to the litigation brought by state attorneys general seeking
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement from tobacco companies tended to
strongly substantiate plaintiffs’ hypotheses. It appears that the tobacco
industry (or at least substantial elements of it) was indeed trying to get
people hooked on cigarettes, concealing clearly relevant information about
the dangers of smoking, and even attempting to mislead the public about
those dangers.357
Rhone-Poulenc is perhaps less clearly incorrect but on balance also
demonstrates too crabbed a view of the scope of Rule 23(c)(4)(A). In its
intense focus on the purported in terrorem effect of certifying even an
issues class, the Seventh Circuit substituted ideologically based,
empirically unsupported policy arguments in lieu of a more focused and
careful reading of Rule 23 in the context of the case. In addition, the

355. Castano thus also appears to violate another central tenant of sound interpretation of statutes,
rules, and contracts: give effect to all sections of the document if this can be done without
contradicting other maxims of construction and does not produce an absurd result. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 267–76 (2d ed. 2006); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.11 at 457–59 (4th
ed. 2004). Treating Rule 23(c)(4)(A) as a “stand-alone” portion of Rule 23 (subject, like all of Rule
23(b) to the class prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy set forth in Rule
23(a) and specifically referenced in the text of the Rule) does not produce an absurd result but instead
permits perfectly rational “miniature” class action treatment for some aspect(s) of a case. On the
contrary, interpreting Rule 23 so as to read Rule 23(c)(4)(a) effectively out of the Rule seems much
closer to an absurd result.
356. 84 F.3d at 737.
357. See The Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium—Fact, Law, Policy, and Significance, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998). Florida and other states sought payment from the tobacco companies
on the basis of allegedly increased costs of providing health services due to the deleterious effects of
smoking. The tobacco industry paid hundreds of billions of dollars in settlement. Not bad for a novel
and untested theory. See also Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and Motive in Mass Restitution
Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2177 (2004) (taking a quite different view of the tobacco litigation but
concluding that it ultimately worked reasonably well as a form of de facto public regulation).
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Seventh Circuit’s corresponding concern that a plaintiffs’ victory could be
unfair because defendants had previously prevailed in twelve of thirteen
litigated cases is touching but not particularly important. As discussed
above, defendants have a host of imbedded advantages in the litigation
process that do not disappear and are at best only reduced by class
treatment of matters.358 In addition, the mere twelve-out-of-thirteen
statistic does not say anything about the quality of the underlying
litigation, available discovery, or other factors bearing on outcome.
Although it is of course possible that Rhone-Poulenc was not negligent
and that tainted blood was not its “fault” (or did not emanate from its
inventory), it is equally plausible that in early, individualized litigation,
plaintiffs and counsel were simply outgunned by Rhone-Poulenc and its
resources. Further, if the case on the merits so clearly exonerates the
defendant, a rational defendant would presumably relish class treatment in
anticipation of obtaining a decision that it could use as a preclusive shield
against such future litigation. If the poor track record of prior taintedblood plaintiffs is an accurate reflection of the “real” merits of the
negligence claims, this argues in favor of certifying the class in
anticipation of a defense victory that will bring adjudicative closure to the
dispute once and for all.
The Seventh Circuit’s Seventh Amendment concerns about issue
certification—that use of multiple juries would violate the constitutional
guarantee—is not persuasive.359 Similarly, the appellate court’s resistance
to issue certification due to choice-of-law issues also seems overdone. The
nub of the plaintiffs’ claim in Rhone-Poulenc was simple negligence. This

358. See text accompanying notes 341–51; Silver, supra note 2; Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2.
359. See Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 744–47 (1973) (arguing that application of
the Seventh Amendment should not be rigidly frozen in historical custom and that the term “common
law” in the Amendment was probably intended by the drafters to allow the evolutionary effect of
changed circumstances and new procedural devices); Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1408 (1997) (arguing that decisions of different juries in connection with related
claims, even if inconsistent, do not violate the Seventh Amendment). See also JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586 (6th ed. 2000) (“Nothing in the Constitution, or its
amendments, guarantees that an individual will have a process that is most likely to result in a
favorable ruling for that individual.”). The basic test to determine applicability of Seventh Amendment
is historical, with the court asking: what was the situation in 1789 when the Amendment was enacted?
See WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 92. In 1789, an era of fragmented communication, slow travel, and lack
of centralized sources of law and judicial decisions (the West Publishing Regional Reporter system
would not exist for another seventy years), it is hard to seriously argue that there were no arguably
inconsistent jury determinations of essentially the same allegedly wrongful conduct. See also Prentice
H. Marshall, Jury Trial of Right, in 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 38.13 (stating that use of
collateral estoppel, even where prior action was bench trial, does not violate Seventh Amendment).
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is not a body of law that varies drastically from state to state or that is
likely to hinge on subtle nuances lodged in the interstices of state supreme
court precedents. Rhone-Poulenc thus reads more like an opinion on a
public policy agenda of curtailing mass tort class actions than one
articulating any strong, lasting argument against issue certification.
Consequently, the case should not (as it apparently has) discourage use of
issue class actions in mass tort matters.
Applied to non-tort matters such as investor class actions, the reasons
given in Castano and Rhone-Poulenc and other arguments raised against
issue class certification seem unpersuasive for the reasons noted in Part II.
The law to be applied in investor securities claims is largely federal or
uniform, eliminating one of the Seventh Circuit’s concerns.360 In addition,
as also discussed in Part II, the potential risk to a defendant company in
securities litigation is more predictable and cabined than is the case with
mass tort matters.361
In the Newton v. Merrill Lynch matter, for example, the Third Circuit
might have been able to satisfy its concerns regarding proof of damages
and vindicate the purpose and sprit of Rule 23 by certifying a class (or
subclasses) on the issue of the financial impact to investors of having their
share purchases conducted at the NBBO posted price rather than
alternatives.362 However, to make this determination, something more than
mere certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) would probably be required for
the inquiry to be manageable. Courts such as the Newton Court need to
expand their notions of acceptable fact-finding and determination.
B. More Functional and Flexible Approaches to Fact Development
As discussed above, excessive formalism tends to have a constraining
effect on use of class treatment. Although formalism has its importance in
a stable legal system, it is not the talisman its defenders purport it to be. To
achieve correct and full application of a rule, statute, or legal concept, a
certain functional flexibility is required. Use of the class action is no
different in this regard than other aspects of law such as statutory
interpretation or contract interpretation.

360. See supra text accompanying notes 106–60.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 106–60.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 178–204.
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1. Presumptions
One area in which courts could open the door, ever so slightly, to
expanded use of class treatment of issues is through the use of rebuttable
presumptions. Such presumptions have been well-established in some
aspects of securities law for some time. For example, the “fraud on the
market” theory of a Rule 10b-5 violation presumes that the entire market
for a given security was affected by false or misleading public statements
surrounding the security.363 Indeed, the presumption of this market-wide
reliance on a misstatement in fraud-on-the-market cases is so strong as to
essentially amount to a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption of
reliance.364
However, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,365 there is resistance to adopting such
presumptions, although the Court has not completely foreclosed such
approaches.366 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.367
stands as an example of this sort of limitation on class treatment and
Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals368 is in the same vein. In similar fashion,
the Ninth Circuit has refused to presume reliance of class members
asserting a RICO claim based on an alleged
course of fraudulent and misleading acts and omissions intended to
induce people to play [the defendants’] video poker and electronic
slot machines based on a false belief concerning how those
machines actually operate, as well as the extent to which there is
actually an opportunity to win on any given play.369

363. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
364. See id. at 241–47.
365. 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 206–300 (discussing Dura Pharmaceuticals and its
implications).
367. 259 F.3d 154 (3d. Cir. 2001).
368. 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003).
369. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2004). The outcome in Poulos,
denial of class certification and effective ending of the case, appears to me perfectly correct because
plaintiffs’ theory of the case on the merits is weak and counterintuitive. Some disclosure is in order: I
have provided consulting services to some of the defendants and their counsel. Managing what
neutrality I can, however, it seems the idea that gamblers who chose this form of gaming recreation
might have a cause of action because odds favor the house is a touch bizarre. Plaintiffs asserted that
the actionable misconduct of gaming defendants was failing to disclose that video poker has an
allegedly different payout matrix than playing with real cards and that electronic slot machines work
on a slightly different random-response mechanism than does a traditional mechanical slot machine.
At the risk of being unempathetic to the recreational patrons of my home state: so what? The
average gambler probably approaches all game machines on his or her own terms, without any
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In addition to the question of reliance, the issue of causation may be
one in which a substantial relaxation in the traditional approach is
warranted. Regarding toxic torts, for example, Margaret Berger has
persuasively argued that the traditional approach of requiring claimantvictims to carry the burden of persuasion as to causation is no longer
apt.370 Under the traditional approach to a toxic tort, like the approach to
most any claim, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove a link
between defendants’ purported wrongful conduct and plaintiff’s injury,
usually according to the “preponderance” standard.371 This makes perfect

expectation as to the degree to which the machine may or may not diverge from more traditional
games in terms of the odds. Odds will eventually become known as casinos and others publish
information about the relative payout ratios, house earnings, and so on. See BEN MEZRICH, BRINGING
DOWN THE HOUSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF SIX MIT STUDENTS WHO TOOK VEGAS FOR MILLIONS
(2003) (detailing successful efforts of MIT students to “beat the system” in Las Vegas). For example, I
am not even an occasional gambler, but I know that my odds against the house are better off playing
craps or blackjack as opposed to the slot machines. Under these circumstances, where plaintiffs have
voluntarily chosen to pursue an activity that on average is guaranteed to be perhaps the biggest money
loser on the floor, courts should have little sympathy. For example, electronic slots resulted in reported
seven-figure loss for former Secretary of Education and Book of Virtues author William Bennett, a
well-educated man who arguably should have known better. See Joshua Green, The Bookie of Virtue,
WASH. MONTH., Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1, 2003, at 8 (estimating that Bennett lost as much as $8 million
gambling, particularly playing high-limit $500-a-pull slot machines); Rod Smith, Gaming Foe
Characterized as High Roller, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 3, 2003, at 1A; David Von Drehle, Gambling
Days Are Over, Says Bennett, WASH POST, May 6, 2003, A12 (Bennett admits to unspecified large
gambling losses but asserts that he will cease habit many view as inconsistent with his promotion of
virtue). See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES (1993) (arguing for continued
fidelity to traditional virtues and morals). But such cases should not be too surprising. Casinos are
profit-making enterprises. The same argument, of course can and has been made on behalf of securities
claims, and it may be particularly well taken if limited to the argument that civil remedies and
government regulation should not necessarily compensate disappointed investors who pursued high
risk investments. See Pritchard, supra note 275, at 1085 (criticizing SEC for focusing on “stereotypical
‘widows and orphans’ in crafting [regulatory] protections,” using “[t]he SEC’s recent initiative to
regulate hedge funds—the investment haven of the ultra-rich” as an example).
But determination of whether the nature of an investment or activity itself adequately warns a
participant of danger is a merits-based substantive assessment. On the question of reliance, pragmatism
could support class treatment—even of claims involving willing participation in risky activity—if
plaintiffs first prevail on the questions of defendant duties, assumption of risk, comparative fault
generally, and plaintiffs’ actual expectations and understanding and if there is some reasonable
sampling method that demonstrates general reliance throughout the plaintiff class. Issue class action
treatment under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and flexible factfinding could potentially be used in even a “long
shot” case like the Poulos video poker claims. Whether it should is a serious question best left to the
discretion of the trial court. Similarly, gaming plaintiffs may be entitled to an issue class action
regarding the addictive properties of such machines. At risk of being seen to endorse litigation in lieu
of personal responsibility, I would prefer to address these types of cases more forthrightly on the
merits rather than preventing their airing through a formalist application of Rule 23. Of course, nothing
is preventing an individual test case by a gambler who has substantial losses that make such a claim
economically feasible (e.g., Secretary Bennett).
370. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice
and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
371. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
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sense if one does not know much about the next incoming tort claim and
request for compensation. It stands to reason that the system historically
has required plaintiffs to “prove up” their cases, including the causal link
between “bad” defendant behavior and injury to the plaintiff.
However, the traditional model—or at least insistence on formal
adherence to the traditional model—becomes less compelling when we do
know something about the case in question and it involves claims of fairly
clearly established defendant wrongdoing or liability coupled with
difficult matters of proof. For example, in the toxic tort context, Professor
Berger argues that the traditional causal model does not adequately
account for the practical limits of scientific uncertainty as to what causes
illness or disease when defendant’s toxins, environmental factors, and
plaintiff’s heredity are combined.372 Similarly, she argues, insisting on the
type of causal proof expected for an automobile accident simply provides
excessive insulation from liability for commercial wrongdoers that
knowingly discharged hazardous substances or used them in connection
with their operations or products.373
Professor Berger proposes that where the defendant’s culpability in the
handling of dangerous materials and injury to claimants have both been
established, the usual doctrine of general causation should yield to a
presumption that the defendant-related toxic material was a proximate
cause of plaintiffs’ injury.374 Describing a concrete operationalization of
her thesis, Professor Berger writes:
How would the asbestos litigation have played out under this
Essay’s proposal to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving
general causation? According to this model, once plaintiffs proved
the manufacturers’ negligence in failing to reveal substantial
information highly relevant to assessing the potential risks of
asbestos exposure, a prima facie case of liability would be made out
for those able to substantiate exposure and ill health. Defendants
should, however, be entitled to two special defenses, both as a
matter of fairness and as an inducement to conduct future research.
Society still needs to know whether defendant’s product poses such
an unreasonable risk that it should be removed from the market, or
whether special safety measures are needed. Consequently,

372. Berger, supra note 370, at 2129–32, 2135–40.
373. Id. at 2120–29.
374. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118–20, 2143–44 (1997).
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defendants should be entitled (1) to prove in general that certain
adverse health reactions could not plausibly arise from exposure to
defendant’s product, or (2) to reduce damages by proof that a
particular plaintiff’s injury is attributable or partly attributable to
another cause, such as smoking. Defendant should bear the burden
of persuasion on these issues.375
In essence, Professor Berger is arguing for a rebuttable presumption of
causation and damage in toxic torts cases, subject to the prerequisite that
plaintiffs first carry the traditional burden of proof on questions of the
liability-related elements of the claim such as dangerousness, defendant
control, defendant behavior, failure to warn, and like issues. Plaintiffs
would also have to prove injury that is consistent with injurious exposure
to the toxic substance. Once this burden is satisfied, the plaintiffs
(including, presumably, a plaintiff class in a toxic tort class action) would
be entitled to the rebuttable presumption of proximate cause and damages
that defendants may counterattack.
The Berger approach to causation or variants of it would appear to have
significant potential utility in class action mass torts, of which the asbestos
toxic tort dominates the landscape. For example, the approach would seem
readily applicable to a case like Rhone-Poulenc. First, plaintiffs would
have to prove defendant negligence and claimant exposure, which could
be facilitated by Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issue class certification. If plaintiffs met
these initial burdens, the rebuttable presumption of causal injury would be
applied. In addition, the amount of damages could be preliminarily
assessed through a formula or use of judicial adjunct or administrative
fact-finders (as further discussed below).376 Such a system would not be
unfair to defendants such as Rhone-Poulenc because they would still have
the opportunity to prove that the type of injury claimed by certain class
members was not a tainted blood HIV injury (either because the nature of
the injury was inconsistent or because the source likely was something
other than the defendants’ tainted blood).
This rebuttable presumption as to causal injury could also be applied to
investor class actions. In order to gain the benefit of the presumption, the
plaintiff class would be required to prove other elements of liability and
prima facie damage to the group in general. Certification of these issues
for discovery and adjudication could proceed pursuant to Rule
23(c)(4)(A). Thereafter, the court could apply a rebuttable presumption as

375. Id. at 2144–45 (footnotes omitted).
376. See infra text accompanying notes 392–431.
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to the causation-related aspects of the claim such as reliance, detriment as
to defendant’s practices, and so on. This type of approach would rather
clearly solve the problems that were seen as preventing class certification
in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.377 Defendants such
as Merrill Lynch, Dean Witter, and PaineWebber would then have the
opportunity to rebut the presumption by evidence of non-reliance or
evidence that for given class members, the NBBO price was actually
advantageous.
As a practical matter, of course, none of the broker-defendants in
Newton would be likely to expend resources attempting to rebut the
presumption I am advocating. Nor would they be likely to insist on a fullblown trial (or trials) of damages issues. More likely, they would settle.
This is hardly a bad outcome, much less an unfair outcome, for the
defendants. By the stage of the proceedings where defendants find the
suggested rebuttable presumption imposed upon them, it will be because
the plaintiffs have established that the defendants violated the securities
laws or the common law requirements of fiduciary duty and that this
generally caused injury to the plaintiff class. At this juncture, defendants
are not in a very sympathetic position for arguing that the judicial system
should nonetheless give these culpable defendants practical leverage
against the plaintiff class by insisting on traditional causal proof. To do so
is to undercut the rationale of the class action and to permit culpable
defendants to escape liability merely because of the economics of
litigation. Defendants will have been permitted to commit “little wrongs”
or “hard/expensive-to-trace wrongs” with impunity. The class-action
scenario that clings to a traditional formal requirement of causal proof thus
reduces the deterrent effect of the securities laws and similar bodies of law
designed to elicit better business behavior.378
Like many good functionalist ideas, the rebuttable presumption of
causal injury may be unable to surmount certain formalist barriers. For
example, the PSLRA requires that an investor plaintiff prove loss
causation.379 “Loss causation is an element of securities fraud, borrowed
. . . from negligence law, that requires plaintiff to establish a sufficient
causal nexus between defendant’s misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s
loss.”380 One reluctant to lower the barriers to successful investor class

377. 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
378. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999).
379. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000).
380. Choi et al., supra note 2. Because my suggestion that courts take a charitable view of proof
of loss causation first requires that the plaintiffs demonstrate (through adjudication of an issue class or
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actions can certainly read the loss causation requirement as mandating
traditional proof of causation as in an automobile accident case or other
tort of negligence. However, one can also engage in a functionalist reading
of the PSLRA loss causation language as permitting non-traditional
approaches to determining causation so long as they are consistent with
the Act’s purpose of deterring frivolous litigation or so-called strike suits.
If, as a prerequisite to enjoying the benefit of the rebuttable presumption
of causation, the plaintiff class must first prove other elements of liability
and a general case for general damages among the class, the case would
appear by definition not to be frivolous. At this juncture, judicial
insistence on traditional, formal proof of causal loss does not serve the
congressional purpose of the PSLRA but instead only deprives a class of
investors of compensation and immunizes defendants for a particular sort
of blameworthy conduct that is hard to litigate on an individual basis.
2. Sampling and Test Cases
Another overlooked option for addressing large cases is the use of
statistical sampling and analysis through examination of representative test
cases or sample cases. Although this technique has been intermittently
used for many years by many courts,381 it appears not to have achieved
general acceptance as a means of addressing class-action issues.
Under any number of variants of the statistics/sampling/test-case
approach, a court may conduct adjudicative proceedings and fact-finding
regarding a particular case or issue in a matter to reach a determination. In
cases of class disputes, the court may do this across a representative
sample of cases that reflect both the range of situations presented by the
class claims and the types of typical claim scenarios at the core of the
class’s complaints against the defendant. Once this information is

other means) that defendants violated the law, I regard it as presenting a much more attractive case for
a liberal attitude toward loss causation than was presented in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 125 S.
Ct. 1627 (2005). There, plaintiffs sought class certification without first addressing the questions of
defendant wrongdoing (i.e., were the statements at issue materially misleading and did defendants act
with scienter) and in which the Supreme Court took a narrow attitude toward proof of loss causation.
See supra text accompanying notes 206–300 (discussing Dura Pharmaceuticals). In addition, Dura
Pharmaceuticals only decided one type of loss causation question as a matter of the substantive law of
the PSLRA. The Court did not set forth a template governing future procedural management of loss
causation cases.
381. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (approving
statistical sampling use); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(statistical sampling used to determine amount of damages in large asbestos case). See also Gregory
Todd Jones & Reidar Hagtredt, Sample Data as Evidence: Meeting the Requisites of Daubert and the
Recently Amended Federal Rules of Evidence, 18 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 721, 746–48 (2002).
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determined, liability may be determined, presumptions established, and
presumptive damages calculated for the variously situated class members.
This permits a determination as to the amount of damages owed the class
and provides a formula for distribution of any award. The case for
sampling and statistical analysis has, in my view, been well made for a
decade, perhaps two. In making this claim, I am thinking most
prominently of two persuasive articles by Professor Bone382 and Professors
Saks and Blanck383 advocating greater use of statistical sampling to
adjudicate large or complex cases. In a similar vein is Professor Walker’s
suggestion for use of sampling.384 Also supporting this approach is the
substantial literature that emerged in the mid-to-late1980s regarding
probability and proof, particularly the use of Bayesian theory to prove
circumstantial claims.385
However, probability theory, like use of statistical sampling proof, has
not been readily accepted by the courts in spite of the intellectual force
behind it. This undoubtedly stems from the baseline reluctance of both the
judicial system and the public to be treated “like a number” regarding
issues of civil liability and legal obligation.386 Once again, the individual
“day in court” ideal appears to hold powerful sway over the system,
suggesting that any departure from targeted, individualized adjudication
for all litigants is an unfair failure of justice. Although the sentiment is
understandable, it is also erroneous.
An attractive variant of the sampling approach is proposed by
Professors Hay and Rosenberg. They suggest having trials of a number of
the claims of class members and then calculating a weighted average
based on the win-loss outcomes and the range of damage awards. In this
way, the judgment in a class action essentially mimics or parallels the

382. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993).
383. Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992).
384. See Walker, supra note 103. While Professor Walker suggested statistical sampling as a
means to resolve issues in federal class action cases, Professor Bone largely promoted use of statistical
sampling as an alternative to class treatment of matters. See Bone, supra note 21, at 269–74. My view,
which is consistent with that of the Saks-Blanck and Walker analyses, is that statistical sampling
should not be seen as an alternative to class treatment but should be a primary fixture of class
treatment of issues, claims, and cases.
385. See Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of
Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985); Ward Edwards, Summing Up: The Society of
Bayesian Trial Lawyers, 66 B.U. L. REV. 937 (1986) (summarizing Symposium on evidentiary proof).
386. For a well-known and venerable example of an academic expression of this angst, see
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971).
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outcome that would result if the parties and the judicial system were
sufficiently inclined to devote the massive resources required to litigating
each and every class member’s claim.387 And, of course, as the results of
particular trials emerge, there is nothing to prevent the parties from
settling the class matter prior to the court’s calculation of the weighted
average proposed by Professors Hay and Rosenberg.
As previously discussed, our system tolerates enormous variance in
outcomes based on jurisdiction, venue, quality of legal representation,
idiosyncratic inter-jury differences, idiosyncratic inter-judge differences,
and temporal differences in the adjudication of a matter.388 By comparison,
the degree of variance that may exist between class members when proof
is streamlined or damages estimated through statistical sampling and use
of test cases is likely to be considerably less. Certainly, the results from
this method cannot be more variegated than under the present system,
which gives lip service to individualized justice but routinely permits
individualized injustice and error to stand. The focus should not be on
whether sampling with statistical analysis is a valid means of proof. The
inquiry should instead focus on whether the particular statistical sampling
in question comports with sound practices.
Perhaps more important, if the alternative to use of statistical sampling
and test cases is to refuse class treatment, essentially leading to the end of
potentially meritorious claims or to bargain-basement settlement, it is hard
to see how rigid insistence on individual proof serves justice. Although the
use of statistical sampling and test cases poses some risk of inaccuracy,
not only are these risks no greater than those inherent in the system, but
they are risks worth taking in order to ensure that claimants in fact really
do receive a “day in court,” albeit in the form of class treatment rather than
individual adjudication (which they would not really receive in any event
if class treatment were denied). Like use of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify a
class on a given issue, the use of statistical sampling and test cases
presents a “half a loaf” situation389 that is preferable to the alternative of
giving plaintiff class rights essentially no real opportunity for vindication.

387. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1394–97.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 302–07.
389. See Romberg, supra note 323 (referring to partial class actions and issue certification as “half
a loaf” in contrast to the presumed whole loaf of class certification of an entire case).
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3. Judicial Adjuncts and Initial Administrative Determinations
Another underutilized tool for entertaining and processing class action
disputes is use of judicial adjunct officers such as special masters or
hearing masters.390 Similarly, courts could make greater use of
administrative-agency-like processes for managing cases, particularly for
determining damages.
For example, if the most highly individualized portion of a class suit is
the question of the damages suffered by each class member (due to
questions of reliance, degree of injury, comparative fault, set-off or
mitigation of loss, etc.), this problem can be addressed in a number of
ways. Perhaps the dominant approach is the traditional, formalist approach
of simply refusing certification on the ground that common questions of
fact or law do not “predominate” and that class treatment is therefore not
the “superior” way to resolve the controversy.391 As is apparent by this
point in the article, I find this approach frequently misapplied to cases that
could profit from at least partial class treatment. Further, the analysis of
many courts reflects a narrow and grudging interpretative approach to
Rule 23 that should not be placed above the purpose and societal mission
of Rule 23 to permit uneconomic claims to be heard and to provide
incentives for better behavior by commercial actors. The traditional,
grudging approach to class treatment should not be the dominant approach
in investor class actions and probably should fade to the background in
mass tort class actions as well.
Instead of this more traditional approach requiring “predominance” as
a condition to any sort of class certification and requiring that the class
device be equivalent to or better than hypothetical individual litigation, a
better approach to Rule 23 would first make greater use of issue
certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), thereby removing the predominance

390. See Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters: Administrative
Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235 (1997); Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, The Role
of Special Masters in the Judicial System: Special Masters in State Court Complex Litigation: An
Available and Underused Case Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1299 (2005); Sean C.
Flynn, Note, The Totten Doctrine and its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REV. 793, 812 (2001) (special
masters are an extremely useful but drastically underutilized judicial tool). See, e.g., Prudential Ins.
Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080, 1083–88 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting use of Special Master in
product liability cases); Apex Furniture Sales, Inc. v. Keinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1096–97 (3d Cir. 1987)
(disapproving of use of special master). See also Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse of Plaintiff Class Action
Settlement: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiation, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308
(1985) (arguing for special master-like figure to supervisor negotiation of class action settlement to
assure fairness and adequate airing of issues).
391. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
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inquiry from much of the case until facts could be established with some
certainty. Use of issue certification can be used to test components of the
claims, including the basic merit of the case (discussed in the next
subsection) so as to determine whether the matter should even progress to
more difficult questions of causation and damages.
Once the bona fides of the class claims are established in part through
issue certification, the court has a choice to make about further processing
on damages issues. The traditional approach to these matters, even among
those who advocate for more aggressive use of issue certification, appears
to be one of treating the issue determinations as preclusive but requiring
separate individual lawsuits on the more individuated questions of
damage.392 Although this alone would be an improved expansion of class
treatment, it continues to present the problem of failing to overcome the
unattractive economics of individual litigation, even in cases where
defendant wrongdoing is relatively clear. In many cases, a prior
determination on liability-related issues will significantly streamline
adjudication of damages, making subsequent individual actions
economically feasible where they were not prior to the decision on the
issue class matter. However, in another large group of cases, deciding the
liability questions will not make individual litigation economically
feasible where class member damages are relatively small or expensive to
prove through traditional litigation.
The seemingly obvious solution, albeit one raising constitutional and
prudential concerns, is to permit courts to establish streamlined means of
assessing individual damages. This can and has been done as a part of a
negotiated settlement.393 The plaintiff class and defendants agree on an
amount to fund compensation, perhaps even agree on a schedule of
compensation, and establish an administrative or ADR means of
streamlined assessment under which parties can seek to prove a right to

392. For example, this appears to be an acceptable result to Professor Romberg in that it at least
permits greater class treatment of common issues and as a practical matter should encourage informal
resolution based on the results of adjudication of the issues class matters. He seems content to stop at
this point and does not argue for particularly aggressive use of innovative fact-finding on damages
matters. See Romberg, supra note 323, at 300–17, 326–33.
393. See McGovern, Mature Mass Torts, supra note 125 (noting and favoring practice under
appropriate conditions); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class
Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 635–37 (1997) (noting practice but questioning it on due
process and accuracy grounds); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases:
Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 700 (1989); William B. Rubenstein, A
Transactional Model of Liability, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 402, n. 141 (2001) (noting use of damage
schedules for large group of claimants).
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compensation under a settlement fund or a deviation from a schedule of
benefits.
This same approach can be applied even in cases where the parties are
not able to settle. For example, Professors Hay and Rosenberg propose
that the court presiding over a class action “should hold multiple class
trials and base its judgment on some suitably weighted combination of the
different verdicts.”394 They would apply this approach not only to the
question of damages per se but also to the issue of liability (weighting
awards according to pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant verdicts).395 They see
this approach as one that reduces any unfair coercive effect class treatment
may have on defendants.396 It is a most promising proposal that has the
additional advantage of actually involving real jury determinations,
making it less likely that it would be struck down by an appellate court on
Seventh Amendment grounds.
To be sure, settlement followed by court approval removes potentially
thorny questions regarding the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and
due process rights to damages adjudication through a traditional Article III
tribunal. Somewhat radically, perhaps, I am suggesting that although these
constitutional constraints should be of concern, they should not be fatal to
judicial experimentation in this regard. Over the past twenty years,
particularly in the mass tort context but also in connection with
“Frankenstein monster” investor litigation,397 commentators have been
arguing that only a legislative or administrative-like solution will truly
serve justice for both claimants and defendant companies.398
Courts have been reluctant to create such administrative infrastructure
on their own. For example, Judge Jack Weinstein has been accused of
essentially embarking on this sort of ADR quest in the mass tort arena.

394. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1382.
395. Id. at 1394–97.
396. Id. at 1382.
397. The phrase is of course taken from Judge Lumbard’s characterization of the shareholder
litigation in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting),
of which the U.S. Supreme Court took a similar view—and then compounded the problem by
requiring individual notice to class members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. See Eisen v. Carlisle v.
Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See also Miller, supra note 27.
398. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litgation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (1992); Ora Fred Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort
Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 SW. L.J. 909, 965
(1986) (contending that an administrative compensation scheme is necessary because of adjudication
and cost aspects of toxic tort litigation); Rosenberg, supra note 393 at 705 (commenting on Professor
McGovern’s damage schedule plan for the Dalkon Shield litigation and concluding that it “adequately
answers critics of collective processing”); Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral
Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1992).
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Although this has earned him praise, it has also attracted a good deal of
criticism.399 But today, twenty years after the Agent Orange settlement, the
perspective of time appears to have vindicated the Weinstein approach.
Use of special masters, hearing masters, presumptions, stylized means of
presenting claims, and judicial arm-twisting to settle large class actions or
mass actions may offend litigation purists. But employing any one of these
devices or a combination of them may often be better than the
traditionalist alternatives of refusing class treatment altogether or forcing
claimants into individual pursuit of claims that will (a) never happen
because of the adverse economics of the matter or (b) result in a settlement
that likely is not better for the plaintiffs than what would obtain under an
eclectic approach to adjudicating class actions. Take for example, the role
of judicial adjuncts such as special masters and hearing masters. Although
they may seem to be fixtures of complex litigation, they could be used to
significantly greater degree. Again, let me use the Rhone-Poulenc and
Newton litigation as examples of what might have been.
In Rhone-Poulenc, the concern was that a trial on negligence alone
would be misleading or inadequate because it would separate the question
of defendants’ negligence from issues of comparative negligence and
alternative causation.400 As previously discussed, I find these concerns
overstated.401 But assume they are not. Alternatives remain that could
permit class treatment of the case. Instead of refusing class treatment of
damages altogether, the court could have provided for streamlined
presentation of damages claims before a hearing master, with the master
making a determination that could either be accepted by the parties or
pursued through an individual action seeking de novo review. In essence,
hearing masters could be utilized as a form of case-specific court-annexed
arbitration of damages issues. Such an approach has the potential benefit
of improving the economic incentives to prompt prosecution of valid
claims that might otherwise be bypassed.
The arguable detriment is that it is too favorable to the plaintiff class
members because it will cultivate claims that might otherwise lie fallow or
because the master will too easily award damages, putting pressure on
defendants to seek de novo trial in order to protect their rights. This

399. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997) (generally praising Weinstein but arguing
that his unorthodox methods should not be adopted by others). See also Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort
as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579 (1994) (criticizing Weinstein
for stretching traditional procedural approaches to preside over administrative-like resolution of cases).
400. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text.
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objection is only superficially persuasive. At first blush, it may seem that
class defendants are being treated differently than non-class defendants,
but this simply is not true. The class defendant has only been brought to
this point because it lost on an issue-certification adjudication regarding
liability, or at least some significant element of liability. The plaintiff class
has thus “earned” the right to benefit from a streamlined, presumptive
presentation of damages and possible attainment of a damage award
without shouldering the greater cost of proof through jury trial.
Further, compare the “plight” of Rhone-Poulenc or any other
hypothetical class defendant to that of a plain vanilla defendant. In
hundreds of thousands of cases, individual case defendants are routinely
required to submit to court-annexed arbitration or other forms of ADR.402
Because of Seventh Amendment concerns, such arbitration results (or
ADR outcomes like Early Neutral Evaluation) are not binding on the
defendant.403 When the arbitration award or ADR damage figure emerges,
the plaintiff and defendant may either accept the result of the streamlined
process or may challenge it through trial de novo.404 This is no different
from what I am proposing for presumptively determining the damages of
class members after a court has found the class defendant to be culpable.
In Newton, the concern was that different class members incurred
different economic effects from having the NBBO price used for their
transactions. Because of this variation among class members, the Third
Circuit was unwilling to certify the matter for class treatment as to
damages. As an alternative, the court could have certified the class,
perhaps into two subclasses, one in which use of the NBBO price was not
injurious and one in which class members suffered losses because the
NBBO price was higher than other reasonably available prices. The court
could have also appointed a special master charged with ascertaining the
degree to which the class as a whole was injured by use of the NBBO

402. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy
in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1199–1200 (2000) (court-annexed arbitration
common); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 889, 898 (1991) (same); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 876 (1997) (same). See also
Raymond J. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983); Paul
Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia
Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983).
403. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (requiring parties to
participate in court-annexed arbitration of certain claims could present serious Seventh Amendment
problem if the parties were not permitted to demand trial de novo after completion of the arbitration
and rendering of award).
404. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. CIV. R. 500; M.D. FLA. LOC. R. 8.01; E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 49.
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prices. This could be determined through random sampling of the class
and statistical calculation. The master could determine the average amount
of loss to each class member. This figure would constitute the amount of
compensation due class members, along with nominal damages or
exemplary damages as otherwise determined by the court and perhaps with
jury consideration of the exemplary damages issues.
Purists (and perhaps even impure but strong proceduralists) who have
stayed with the article thus far are now perhaps figuratively jumping up in
rage. The method I propose has the effect of homogenizing the class injury
and results in a judgment that will undercompensate some class members
(as averaging always does) and overcompensate the class members that
actually came out ahead because of defendants’ failure to use best
execution in conducting their trades. Although this is of course imperfect,
so is the litigation world. What actually happened in Newton—stoppage of
a valid class-action claim in its tracks—seems to me far worse for the
plaintiff class than my proposed blended damage award based on
statistical sampling conducted by a special master.405
In similar fashion, Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, if permitted to go
forward under the Ninth Circuit’s theory of causation (that fraud that
inflates share price presumptively causes a loss because the purchaser of a
security is out-of-pocket in some amount because of the fraud),406 could be
tried and resolved through use individually or collectively of the types of
devices advocated in this article. Sampling and statistical analysis could be
used to assess the amount of share price decline due to misleading
statements about product development as opposed to a generally declining
market. Or a special master could assess the facts emanating from
discovery and put forth a presumptive schedule of damages calculation. Or
the court could hold one large trial with expert witness testimony.
Alternatively, the court could use several trials as per the Hay-Rosenberg

405. I should emphasize that there is no requirement that the statistical sampling be conducted by
a special master or other type of judicial adjunct officer. The Article III trial judge presiding over the
case could preside over hearings and receive evidence on the point, both through the adversarial
process and court-appointed experts. However, because of the technical issues presented by the
endeavor, I am more confident that it would proceed smoothly if done in the first instance by a special
master, subject to judicial review.
In addition, there is no requirement that there be only a single special master. For example, in
Newton, three special masters (e.g., a statistician, a lawyer, and a stockbroker or compliance officer)
working together would seem apt. In Rhone-Poulenc, a special-master committee composed of a
lawyer, a doctor, and an economist would seem apt. Although use of multiple special masters presents
issues of cost and coordination, spending the money up front for the expertise may prove more
efficient in the long run.
406. 339 F.3d 933, 937–39 (9th Cir. 2003).
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approach and determine an amount of weighted injury, one that would
include the pharmaceutical company’s “day in court” on the issue of
whether its public statements were misleading. In short, it simply does not
seem that Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals is too hard to adjudicate or
unfair to the defendant if tried (with the plaintiff merely permitted to
survive dismissal because of the presumptive injury that the Supreme
Court refused to recognize).
I am, at this juncture, not so much spurning the procedural “rules of the
game” as I am arguing in favor of a more distributive approach and a more
policy-purposivist approach in which court decisions look to further the
public policy purposes of substantive law and Rule 23, even when this
creates some tension (even considerable tension) with the proceduralist
goals of due process, accuracy, individual determinations, and full
adjudication of issues presented in lawsuits. In short, I am arguing that we
accept the inevitable truth that perfection is unattainable in this context
and that the justice system make a conscious choice to advance the relative
“good” rather than withholding it while waiting for the “best” that is never
to come.
The type of hearing master/special master use I advocate has been
common as part of class action or mass tort settlements. Agent Orange,407
asbestos,408 discrimination,409 and securities claims410 all provide
examples. In my view, this approach has worked well, so well that we
should not insist on settlement as a prerequisite to such use of judicial
adjuncts to make preliminary factfinding on individual damages questions
within a class. To be sure, incorporation of this approach in a settlement
has certain advantages because the parties can agree to be bound by the

407. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See
Farrell, supra note 390, at 258 (noting use of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Sol Schreiber, David I. Shapiro,
and Leonard Garment as special masters in Agent Orange case).
408. See, e.g., In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 737 F. Supp. 735 (E.
& S.D.N.Y. & N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
409. See, e.g., Rajender v. Univ. of Minn., 730 F.2d 1110, 1112 (8th Cir. 1984) (describing
settlement in Title VII action utilizing three special masters to administer proceedings); Forehand v.
Florida State Hosp., 839 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (use of master to organize and preliminarily
assess evidence in discrimination case); Officers for Justice v. Civil. Serv. Comm’n, 473 F. Supp. 801,
818 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (use of special master to distribute damages in job discrimination class action).
See also State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992) (appointing special master in case
challenging death penalty on bias grounds). See generally Tristin Green, Targeting Workplace
Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (2003); Timothy G.
Little, Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of Quincy v.
Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435 (1984).
410. See, e.g., In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 912 F. Supp. 822, 825 (W.D. Pa. 1995); In re
Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 124 F.R.D.
99 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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master’s findings, thereby eliminating the additional cost and uncertainty
of de novo challenge to the master’s work. But if the master-managed
damages processing is done well, de novo challenges (or at least de novo
challenges that are taken very far) should be relatively few in number.
This appears to have been the experience with court-annexed arbitration,
where litigants appear either to accept their awards or to file for de novo
trial only to have some negotiating leverage, eventually resolving the
matter well short of trial.411
In cases where proof of damages is based on objective, transparent
information, the hearing master should be entitled to issue a damages
award and indicate that he or she finds no genuine dispute of material fact
as to the underlying data or the calculation of the proper damages award.
In this way, the prevailing party can move for summary judgment on the
award. The court is of course not bound by the master’s findings and may
not even give these findings deference.412 Framing the issue in this way
gives the court an opportunity to reduce the cost of obtaining damages
awards for deserving plaintiffs (and they have been found to be deserving
due to previous proceedings in the case) and to eliminate defense
incentives to seek review of a master’s findings only to create settlement
leverage or to raise plaintiffs’ cost of obtaining relief.
The case for more forceful use of masters either as fact-finders or as
streamlined preliminary adjudicators is strong, so strong that one puzzles
as to why the idea has not received greater support. As with reservations
about the class action generally, the answer appears to be that an amalgam
of history, tradition, politics, and ideology combined to favor (at least in
theory) highly individualized adjudication before an Article III tribunal (or
its state law equivalent). Defense political interests have exploited this
sentiment to their advantage. Witness the anti-class-action public relations
campaigns attending passage of the PSLRA and CAFA. In addition,
particular episodes in the history of complex litigation have tended to
make courts reluctant to employ masters to their fullest extent in spite of
their longstanding presence on the periphery of complex litigation.413

411. See Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 402 (describing Eastern District of Pennsylvania courtannexed arbitration program); Broderick, supra note 402 (same).
412. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3) provides:
The court must decide de novo all objections to findings of fact made or recommended
by a master unless the parties stipulate with the court’s consent that:
(A) the master’s findings will be reviewed for clear error, or
(B) the findings of a master appointed under Rule 53(a)(1)(A) or (C) will be final.
413. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); David I. Levine, The Authority for the
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Consider as a telling example the long-running litigation of Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,414 a class action brought on behalf
of persons with mental disabilities contesting their treatment at Pennhurst,
a large institution in Eastern Pennsylvania. The litigation resulted in the
noteworthy relief of requiring the defendants to develop individual
habilitation plans for each class member and to provide for communitybased living arrangements to the extent possible for eligible class
members. In essence, the trial court ordered that Pennhurst be depopulated
and that class members received community-based living and habilitation
in contrast to the “warehousing” and mistreatment the court found (after
weeks of hearings) at Pennhurst.
This of course presented a rather daunting relief problem: how to effect
and administer such an order. The trial court’s solution was the
appointment of a special master to represent the class members during the
relief stage of proceedings, develop implementation plans for the order,
and monitor compliance with the order.415 Subsequently, in response to the
Third Circuit’s analysis on review, the court established a hearing master
to make a preliminary resolution of disputes over habilitation
arrangements.416 For example, the families of disabled class members and
the special master might disagree over the appropriateness of a particular
placement or treatment. In addition, because of the nature of the
disabilities of most class members, they were not articulate but could in
many cases be determined to have a preference for a particular living and
treatment situation. The hearing master heard contested cases of this type
and made reports and recommendations to the trial judge, who ruled
accordingly.
This large remedial undertaking moved forward, with class members
eventually receiving habilitation plans and most placed in low-density (at
least as compared to the Pennhurst facility) community living
arrangements. Fairly late in the litigation, defense lawyers hit upon legal
defenses to the court’s order that had not been emphasized below but
found traction in the Supreme Court’s chariness of new individual rights
and solicitude for states rights via expanded Eleventh Amendment
power.417 In Pennhurst I, the Supreme Court held that the relief requested

Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History
Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753 (1984).
414. The original Halderman v. Pennhurst merits decision of the trial court is reported at 446 F.
Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The case is marked by dozens of opinions thereafter.
415. See 446 F. Supp. at 1326–28.
416. See 612 F.2d 84 (1979); 533 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
417. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 126, 165–67 (Stevens J.,
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could not be supported by the patient’s “Bill of Rights” in the
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1975, on the ground that this language
was “merely in precatory terms” and did not confer substantive legal
rights.418 On remand, the Third Circuit court persevered, finding that the
relief was nonetheless justified by the substantive rights created by
Pennsylvania’s own statutes.419 In Pennhurst II, however, the Supreme
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prevented the federal district
court from requiring that the defendants follow state law.420 (I wish I were
making this up; Pennhurst II’s legal analysis is as silly as it sounds, a point
more eloquently made in Justice Stevens’s dissent.)421
By this time, the Pennhurst State School and Hospital was well on its
way to closure, the victim of depopulation, age, and changing state policy.
Class members had generally found community placements long before.
For purposes of this article, what makes the Pennhurst litigation more than
an interesting remedial case study, an embarrassing example of judicial
result-orientation, or a bad constitutional law precedent is the tone it set

dissenting regarding Court’s willingness to consider Eleventh Amendment defense so late in the case
and in contradiction to the Court’s previous ruling requiring Third Circuit to consider whether
Pennsylvania state law supported trial court decision).
418. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
419. 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982).
420. 465 U.S. 89 (1983).
421. See 465 U.S. at 126–67 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Stevens stated:
This case has illuminated the character of an institution. The record demonstrates that the
Pennhurst [facility] has been operated in violation of state law. . . . In 1981, after [years of
litigation and adjudication] this Court ordered the . . . Third Circuit to decide whether the law
of Pennsylvania provides an independent and adequate ground which can support the District
Court’s remedial order. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, unanimously concluded that it
did. This Court does not disagree with that conclusion. Rather, it reverses the Court of
Appeals because it did precisely what this Court ordered it to do; the only error committed by
the Court of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court’s command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication of the
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a completely unprecedented holding, today the
Court concludes that Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from
enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view of sovereign
immunity of the States supports this result. . . .
....
. . . Today, however, the Court casts aside well-settled, respected doctrine that plainly
commands affirmance of the Court of Appeals—the doctrine of the law of the case, the
doctrine of stare decisis (the Court repudiates at least 28 cases), the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, and the doctrine of judicial restraint. No sound
reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or this Court’s voyage into the sea of
undisciplined lawmaking. As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character of an
institution.
Id. at 126, 165–67.
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against use of masters in litigation.422 In Pennhurst I, Justice White
concurred specially to attack the appointment of a special master, stating
that instead of using a special master
the court should have announced what it thought was necessary to
comply with the Act and then permitted an appropriate period for
the State to decide whether it preferred to give up federal funds and
go its own route. . . . In any event, however, the court should not
have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the
first instance which patients should remain and which should be
removed. . . . In enacting [the statute in question], Congress
eschewed creating any specific guidelines on the proper level of
institutionalization, leaving the question to the States to determine
in the first instance. A court-appointed Special Master is
inconsistent with this approach.423
Unfortunately, Justice White’s factual presentation was a bit
misleading in suggesting widespread usurpation of power over state and
local executives or abdication of judicial duties. The Special Master was
not charged with making “first instance” decisions as to habilitation but
with monitoring the habilitation plans drawn by the government
defendants and the conditions of the institution. The Special Master did
not manage the facility but monitored the government defendants’
compliance with the remedial order. The government defendants were
cleared in the first instance of administering a program in which each
disabled class member received a customized habilitation plan drawn by a
mental health professional pursuant to a court order resulting after trial on
the merits. As discussed above, the habilitation plan was subject to review
and challenge by the Special Master and as necessary, further review
before the Hearing Master and eventually the District Court. In subsequent
Pennhurst opinions, Judge Raymond J. Broderick, who had presided over

422. Pennhurst will also always be interesting to me because of my peripheral personal
involvement as law clerk to the Hon. Raymond J. Broderick (E.D. Pa.), who decided Pennhurst on the
merits and presided over the ensuing years of enforcement of the decision. I worked with Judge
Broderick on many Pennhurst decisions, some of which are reported, (see, e.g., 526 F. Supp. 423
(E.D. Pa. 1981), 555 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1982), 566 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1983)) so I am hardly
neutral in the matter. I think Pennhurst was rightly decided in first instance, that the Eleventh
Amendment should not have been considered a bar to the decision or relief, and that the remedies
ordered were apt under the circumstances, including appointment of both a special master (which
required a considerable staff) and a hearing master. I also found the performance of the masters
(Special Master Carla Morgan, a health policy professional, and Hearing Master Michael Lottman, an
attorney with expertise in disability law) to be exemplary during the time I was involved with the case.
423. 451 U.S. at 54–55 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
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the case from the outset, occasionally tried to correct the record in this
regard, but felt significantly chilled in his use of judicial authority by
Justice White’s criticism.424 But for purposes of influencing the judicial
body politic, the damage was done. In a Supreme Court opinion that
would be read by hundreds of judges, thousands of lawyers, and cited
nearly 1,800 times during the ensuing twenty-four years (710 legal
periodical citations and more than a thousand caselaw citations),425 a
justice had condemned use of a master even in a complex case that seemed
to call for use of a master or similar creative approach to remedial
enforcement.
Of course, Justice White’s salvo was not the first attack on masters.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have provided for use of
masters since their inception of the Rules in 1938, there has always been
concern that overly liberal use of masters will lead to unwise
“outsourcing” of the judicial function. Then, the 1957 case of La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co.,426 gave use of masters a particularly bad name
because of Judge La Buy’s conduct. Faced with an antitrust case that he
found complex, Judge La Buy decided to appoint a master, presumably on
the ground that this was easier than actually becoming a bit educated on
the subject. The Supreme Court struck down the appointment of the
master in an opinion that reads interstially like a criticism of a judge who
was a bit too worried about losing golf course time if forced to roll up his
sleeves presiding over a major trial in a complex area.
In the wake of La Buy, special masters were in something of disrepute.
Or at least there was reluctance to utilize masters unless the case was clear
and the master’s role was confined to one more peripheral to the merits to
be decided by the court. Over time, the increasing complexity of litigation
made masters popular as part of settlement arrangements, but masters
appear not to have become well-established in litigation when, at the time
of Pennhurst I, Justice White’s attack provided another setback. Although
masters continued to be used and grew in use during the course of the
litigation growth of the 1980s and 1990s, this was often in the context of

424. See, e.g., 545 F. Supp. 410, 416–20 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (describing “Need for the Special
Master” and describing primary functions of special master as monitoring community living
arrangements, reviewing defendant-drawn individual habilitation plans, and monitoring conditions at
Pennhurst facility).
425. Shepardization of Pennhurst I via LexisNexis as of July 15, 2005. The Court’s 1984
Pennhurst II decision finding an Eleventh Amendment bar to the class claims has been even more
widely cited (4,664 citations as of July 15, 2005, 715 in legal periodicals).
426. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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administering a settlement427 or making preliminary discovery and case
management decisions (as in the AT&T antitrust litigation)428 rather than
as judicial adjuncts empowered to make preliminary determinations
regarding aspects of liability and damages.
In addition, the mass tort cases of the 1980s created renewed interest in
use of special masters and prompted considerable activity and innovation
by masters.429 In part, my historical thesis is that the judicial system’s use
of masters has been disfavored on an official level while being embraced
as a practical matter by many courts. Now, frankly, more than twenty
years after Pennhurst I and nearly forty years after La Buy, it is time to
give special masters and hearing masters a little more official recognition
and a significant place at the litigation table for purposes of addressing the
merits of disputes.
Even where the strictures of the system prevent factfinding or
adjudication by masters, masters can nonetheless play an important role in
framing issues and in clearing out the “underbrush” of contested matters to
facilitate better deployment of judicial resources. In particular, greater use
of masters can be used as an alternative to shutting the door on class
actions when the inability to certify an entire matter for class treatment
would otherwise effectively extinguish the claim. My proposal is that
masters be deployed more in connection with adjudication of the merits of
class claims, even in cases where the claims are emerging or novel rather
than mature.430 In appropriate cases, masters may make the claim mature
through use of information development, sampling, statistical analysis, and
administration of test cases, setting parameters for more routinized
analysis.

427. See, e.g., Rajender v. Univ. of Minn., 730 F.2d 1110, 1112 (8th Cir. 1984) (describing
settlement in Title VII action utilizing three special masters to administer proceedings).
428. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1348–49 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Special
Master’s Guidelines for the Resolution of Privilege Claims in United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603,
604 (D.D.C. 1979).
429. See Symposium, The Role of Special Masters in the Judicial System, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1193 (2005); Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital
Resource in the Era of Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269 (2005); Lynn Jokela &
David F. Herr, Special Masters in State Court Complex Litigation: An Available and Underused Case
Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1299 (2005); Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and
Legitimacy of Special Masters, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235 (1997) (reviewing law, history, and
practice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 53); McGovern, supra note 125 (describing use of masters, including
author’s own activity, in working to streamline mass tort case processing); Rosenberg, supra note 398
(noting and approving practice and describing author’s own experiences).
430. See McGovern, supra note 125 (suggesting that use of masters is most apt where the tort
claim is mature and thus more susceptible to systemic valuation and treatment and that masters may be
inappropriate for cases with less developed track records).
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In addition, federal courts, now the dominant forum for class actions,
may wish to consider developing a cadre of judicial adjuncts to which
judges may refer portions of class actions for statistical sampling, fact
development, and preliminary decision-making. Two practical drawbacks
of using masters are the cost and the logistics of selection. Generally,
appointment of a master or stipulation as to the appointment of a master
entails cost-sharing by the parties. Even in large cases with well-heeled
parties, this can be a significant cost. Masters are usually drawn from the
ranks of private practice, private industry, or academia. These persons
normally are paid an hourly rate commensurate with their station. Figures
of $500 or more per hour are common. In a large matter, this adds up. In
addition, although the expertise of these masters is attractive, there may be
disputes over their neutrality. Most persons with expertise in a field (law,
science, accounting, the stock market) have acquired a point of view (or at
least a perceived point of view) with this expertise. As a result, the type of
master that may be attractive to plaintiffs may be an anathema to
defendants, and vice versa.
As an alternative, the federal system may find it relatively costeffective to develop a group of masters with a variety of expertise in the
fields that tend to be at issue in class actions or mass actions. These
government-employed masters could be either civil servants or Article I
judicial officers. Their status should not make much difference in light of
the role I advocate for them and the judicial control to which they would
be subject. Obviously, there would not be high demand for their expertise
in all judicial districts. Although there might be sufficient demand in
places like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C., it is
not relevant where the Federal Masters would be headquartered. Either
they could come to the venue of a matter for purposes of conducting
conferences, investigations, or hearings—or the litigants can come to the
location of the Masters (I am mightily resisting the urge to call this situs
the “Master’s Chambers”). As a matter of experimentation, an Office of
Federal Masters could be established in Washington that could be used at
the discretion of trial judges in class actions, mass actions, or any other
matter on which the court found it useful to employ a master, without
separately “employing” a master from the private sector and taxing the
parties for the costs of the master.431

431. I have made similar suggestions for creation of a group of Article I specialist discovery
jurists. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post, 64 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Spring/Summer 2001, at 197, 241. I have also proposed a similar wing of the “multi-door
courthouse” composed of government-employed ADR officers assisting in dispute resolution. See
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I realize that I am advocating an enlargement of the federal judicial
force in a manner that tends to make it look more
administrative/Continental and less adjudicatory/Anglo-American. But
fidelity to historical self-concept seems at best only a rebuttable default
rule of how best to process difficult litigation. For the reasons set forth in
this article, I am advocating greater drive toward administrativebureaucratic treatment of class actions (and other complex matters as well,
I suppose) because of the shortcomings of the traditional courtadjudication model. Although this model can be a powerful force for
investigating matters, developing new claims and defenses, and providing
an avenue of relief when the executive and legislature fail, the traditional
judiciary has been hampered in its ability to deal with class actions, mass
torts, and similarly complex matters. Because of these limitations, some
worthy class actions are not fruitfully resolved and some large, chronic
social ills persist in an expensive way that compensates lawyers at
considerable cost to victims and defendants.
The asbestos litigation phenomenon is perhaps the shining example of
this problem. It cries out for a legislative solution, but none has come
during the past twenty years. Other mass torts present variants of this
problem of ongoing disputing with high transaction costs even after
liability issues are reasonably clear. Some, as with the tainted blood of
Rhone-Poulenc, present a perhaps even bigger problem of victims lacking
full recompense when denied class treatment of their claims. So, too, with
the smoking victims of Castano. In the realm of investor litigation, the
problem may not be as severe, but there are nonetheless too many cases
like Newton in which blameworthy behavior by those in the securities
industry is not well-deterred because it slips through the economic cracks
of the current system.
4. Peeking at the Merits and Peaking at the Merits
The traditional view of class-action certification posits that the decision
should be made on the basis of the allegations of the complaint and not in
connection with the actual strength of the contentions. At one level, this

Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 297 (1996).
Although those ideas, like this article’s proposal of an “Office of Federal Special Masters,” are
unlikely to be adopted in the current environment, in which Congress has given only tepid resource
support to the Third Branch, I continue to like both ideas and in general argue that the judiciary should
have more judicial adjuncts under its control and should depend less on private individuals serving
tours of duty as special masters, arbitrators, ADR professionals, or the like.
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makes sense as consistent with the prevailing view that pretrial
proceedings should not substitute for the factual determinations to be
made at trial (unless the facts are not genuinely in dispute, making the case
apt for summary judgment). For class actions, this view has probably
become outmoded. Even if class certification lacks the in terrorem effect
posited by its critics, class certification changes the dynamics of the
litigation in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. As a result, it is not
unreasonable for courts to engage in a modest examination of the strength
of plaintiffs’ contentions when determining whether to accord class
treatment to all or part of a matter.432
Although this puts some significant pressure on plaintiffs to expend
resources early so they can demonstrate at least a non-speculative, nonfrivolous basis for the claims asserted, this seems better than the
alternative of refusing class treatment in cases where liability is assumed
(for purposes of deciding a motion) because of generalizations about the
degree of difference found among the members of the plaintiff class. As an
alternative, courts that satisfy themselves that the plaintiffs’ contentions
have some strength are in a position in which they can feel comfortable
according the matter the type of flexible treatment advocated in this
article.
If the plaintiffs’ complaint is merely unverified assertion, one can
understand judicial reluctance to accord even partial class treatment of a
matter to plaintiffs and counsel who may not be “deserving” of such
procedural support. However, if the claims appear to have merit, the court
is not favoring the claimants with class treatment but is merely refusing to
favor the defendants by withholding class treatment. For example, if the
initial look at the merits is promising, a court should feel comfortable
invoking Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to provide class treatment of common issues. If
determination of the class-certified issue(s) demonstrates validity to all or
part of the plaintiffs’ liability claim, the court should be willing to be more
flexible in use of statistical sampling, use of masters, use of test cases,
presumptive compensation schedules, or other tools that will streamline
resolution of the case so that the plaintiffs are not deprived of the benefits
of class treatment merely because of some variation in their injury.
Use of the Rule 23(c)(4)(A) issues class on key elements of the claim is
particularly important in that it provides a sound justification for the

432. See Bone & Evans, supra note 103 (advocating earlier and increased examination of the
merits of class action claims); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the
Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (proposing that courts examine value of claims and number of
claims as part of certification decision).
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admittedly aggressive use of non-traditional resolution advocated in this
article. In the abstract, defendants can rightly complain if a court relaxes
traditional approaches to adjudication and proof in a manner that favors
plaintiffs. These defendants can rightly complain that they should be
entitled to hold plaintiffs to the ordinary standards of litigation proof, even
if this presents adverse economic consequences for the plaintiffs.
However, after a court has determined that a defendant concealed
information, misrepresented, made a dangerous product, engaged in fraud,
or failed to discharge a legal duty, everything changes. At this juncture,
the defendants no longer should be accorded the presumptions of nonliability that impose most litigation burdens on a plaintiff as the party
seeking relief. Now, a court has adjudicated the defendant to be
blameworthy in some significant way, even if the court has yet to find all
elements of a cause of action satisfied as to the plaintiff class as a whole.
At this juncture, it is no longer unfair to depart in reasonable ways from
the traditional modes of proof and adjudication.
Consider, for example, the question of damages in a mass tort claim
among a class of litigants that has injuries, but not the type of grave
injuries that attract lawyers willing to work for a contingency fee and
invest significant expenditures developing and proving the individual’s
claim. If, after a class-action determination that defendant has engaged in
tortious conduct, it would seem to elevate form over substance to refuse to
permit courts to at least explore assessing damages through use of test
cases, samples, statistical analysis, presumptive schedules of
compensation, and processing by masters.
A more persuasive case still for a flexible approach to damages can be
made for investor claims. Consider Newton v. Merrill Lynch, for example.
Once it has been determined that the broker-defendants did not satisfy the
duty of best execution and did not disclose this to class members and that
this constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5, it is
hard to be sympathetic if the defendants complain about statistical
sampling, test cases, or administrative-like master’s hearings to assess
presumptive damages. Damages may even be determinable as a matter of
law for some class members.
5. Process Concerns
As discussed throughout this article, many observers, particularly
“hard-core” proceduralists, will object to the article’s suggestions of
relaxing traditional approaches and “working so hard,” if you will, to
allow class treatment to benefit plaintiffs. As discussed in the previous
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subsection, part of my answer to this criticism is to suggest greater use of
issue class actions to determine that defendants are in fact at least
somewhat culpable, prior to departing significantly from the traditional
models of adjudication and traditional restrictions on class treatment. Once
this takes place, the inquiry should be significantly different than at the
outset of the cases when the parties are unsullied by any adverse
determinations about their behavior. Much of today’s class action
jurisprudence has it backwards in that courts attempt to make a very
important decision on certification (often of the entire matter rather than
merely a single issue) without plaintiffs having first established any bona
fides of their assertions. By contrast, my proposal would more often
ensure that class treatment is being accorded to claims that truly have
merit.
In addition, I want to be clear about the degree to which I am
advocating relaxation of the traditional approach. I am not suggesting that
“any” selection of test cases, sampling, or statistical analysis will suffice.
On the contrary, use of these devices would need to satisfy applicable
quality control standards. Perhaps more important, they would have to
satisfy the court that the procedures were sufficiently fair and likely to
enhance resolution of the dispute so as to prompt the court to exercise its
discretion in favor of such approaches. The approaches I advocate all
require an affirmative judicial determination that they are apt for the case
and context in question. I am not advocating a change in the general norms
or default procedures of dispute resolution. Before any of what I propose
can happen, the plaintiff class (or a defendant that sees value in pursuing
class treatment of some matters) must convince the court to take these
steps, which is itself a significant constraint on use of this sort of class
treatment.
In like fashion, I am not suggesting repeal of the Seventh Amendment
(although, after years of reliably Association of Trial Lawyers of Americalike sentiments on the issue, I have come to see jury trial as vastly
overrated).433 The Seventh Amendment will probably always be among us.
But this does not mean that unreasonably constraining aspects of the jurytrial guarantee cannot be attacked through flexible devices like masterconducted hearings or presumptive compensation schedules, so long as
these devices stop short of outright substitution of jury determination of

433. See supra text accompanying note 317 (discussing problems of jury determination); Graham
C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2001) (noting perceived defects
in jury system); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997).
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contested facts. I am only proposing making the exercise of that right less
attractive under limited circumstances where the Amendment is being
invoked more to thwart class treatment than to infuse adjudication with the
voice of the people.
In similar vein, due process concerns should not impede greater use of
class treatment of at least some aspects of cases. So long as the
complaining litigant is permitted to challenge and attain review of the
nontraditional class treatment to which it objects, it would seem that due
process is satisfied. Due process should not impart a right to litigants to
insist on traditional adjudication in the face of a judicial determination that
the case may profit from partial class treatment coupled with use of
nontraditional means of adjudication.
And, if nothing else, there is the right to opt out. Where a court
embarks on nontraditional class treatment of a matter, it should provide
class members with the chance to opt out at an apt juncture. For instance,
in the examples used throughout this article, it would be appropriate to
notify the class and permit opting out after liability has been determined in
a mass tort and prior to the court’s embarking on statistical sampling to
determine class-member damages.434 In an investor’s 10b-5 claim such as
in Newton, it would be apt to provide disclosure and a chance of opting out
after the court determines to examine the effect of use of a particular
posted price through sampling, statistical analysis, or abbreviated hearings
before a master.
One might also characterize my proposal as in many cases permitting,
in effect, a very extended opt-out to class members. For example, if the
court utilizes sampling or master’s hearings to presumptively determine
injury but permits demands for de novo review, the court has essentially
established a fail-safe opt-out for the benefit of the class member. If the
class member likes and accepts the results of the court’s streamlined
procedure for determining damages, the class member need do nothing. If
the class member is unhappy with the result of an alternative procedure,

434. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1158 (1998) (arguing that class actions
with preclusive effect should not be settled unless all class members have the option to reject
settlement and opt-out at time of offer, with exceptions for limited fund cases or in other circumstances
“in which the problems of class members holding out their agreement would be insurmountable”). See
also Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 98 (suggesting that enhanced “exit” for class
members is a more productive means of addressing concerns over class settlements than efforts to
increase class-member voice or control or performance of class counsel); Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and
Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2004).
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the class member may demand trial de novo. Of course, the defendant
resisting class treatment or streamlined adjudication may take that decision
out of the hands of a plaintiff class member by demanding trial de novo on
its own behalf. In any event, after the proverbial dust has settled, it is hard
for me to be concerned that any litigant lacked meaningful ways to avoid
class treatment and streamlined adjudication if that was the litigant’s wish.
This, of course, raises a practical problem with my proposals: are they
so free-form and subject to escape hatches that they operate to strip the
class-action device of perhaps its greatest feature, the opportunity for the
parties (particularly beleaguered defendants) to achieve global peace in the
matter? I think not. I am not naive enough to think that even wise and
creative judicial adoption of a more flexible approach to class actions will
make trial itself more attractive. Parties will still want to settle and will
settle. But in my envisioned world, plaintiffs need not settle too cheaply
(or drop meritorious claims altogether) because of the economics of
disputing and judicial hesitancy to utilize class treatment. As discussed,
the net effect will be to provide more class treatment, which will put
somewhat more pressure on defendants to settle in some circumstances.
But, in the cases I posit of a preliminary showing of defendant culpability,
defendants should face some pressure to settle as compensation to
claimants and as deterrence against future wrongdoing.
Further, this article is not advocating any particular solution to the
question of how to ensure fair settlements that are not tainted by
impermissible conflicts among class members or counsel. There is
considerable commentary on this issue that lies beyond the scope of this
article.435 For the record, I am against settlements that unduly favor some
class members at the expense of others (unless the differential treatment
has a legal basis; for example, in asbestos cases mesothelioma victims
should get more than pleural plaque victims). I am also against settlements
that pay counsel fees disproportionate to class recovery. But none of the
proposals in this article will necessarily increase the number of such
settlements and certainly will not deprive courts of power to prevent such
settlements pursuant to Rule 23(e). Those are separate issues presenting
separate challenges for courts and the judicial system. Whether those
challenges are successfully met turns on factors other than expanded class
treatment as proposed by this article.

435. See, e.g., Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 98; Weber, supra note 434; Legal
Study Questions Rationale for Limiting Class Actions, LIAB. & INS. WEEK, Jan. 20, 2004; David A.
Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1994).
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In commenting on this article at the Symposium Conference, Judge
Gerard Lynch diplomatically raised the question of whether the
approaches proposed in this article were impractical not because of the
barriers posed by legal doctrine but because of the practical limits of
judicial resources. He specifically noted the long line of pending cases in
the Southern District of New York that are not high-stakes mass torts or
investor class actions but that nonetheless require equal consideration from
the court.436 Even the federal court located in the epicenter of American
commerce and litigation must deal with “minor” criminal matters,
landlord-tenant disputes, student-loan delinquency, and the like. In this
environment, he noted, there are practical limits on the opportunities for
trial judges to entertain or craft new, creative, hybridized approaches to
class treatment of cases.
Without doubt, Judge Lynch’s point has merit. In the real world, formal
approaches and the status quo doctrine are the norm in part because this is
the path of least resistance for overburdened courts437 that must process a
large and eclectic mix of cases with efficiency, in light of budgetary and
resource constraints. Unless a court is strongly motivated to work against
the tide to provide class treatment or is pushed in that direction by very
effective class counsel (who in most cases will be met with an equal and
opposite reaction from defense counsel and thus be largely neutralized), an
academic proposal for more expansive approaches to class treatment may
be more likely than most academic proposals to remain an academic
proposal.
But if the judicial system surmounts the politics and sociology of
inertia, my own prediction is that the approaches suggested in this article
would make the problem of constrained judicial resources better rather
than worse, perhaps providing ancillary benefits in areas outside classaction litigation. For example, a cadre of special masters capable of
deployment in service to the courts would presumably ease the burden on
judges simply through the addition of more personnel alone. In addition, to
the extent that these masters are delegated tasks that are time consuming
but do not involve core adjudicative functions, this should give Article III
judges more time for reflection as to case management and the structuring
of disputes before the court. Greater use of issue certification pursuant to
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) could well make large, complex cases more manageable

436. Hon. Gerard Lynch, Remarks at ILEP Conference (Panel III) (Apr. 8, 2005).
437. It may also even bring sound, perhaps even optimal results, notwithstanding my criticism to
the contrary. I take pains to note that I am extrapolating from Judge Lynch’s comments in ways with
which he might well disagree.
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by dividing them for conquest, or could at least provide more expeditious
and calibrated preparation for settlement by the parties. Sampling and
statistical analysis (especially if it need not be done from the ground up by
the judge) could avoid, shorten, or streamline trials and hearings.
Even the best of reform proposals normally require adequate
institutional commitment if they are to succeed. This article’s suggestions,
perhaps being something less than the “best” of proposals, while still, I
hope, “good” proposals, will need institutional support and financing as
well.438 Ultimately, improved use of expanded class treatment depends on
the electoral political system as much as it depends on the judicial system.
But, at least during the past decade, the political arena has not been a
friendly environ for class actions.
CONCLUSION: AN EQUILIBRIUM OPPORTUNITY FOR A FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO CLASS TREATMENT
Class actions have been maimed but not killed by the past ten years of
backlash against them. In particular, investor class actions retain
considerable vitality in spite of the PSLRA. But class treatment remains
underutilized in ways that tend to reduce legal deterrence and
undercompensate victims of “small wrongs.” This presents a problem that
the judicial system can ignore or insist on “solving” only through specific
legislation or Rule 23 revision.439 Alternatively, the judicial system can
address these problems itself by taking a more encouraging approach to

438. Although my suggestions will result in an increase in the judicial branch payroll, I dispute
any suggestion that they will raise net social costs. That remains to be seen and will vary according to
the effectiveness with which the expanded approaches to class treatment improve adjudication and
serve the public-policy purposes of the substantive law. If they do, this should reduce the degree to
which tortfeasors and those committing securities law violations externalize the costs of their conduct
on victims or society generally. For example, if a tortfeasor or its insurer does not compensate the
victim, society might do so through government aid programs. If securities fraud is unpunished, it not
only may beget more such fraud but will impose costs on those adversely impacted. It may well be
cheaper in totality to expend more resources on judicial activity in order to reduce costs imposed on
society by private parties and to force those parties to provide compensation to the injured.
439. And I am by no means against a revision of Rule 23 to expand its use. Some of the recent
amendments to Rule 23 regarding interlocutory appeal and settlement have, in my view, been useful
developments. But as a practical matter, it will be hard to develop the substantive professional
consensus for an expanded Rule 23 and to obtain agreement on specific language. For example, a
promising draft proposal of the 1990s was not implemented. See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux:
Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79 (1994). To a large degree, this is a function
of not only ideological and political division within the bar but also the degree to which context is so
important to determining proper treatment of class claims. Consequently, the area will always be
heavily vested with judicial discretion. I am simply arguing for moving exercise of that discretion in a
direction of greater receptiveness toward class treatment, notwithstanding some of the current backlash
against class actions.
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class treatment of matters and resolution of class claims, as suggested in
this article. More specifically, I am suggesting that courts exercise their
discretion and flexibility in favor of more class treatment rather than less
and that courts adopt a less formalist and more functionalist approach to
class claims.
Although the distinction is necessarily oversimplified, as a general
matter, two central strands of thought in the law are the formalist and the
functionalist (often labeled “instrumentalist”). Under a formalist approach,
correct legal decisions are determined by pre-existing ground rules,
usually as expressed in legislation and judicial precedents setting
forth rules of legal doctrine. A formalist court faced with
interpretive issues attempts to reach its decision solely by logical
deduction, applying pre-existing legal rules to the facts of a
particular case. From the general rule, the formalist [court] reaches
a specific resolution of the case before [the court].
Under this formalistic theory, the law is viewed as a complete
and autonomous system of logical principles and rules, where the
judge applies the law and remains socially neutral. Formalists view
this approach as a matter of logical necessity rather than a matter of
choice.
....
Accordingly, formalist judges generally apply the philosophy of
judicial restraint, in favor of established legislative and
administrative authority.440
Formalism also frequently operates in tandem with a restrained,
textualist approach toward interpreting statutes, rules, regulations,
contracts or other documents.441 The formalist-textualist tends to read rules
and statutes narrowly, sometimes even hyperliterally, to preclude relief
requested, to refuse to excuse a deviation, or to otherwise limit judicial
involvement.442 Although it is comparatively rare, a formalist-textualist

440. FISCHER ET AL., supra note 316, § 2.03[A] (citations omitted).
441. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (reviewing
textualism in statutory interpretation and treating it as a formalist enterprise); Daniel A. Farber, The
Inevitablity of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533
(1992) (countering formalist approaches to statutory interpretation with practical reason model of
interpretation).
442. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (adopting similar narrow
view of the scope of section 1—that it only applies to workers directly involved in interstate
transportation of goods, thus essentially mooting the importance of Gilmer); Gilmer v.
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could be expansive rather than restrictive in approaching legal questions,
perhaps the best example being Justice Hugo Black’s absolutist views on
the First Amendment.443 In addition, formalist analysis may be seen as
more theoretical and less pragmatic,444 or more deductive and less
inductive.445

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that broker employee’s required assent to
Stock Exchange arbitration agreement was not part of his “contract of employment” and hence was not
subject to statutory provision in 9 U.S.C. § 1 stating that arbitration agreements are not enforceable if
contained in contract of employment); United States v. Locke. 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (strictly interpreting
statute requiring mining claims to be renewed “prior to December 31” to preclude renewal where
application was made on December 31, thereby divesting family of gravel mining rights they had
exercised for more than twenty years); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982)
(rigidly imposing per diem damages provision of Jones Act with result that seaman deprived of ten
days’ wages received award of more than $300,000 due to long duration of litigation; the result could
be defended as necessary to vindicate the purpose of the Jones Act but the Court instead took a
formalist-textualist approach); Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare Systems of Pa., Inc., 797 A.2d 346 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002) (rejecting doctors’ action against insurance company for extremely slow payments
under insurance agreement, taking view that since contract does not state that payments must be made
within a reasonable time, insurer is permitted complete latitude as to when to pay physicians); see
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259).
443. Justice Black took the position that the words “Congress shall make no law” operated as an
absolute prohibition on any restrictions on freedom of speech or the press and was unwilling to engage
in examination of historical factors or balancing of interests in First Amendment matters. See HOWARD
BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AND
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 10, 138 (1992).
Among other prominent jurists, Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit occasionally
appears to take this approach in reading a text broadly and absolutely to overpower a state law or
practice. See, e.g. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a
constitutional “right to die” based on insufficient justification for government interference with
personal liberty, privacy, dignity, and freedom), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997) (holding that assisted suicide is not fundamental liberty interest protected by Due Process
Clause).
Among academics, one finds some of this same broad formalist-textualism in the writings of
Ronald Dworkin and Akhil Amar. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 160 (1986) (“Pragmatism is
a skeptical conception of law because it rejects genuine, nonstrategic legal rights.”); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801–11 (1994) (arguing that the Framers
intended the Fourth Amendment to embody a reasonableness requirement for all government
evidence-gathering activity).
This type of expansive formalist-textualism is in general a more “liberal” formalist-textualism as
contrasted to something like the conservative formalist-textualism of Justices Scalia and Thomas, but
like so much other general legal description, it is an oversimplification. Justice Black’s views would
presumably have put him in the camp of jurists opposed to government regulation of “hate speech,” a
type of limitation on expression normally supported by political liberals. My larger point is that
formalist textualism, whether applied with a liberal or conservative slant, is generally a less useful
interpretative mode than functionalism.
444. See Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 393
(2004).
445. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998). See also Frank Easterbrook,
Formalism, Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13 (1998); Peter B.
McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional
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In tension with the formalist approach, which continues to reign as the
dominant approach and what most observers deem “legal reasoning,” is
the “countervailing school of American jurisprudence” that is willing to
depart from precedent and literal application of rules in cases where such
departure is justified by other factors, such as the policy underlying the
respective area of law, the social facts of the matter, and the practical
impact that will be felt by exercise of any of a court’s various options for
adjudicating the dispute.446 The non-formalist approach, or portions of it,
travels under names such as Instrumentalism, Legal Realism, or Legal
Pragmatism, but Legal Functionalism seems to me to best capture the
concept.447 “Put another way, where legal formalism emphasized logic,
precedent, text, legal functionalism emphasizes sociology, party intent,
and . . . purpose as well as social and individual expectations.”448
As is apparent by this point of this article, I am a proud functionalist,
generally advocating this approach as the preferred method of addressing
any legal problem. A few caveats are in order, however. My concept of
functionalism is one in which formal norms set parameters on the types of
functional decision-making that may be undertaken by a court. Linked to
this is the notion that even well-reasoned sociological arguments cannot
overcome clear positive-law directives such as the Constitution, a statute,
longstanding settled judicial precedent and, of course, procedural rules
such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. To the extent that clear
positive law forecloses the expanded class treatment I advocate in this
article, the expansion cannot occur. For example, the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,449 unless
subsequently modified, would preclude some—but by no means all—
functional approaches to expanded class treatment proposed in this article,
at least as to loss-causation questions presented in Rule 10b-5 claims.450
But being bound by clear authoritative text is not the same thing as
giving a crabbed or hyperliteral reading to the text. To be bound by
positive law is not the same thing as to be enslaved by traditional thinking
on a subject. So long as functionalism does not become partisan straining
in service of a personal policy preference (as opposed to a widely

Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987).
446. FISCHER ET AL., supra note 316, § 2.03[B].
447. Id.
448. FISCHER ET AL., supra note 316, § 2.03[B]. Accord Sward, supra note 444, at 393–94.
449. 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
450. See supra text accompanying notes 206–300 (discussing Dura Pharmaceuticals).
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recognized public policy), it is legitimate legal functionalism to attempt to
avoid undue constraints in the use of Rule 23. Although functionalism
traditionally and today takes a comparative back seat to law’s normal
preference for formalism, there is ample support for functionalist
approaches throughout the mainstream legal community, with many
contending that functionalist/pragmatist approaches in fact dominate, but
do so sub silentio.451 The same Supreme Court that was in my view
crabbed and formalist in Dura Pharmaceuticals also decided a number of
cases in the same term through functional analysis.452
Another circadian rhythm of the law is a drive toward equilibrium
between the various polar opposites of law vying for dominance: stability
and change; rights of plaintiffs and rights of defendants; text and context;
duty and freedom; rights and responsibilities; deterrence of wrongdoing;
inducement of care; facilitation of economic activity; and so on. The
judicial system, through both the conscious and subconscious decisions of
judges and policymakers, strives for equilibrium in a manner that mutes
the largest potential impact of new developments or seeks to restore
balance when the respective power of litigants or approaches has become
lopsided.453

451. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing for idea of
liberal state based on pragmatic theories of government); THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW
ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (arguing that dominant
theme in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been cautious and pragmatic functionalism).
452. See, e.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005) (holding that Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) were not part of debtor’s estate even though they were in theory funds available on
demand due to practical impediment to withdrawals before age fifty-nine and a half because of
substantial penalties for early withdrawal); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (permitting
disparate-impact claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act even though such claims not
expressly authorized in ADEA because of similarity to Title VII, which recognizes such actions, and
because it serves functional policy purpose of ADEA); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167 (2005) (permitting action under Title IX for retaliation by male high school coach who
complained of school’s neglect of girls sports); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding
execution of juveniles unconstitutional in part because of research establishing differences between
adult and juvenile cognition, impulse control, and ability to appreciate consequences of acts).
All of these cases showing more of a functional or policy-purposivist orientation by the court were
decided within a month of the more formalist Dura Pharmaceuticals decision. But see Commissioner
v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (taking more formalist approach in holding that entire amount
recovered by discrimination plaintiff must be treated as gross income for tax purposes notwithstanding
that plaintiff is obligated to pay one-third of recovery to attorney pursuant to contingent fee
agreement). Both formalism and functionalism appear to be alive and well at the U.S. Supreme Court
and undoubtedly throughout the legal system. Although formalism may be dominant, it is not alldominant.
453. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 757 (2004) (arguing that courts have rediscovered unconscionability as a defense to contract
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Class actions have been under attack of sorts for more than ten years.
Although the assault has been only partially successful, use of class
treatment has been restrained and even discouraged by the combination of
the PSLRA, adverse court decisions, ongoing political criticism, and
CAFA. Although these efforts are not all strictly “anti-class action” and
arguably have had some salutatory effect on class actions, the net effect
has been law reform in the direction of restricting class treatment rather
than expanding it.
At this juncture, some equilibrium adjustment is arguably in order.
Despite the past ten years of largely anti-class effort, class actions have
retained vitality and continue in frequent use. But class actions have been
set back and remain underutilized. Class treatment could be given to a
significant number of mass torts and to investor claims in which it is now
severely limited or denied altogether. Courts taking a more flexible
approach could restore equilibrium by making it easier to provide society
with the benefits of class treatment in ways that do not invite the types of
purported class abuses that animated passage of the PSLRA and CAFA.
Taking a more flexible approach to class actions and restoring
equilibrium would provide the advantages of vindicating small claims,
encouraging apt corporate behavior, and deterring wrongdoing in a manner
designed to be less costly than traditional, stand-alone individual litigation.
Such efforts would seem particularly in order for investor class actions,
which tend not to present some of the problems commonly associated with
mass tort class actions. Unless one embraces corporate immunity as a
greater goal, the type of incremental, cautious expansion of class treatment
urged in this article would appear to be a clear improvement over the
status quo. At the very least, our jurisprudence of class treatment should
not foreclose the effort.
The modern class action is now nearly forty years old. When
promulgated in 1966, Rule 23 was surrounded by an atmosphere of
optimism for legal and government enterprise. Lyndon Johnson’s “Great
Society” and “War on Poverty”454 and the Warren Court’s expansion of

enforcement in response to shift in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements, requiring courts to give
greater scrutiny to unconscionability issues presented in arbitration clauses). A similar form of
equilibrium analysis has been applied to assess Supreme Court decision-making, William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994), and retroactive
application of judicial decisions, Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1997).
454. See BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM: A BRIEF
BIOGRAPHY WITH DOCUMENTS (1995).
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civil rights455 were contemporaries to the Advisory Committee’s
movement in favor of the more forceful class-action rule that was intended
to provide voice to those who might otherwise not have it and to deter
wrongdoers who previously were effectively insulated from responsibility
by the economics of disputing.
Rule 23 was promulgated in an atmosphere of optimism regarding the
legal system’s ability to help. That optimism has waned and been to a
degree replaced by far more limited notions as to what class actions can
accomplish and whether they are a net good for society. Although starryeyed optimism can be as much the foe of progress as any reactionary, there
is a difference between tempering optimism with realism and having
optimism descend into pessimism or cynicism. The fortieth anniversary of
the modern class action provides a good juncture for taking stock and
correcting course to recapture some of the optimism about and potential
for class treatment of claims.

455. The most widely known examples are the Warren Court’s expansion of the rights of criminal
suspects and defendants. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964). But this rights revolution was hardly confined to criminal law. See, e.g., Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that First Amendment permits high
school student to wear black armband to school in protest of Vietnam War notwithstanding school
dress code); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that state legislative apportionment must not
dilute voter strength, effectively liberating states from control by rural minority of population).

